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Abstract 
With lessons learned from the 1999 Kosovo intervention as a point of departure, this 
thesis addresses the question of whether the development of the Responsibility to 
Protect (RtoP) doctrine and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
actually made a difference in determining whether and how Europe responded to 
subsequent mass atrocities in its neighbourhood. Viewing the RtoP as an emerging 
international norm, a social constructivist framework is applied to explore the 
influence of norms on European foreign policy-making. It is argued that even an 
emerging international norm can be influential if it is considered a legitimate 
behavioural claim. The influence of the RtoP will be assessed by gauging the extent 
to which it is distinctively used to justify foreign policy decisions and to 
communicate the basis for those choices to a wider audience. The development of the 
RtoP and the CSDP from 1999-2011 in theory and practice paves the way for an in-
depth case study analysis. Focusing on the UN, the EU as well as French, German 
and British discourses, the question of whether the RtoP has actually made a 
difference will be answered by scrutinizing European responses to the Libyan crisis 
(March – October 2011) and the Syrian crisis (March 2011 – September 2013). 
Ultimately, light is shed not only on the relevance of the RtoP for Europe but also on 
the role of the EU as a security actor in its neighbourhood. 
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Preface 
This study was conducted within the framework of the Marie Curie Initial Training 
Network EXACT (EU External Action) under the 7th Framework Programme of the 
European Commission from October 2010 to September 2013. The stated aim of the 
programme was to  
critically examine EU External Action and its respective institutional 
architecture from a global perspective. This policy domain is one of the 
most challenging and significant fields of theory-led and empirically 
based research for scholars engaged in research focusing on foreign 
policy, international relations and European integration. (EXACT 
website, www.exact-training.net, 11 January 2014) 
The initial title of my Ph.D. project, when applying for the EXACT programme in 
January 2010, was “Human security on the EU foreign policy agenda, Strategic 
concepts of EU conflict prevention and crisis management in traditional and new 
fields of security policy”. In my proposal, I had planned to analyse the utility of the 
human security concept in various areas of EU External Action (security and 
defence, trade, development and environmental policy). Soon I realised not only that 
my project was too broad and too ambitious, but also that operationalising the 
concept of human security bore more theoretical and analytical challenges than 
originally expected. 
Since the start of the EXACT programme in October 2010, my research topic has 
changed substantially. Inspired by political debates and events surrounding the Arab 
Spring since December 2010 and my work at the FIIA in Helsinki and TEPSA in 
Brussels, the focus of my study shifted towards the relevance and the application of 
the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in European foreign policies as well as its link to 
human security. This change allowed me to look at a very topical debate while 
keeping my initial interest in conducting a PhD: the question of whether the 
academic debates on a changed conception of security and the shift from state to 
human security after the end of the Cold War had an actual impact on practice and 
policy-making. Without facing the challenge of operationalising the concept of 
 
  viii 
human security I would still be able to assess its potential political impact in the form 
of the RtoP. 
This study aimed to address EXACT research topic 3 on the European/ Common 
Security and Defence Policy of the EU. Research topic 3 stipulated the engagement 
with the following: 
Although the central domain of so called “high politics”, defence 
cooperation has seen increasing activity at the European level. … The 
policy domain however suffers both from deeply entrenched differences 
in opinion between the member states about appropriate fora for the 
formulation of defence policy as well as immense differences in military 
capabilities among the member states. … EXACT… endeavours to 
apply a diverse set of theoretical approaches to the study of this area, 
including neo-institutionalist and constructivist approaches. (Official 
EXACT website, www.exact-training.net/ field of research) 
In order to analyse the influence of the RtoP on European security and defence 
policies in response to mass atrocities this study has adopted a social constructivist 
approach. The focus is thus less on why the EU and its member states (re-)acted in a 
certain way but more on how European foreign policies are constructed. The extent 
to which member states are willing to cooperate within the EU framework in the area 
of military intervention plays thus a crucial role in the analysis. The question and 
approach chosen for this study therefore fit the purposes of the EXACT programme. 
Against this background, the following thesis seeks to make not only a theoretical 
contribution in studying EU external action from a social constructivist perspective 
but the empirical findings on European responses to crises in its neighbourhood are 
also of relevance to the ‘real world’. 
Participating in the EXACT programme has been a unique and much appreciated 
experience. I would therefore like to thank the coordinating institution of the 
programme, the Jean Monnet Chair of Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels at the University 
of Cologne, Wulf Reiners and his team particularly, as well as the whole EXACT 
consortium.   
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Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Introduction  1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The repeated horror of mass atrocities has been one of the most disconcerting 
developments in human history. It was not until after the cruelty of the Holocaust 
that the international community was compelled to make assurances aimed at ending 
suffering more seriously. Yet, the international community showed little commitment 
to the proclamation made after the Second World War of “Never Again” to 
genocide1 in the decades that followed. By contrast, states stood by and watched 
tragedies such as the ethnic cleansing of Bosnians by the Serbs and the mass 
slaughter of the Tutsi population by the Hutus in Rwanda throughout the 1990s. 
Reaching the climax of the inability and/or failure of the international community to 
prevent or halt such events, it was during the 1999 crisis in Kosovo that the former 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote a landmark article in which he essentially 
challenged the traditional view on state sovereignty and the non-intervention 
principle, claiming that the principle of sovereignty contained in the UN Charter 
should be re-interpreted as a responsibility to protect individuals (Bellamy, 2011). 
Although arguably acting to stop mass atrocities, the Kosovo intervention by NATO 
revealed a mismatch between the aspirations of prevention, on one hand, and the 
number and capabilities of the troops that were actually employed, on the other. At 
the same time, post-Cold War security challenges and institutional shifts inside 
NATO, highlighted by the Kosovo crisis, initiated a fundamental rethinking of the 
role and the responsibility not only of the international community but also of the 
European Union (EU). Europe’s inability to stop mass atrocities in its direct 
neighbourhood served as a wake-up call for the EU to meet the expectations and 
responsibilities set out in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) not only 
on a rhetorical level but also in practice.2 The subsequent construction of the 
                                                
1 The proclamation of “Never Again” after the Second World War was codified in the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 9 December 1948 as General Assembly Resolution 260. 
2 Since the Maastricht Treaty, one of the main objectives of the EU is “to assert its identity on the 
international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy 
including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common 
defence” (Article B, TEU Maastricht). 
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Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)3 and the EU’s reasoning on its 
responsibility to act externally were to some extent affected by the predominant 
discourse on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), taking place at the United Nations 
(UN).  
At the UN World Summit on 14 September 2005, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair 
(2005) stated on behalf of the EU: 
The EU strongly welcomes the agreement on the responsibility to 
protect. We cannot stand by as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
or other gross violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights are committed. The primary responsibility for the protection of 
populations lies first and foremost with each individual state, as the 
Outcome Document recognises. However, where the state in question is 
unable or unwilling to do so, the international community can and 
should act through a comprehensive range of measures, including 
collective action through the Security Council, and in extreme cases, 
and out of necessity, by use of force, authorised by the Security 
Council. International recognition of this is an important step forward. 
Given EU member states’ different historical backgrounds and capabilities, one 
might be sceptical that this rhetorical statement constituted a genuine commitment to 
follow through with the commitment of troops and resources that the implementation 
of the concept might demand. Significantly, more than a decade after its failures in 
the Balkans and the Kosovo crisis, the EU still appears unable to prevent or halt mass 
atrocities from occurring in its neighbourhood, as the crises in Libya and Syria have 
shown since 2011. Legitimately, the question that arises is whether the development 
of the RtoP and the establishment of the CSDP have changed anything. In this 
context, this thesis aims to investigate the influence of the RtoP as an emerging 
                                                
3 When created in 1999 this policy was labelled the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 it was renamed in Common Security Defence 
Policy (CSDP). The latter term is used consistently throughout this thesis even if referring to earlier 
stages in the European integration process. 
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international norm on European policy responses to crises involving mass atrocities 
in its neighbourhood. Furthermore, it will analyse whether the RtoP in connection to 
the creation of the CSDP has had an impact on the EU’s role as a security actor. In 
doing so, this study aims to make a small yet original contribution in four areas 
addressing a set of rather distinct literatures. 
The underlying research interest behind this thesis derives from the rise of debates 
since the end of the Cold War about the changing nature of security, the development 
of human security, and its actual effects on the foreign policy of states and other 
actors in the international system. A central argument to this study is that the RtoP’s 
potential to make a difference in policy responses to mass atrocities derives from its 
roots in the concept of human security. Speaking to the human security, RtoP and 
humanitarian intervention literature, the analysis conducted here aims, first of all, to 
provide fresh insights into the policy impact of human security as well as on the 
relationship between human security and RtoP. 
Second, this thesis seeks to enhance the understanding of the relevance of the RtoP 
for the development of the EU’s CSDP and its practical application. On this note, the 
EU will be treated as potential norm entrepreneur for the RtoP on one hand and as 
potential security actor influenced by the RtoP as an emerging international norm on 
the other. Furthermore, the empirical analysis of European crisis responses also aims 
at providing an overview of single member states’ interpretations of the RtoP and its 
impact on Europe more broadly.  
Conceptualising the RtoP as an emerging international norm and analysing its 
influence on actual political behaviour speaks, thirdly, to the scholarly body on 
(international) norms. It is argued that independent of their label and status, also 
emerging international norms can have an impact if they are seen as a legitimate 
behavioural claim. On this basis, this thesis aspires to contribute not only to the 
discussion on the influence of norms but also on what constitutes a norm. 
Finally, providing a detailed empirical analysis of European responses to the crisis in 
Libya and in Syria since 2011, the research results of this study can also be of 
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practical value. Insights on how and in what circumstances the RtoP is used to 
legitimise a specific policy response can be relevant to future cases of mass 
atrocities. Furthermore, the extent to which member states are willing to cooperate 
within the EU framework on security and defence in response to a concrete crisis can 
provide evidence on the practical relevance of the EU as a security actor. 
This introductory chapter will provide further details on the relevance of addressing 
the influence of the RtoP on European foreign policy as well as on the contributions 
this study intends to make. Against this background it will introduce the theoretical 
analytical framework applied throughout the empirical analysis. The following 
section begins by highlighting the development of and the link between human 
security and the RtoP. The relevance of the RtoP for the development of a common 
European security and defence policy and the role of the EU as a security actor will 
be discussed in section 2. It also sets the theoretical groundwork of this study and 
discusses the concept of the RtoP as an emerging international norm as well as its 
scope. Against this background, section 3 defines the main research question, sets out 
the main line of argumentation and introduces the approach used to tackle the 
expressed research problem. The chapter concludes with a brief synopsis of the 
study’s structure and the main themes addressed.  
1.1 Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect 
Tragedies such as the mass slaughter of the Tutsi population by the Hutus in Rwanda 
in 1994 and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnians by Serbs in 1995 challenged traditional 
security thinking. One result was the development of the human security concept. 
What was new in this context was the changing and deepening of perspective from 
an exclusively state-based conception of collective security to a people- and 
community-centred definition of human security.  
Since the inception of human security in the 1994 UNDP Human Development 
Report, an extensive body of literature has emerged to define and operationalise the 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
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concept.4 However, almost two decades later there is still no agreement either 
amongst scholars or policy-makers on what human security genuinely means and 
what it implies (Alcalde and Bouchard, 2008; Bellamy and McDonald, 2002; 
Chandler, 2008). Nevertheless, the concept has been linked to a number of 
international policy initiatives such as the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines 
and child soldiers, the regulation of the international arms trade as well as the 
Responsibility to Protect.  
The existing literature shows that human security has an influence on national and 
international discourses on these highly sensitive security issues (Alkire, 2003; 
Krause, 2007). The question, however, of whether the concept has a genuine impact 
on policy – as opposed to mere rhetoric – is still unexplored. While human security 
has rightly been criticized for its theoretical vagueness and incoherence (Chandler, 
2008; Thomas and Tow, 2002), providing an analytical answer to the question of its 
policy relevance is not an easy task.  
Keith Krause (2007: 4-5) has argued that it is only possible to link human security to 
specific policy areas when focusing on a narrow definition of the concept limiting it 
to its ‘freedom of fear’ component.5 The ‘freedom from fear’ approach seeks to limit 
the practice of human security to protecting individuals from violent conflicts. With 
its focus on the protection of civilians, human security can be seen as the underlying 
framework of the RtoP. In this context, human security can be understood as putting 
people’s security concerns first, while at the same time aiming to prevent the use of 
power to threaten it. 
The debate on the RtoP was launched under the aegis of United Nations Secretary 
General (UNSG) Kofi Annan (2000), in order to be able to respond to future cases 
akin to “Rwanda or Srebrenica – to gross and systematic human rights violations that 
affect every precept of our common humanity”. Adopted during the UN World 
                                                
4 For a detailed overview of the state of the art of human security, see Alkire, 2003. 
5 According to the 1994 UNDP Report human security refers to both the ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘the 
freedom from want’. While the former is defined as the freedom from violent threats to individuals’ 
physical well being, the latter includes threats such as hunger, disease and natural disasters. 
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Summit in September 2005, the RtoP developed the older norm of humanitarian 
intervention6 further in three ways (Thakur, 2006). First, RtoP placed more emphasis 
on the primary responsibility of the state to protect its citizens. Second, RtoP 
introduced a range of non-coercive means (e.g. diplomacy, humanitarian aid, 
sanctions and legal instruments) to be exhausted before considering the use of 
military force. Third, RtoP introduced the novel idea that the international 
community could and should use force (if necessary) to enforce the norm that states 
had a responsibility to protect their own citizens.  
Humanitarian intervention was linked to the notion of states having a ‘right to 
intervene’ and therefore entailed the ‘fear of domination’ based on the dynamics of 
international power politics (idem). On the other hand, by taking into account the 
changing security concept from state to human security, RtoP promoted the notion of 
states having a ‘responsibility to protect’ people from mass atrocities (Evans, 2006: 
708). The RtoP thus aimed to shift the perspective of intervention from the 
prospective interveners to those in need of support (Thakur, 2006).  
Although the notion of humanitarian intervention is understood as reflecting state 
security and national interests more strongly, its humanitarian dimension is not 
dismissed altogether. While the lines between humanitarian intervention, human 
security and the RtoP can at times be unclear, this thesis builds on the argument that 
RtoP as a newly emerging international norm can potentially make a change in 
practice in comparison to its predecessor. This potential for change rests on the 
practical application of human security and the implementation of policies genuinely 
designed to protect civilians possibly precluding and following up a military 
intervention with non-coercive means, such as preventive sanctions, diplomacy, 
humanitarian aid and legal instruments as well as reconstruction and transition 
support. 
                                                
6 Humanitarian intervention has been defined as “the use of force against a territorial state by another 
state or a collective group of states, with or without authorisation from the UNSC for the promotion or 
protection of basic human rights of individuals other than intervening states’ own citizens, without the 
permission from the territorial state within whose border the use of force takes place” (Holzgrefe, 
2003: 15). 
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Against this background, the underlying aim of this thesis is to assess the policy 
impact of human security in the form of the emerging international norm of the RtoP. 
If the RtoP has an impact, a change in the design and the direction of policies taking 
into account the human security concept should be visible. However, if the new norm 
and the people-centred perspective are merely reflected in the discourse while 
policies focus almost exclusively on the use of military force, the impact of the RtoP 
remains superficial. Focussing on the actual policy impact of human security in the 
form of the RtoP aims at filling a gap in existing research.  
Moreover, this thesis will provide fresh insights on the relationship between human 
security and the RtoP. After the Libyan intervention in 2011 the RtoP has become 
increasingly linked to the question of military intervention. Human security 
proponents such as Mary Kaldor (2012) and others have argued that a no-fly zone is 
not the right instrument to provide protection for civilians on the ground. 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that the military operation in Libya went beyond 
the UN mandate by extending air strikes to non-military areas in order to achieve a 
regime change. In the case of Syria, the RtoP only started to play a dominant role in 
European discourses once the US President Barack Obama threatened to use military 
force in Syria after the chemical weapon attacks in August 2013. The international as 
well as the European discourse crystallized around the need to punish the Syrian 
government for the alleged crimes rather than protecting the Syrian population. 
Throughout this study, we will be alert to the possibility that, perhaps ironically, the 
RtoP in practice has actually undermined the human security concept instead of 
respected it.  
One way to combat the misuse of emerging international norms such as the RtoP and 
to increase its collective understanding can be via the activities of a norm 
entrepreneur. Within the existing literature on international norms, norm 
entrepreneurs play a crucial role in determining the extent to which an international 
norm is influential (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896). The goal of norm 
entrepreneurs is to make decision-makers perceive the proposed norm as legitimate 
and appropriate. With the aim of assessing the influence of the RtoP on European 
foreign policy-making, the EU will be considered as potential norm entrepreneur 
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affecting the collective understanding of the RtoP within the European context. At 
the same time, it is assumed that the RtoP can in return have an impact on the EU’s 
role as a security actor. 
1.2 Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
A basic commitment to a broad definition of human security can be seen in Article 
21 of the Treaty on European Union, which spells out the general provisions of the 
EU’s external action. It lists among other objectives the strengthening of 
international security, the consolidation and support of democracy, rule of law, and 
human rights and reinforcing the principles of international law. The European 
Security Strategy (2003) embraced the human security perspective in addition to a 
traditional state-centric view. It emphasized the notion of people-centred solutions 
combined with cooperative engagement. The Report on the Implementation of the 
ESS (2008), which aimed at reinforcing the previous strategy, reflected the human 
security concept more explicitly:  
…the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked 
to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting 
good governance and human rights, assisting development, and 
addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity (Report on the 
ESS, 2008). 
On the EU’s role in crisis management the Report affirmed: 
We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities 
in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based 
approach coherent with the concept of human security (idem). 
Although the Implementation Report could be seen as a breakthrough in the 
institutionalisation of human security within the EU, little attention was actually 
given to defining it as a core narrative (Kaldor et al, 2007: 274). Within the EU 
foreign policy discourse and particularly in the area of security and defence, human 
security has rarely been adopted unambiguously. It has, however, been argued that 
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the EU is actually ‘doing’ human security, yet, without explicitly using the term in its 
official language and documents (idem). 
A joint EU position on the RtoP was adopted at the 2005 UN World Summit, with 
the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw (2005), declaring on behalf of the EU that, 
“the EU welcomes the unprecedented recognition of the international community’s 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or 
crimes against humanity”. The EU underlined that only if diplomatic and 
humanitarian measures do not show any immediate effect, it lies with the authority of 
the UNSC to permit enforcement measures as a last resort. On this note, the EU also 
emphasised the importance of the prevention of mass atrocities as part of the RtoP.  
Since the endorsement of the RtoP during the 2005 UN World Summit, the EU had 
been an active promoter of the newly emerging international norm. The 2008 
Implementation Report reaffirms: 
Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of 
their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. 
The construction of the CSDP was not only influenced by the EU’s failures in the 
Balkans throughout the 1990s and NATO’s post-Cold War transformation, but was 
also informed by the development of the RtoP as emerging new international norm 
(Barnutz, 2010). The influence of the RtoP on the CSDP becomes evident in three 
respects. First, the EU developed the CSDP on the basis of a perceived responsibility 
to act externally in the area of security. Second, the type of intervention that has 
significantly shaped the role of the EU as a security actor is the use of force to 
prevent or halt mass atrocities. The crises around which the EU has designed its 
CSDP are mostly those with a humanitarian dimension (Lucarelli and Menotti, 2006: 
148).  
Third, the development of the RtoP on the UN level influenced the EU’s reasoning 
on its international responsibility. The people-centred focus of external EU policies 
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is influenced by the debate on the RtoP. According to Ian Manners (2006: 192), “the 
centrality of the concept of human rights and RtoP for EU policies is apparent in the 
EU’s external action”. According to Article 21 (TEU), the EU’s external action shall 
be based on the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law. 
In this context the EU faces a two-fold dilemma between its aspirations to be a 
‘normative power’ (Manners, 2000; 2002) and its commitment to multilateralism on 
one hand and its role as a security actor and its approach to the use of force and 
military interventions to prevent or halt mass atrocities on the other. As a normative 
power, the EU promotes the RtoP by invoking its international commitment and by 
the power of example. If successful as norm entrepreneur, the EU can influence what 
kind of crisis response is appropriate and legitimate. Yet, the EU seems to subscribe 
to an interpretation of the RtoP that emphasises the responsibility to prevent and 
conveys the understanding that force should be used only in rare and clearly defined 
circumstances. EU interventions, therefore, have more frequently taken the form of 
economic and political reconstruction and peacekeeping through presence on the 
ground. Furthermore, the geographical area of intervention has been limited to the 
EU’s neighbourhood as evidenced by both actual performance and the European 
Security Strategy’s prescription that interventions should only take place in a legal 
framework.  
The EU’s understanding of its international responsibility is, however, not only 
influenced by the development of the RtoP but also relates to the availability of its 
security and defence capabilities. Despite the development of the CSDP and the 
establishment of civilian as well as military crisis management capabilities, the EU is 
still reliant on NATO or US assets and structures when it comes to military 
interventions. Member states remain the key actors within the CSDP and security and 
defence issues are therefore subject to intergovernmental decision-making. The 
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extent to which the EU is able to react in response to mass atrocities with military 
means depends thus largely on the political will of the member states7 to cooperate 
under the EU framework. The EU’s understanding of the RtoP as well as its role as a 
normative power, acting with primarily civilian means, convey the image of a 
reluctant security actor that is dependent on the peculiar institutional structure of EU 
foreign policy dominated by intergovernmental decision-making.  
Finally, the increasing link of the RtoP to the use of force in recent crises, such as in 
Libya and Syria since 2011, might have influenced the EU in the opposite direction. 
Understanding its responsibility more in terms of prevention and assistance, while 
lacking the capabilities to undertake a military intervention on its own, the recent 
application of the RtoP might have made the EU an even more reluctant security 
actor. Consequently, the EU has become more averse to promoting the emerging 
international norm in response to mass atrocities in its neighbourhood. In contrast to 
the well-known ‘capability-expectations gap’8 (Smith, 1993) that is said to plague the 
EU’s foreign policy, there might yet be a convergence between the EU’s 
understanding of its responsibility and its capabilities.  
Having outlined the EU’s understanding of the RtoP as an emerging international 
norm, the question arises on what kind of theoretical basis it is possible to assess the 
influence of the RtoP on the EU’s foreign policy on one hand and the EU’s possible 
role as a norm entrepreneur for the RtoP on the other. The nature of EU foreign 
policy and the influence of international norms more general therein can be 
explained from different theoretical angles. The research interest behind this thesis is 
less to answer the question of why European actors respond (or not) to mass 
atrocities in their neighbourhood but rather to explain how these responses became 
                                                
7 The “political will” of the member states should not be seen as an all-encompassing explanation for 
the impact of the CSDP in practice. Yet, as they remain the key actors within the CSDP, the question 
of whether member states are willing to act under the EU framework when applying the RtoP in 
practice can reveal crucial insights on the role of the EU as a security actor. 
8 Analysing the international role of the EU, Christopher Hill (1993) identified a gap between what the 
EU promised to do on paper and what it was actually able to do in practice. In this context he 
conceptualized the capability-expectations gap as having three components: the ability to find a 
common agreement among the members states, the availability of resources and capacity, and the 
disposability of instruments at the EU level.  
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politically possible and what role the RtoP played therein. On this note, it is argued 
that a social constructivist perspective is the most appropriate for exploring the 
influence of the RtoP on European foreign policies in response to mass atrocities.  
The nature of EU foreign policy 
A social constructivist perspective on EU foreign policy focuses on the nature of the 
EU’s international action and the ways in which it acts as a normative exporter of 
values, beliefs and norms (Tonra and Christiansen, 2011). Instead of searching 
exclusively for causal explanations of choice and behaviour, a constructivist 
approach asks how such decisions are possible and what are the normative bases 
upon which such choices are made. Constructivists argue that international norms are 
not only important for understanding foreign policy behaviour in the neoliberal 
sense, but that in fact, they are crucial to explaining politics because they constitute 
identity and therefore interests (Katzenstein, 1996).  
In contrast to the realist perspective, international norms matter as they shape 
national interests that are not exogenously given but constructed vial social 
interactions between agents and structure. Moreover, international norms do not only 
have an impact when they serve a certain purpose or fit a given material interest but 
also when they are perceived as legitimate and appropriate (see Kratochwil, 1989; 
Onuf, 1989). In getting behind the rationalist questions, the social constructivist 
perspective allows us to explore how a range of policy choices within the EU is 
defined and how these may be enabled or constrained by existing normative 
structures (see Onuf, 1998; Wendt; 1992).  
The constructivist focus on EU foreign policy has opened new pathways to a 
discussion of the EU’s international capacity, looking at the growth of a common 
European identity in foreign policy (Jørgensen, 1997), an analysis of the role of 
discourse and public opinion in the creation of such an identity (Larsen, 1997; H. 
Smith, 1995) and the implications of such a development in creating the EU as a 
normative actor – driven by its identity and norms rather than interests (Manners, 
2000, 2002; Matlary, 2002). From the normative power perspective the construction 
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of the EU on the basis of common values and shared norms as well as its specific 
constitution is what characterises it most as a foreign policy and security actor. 
The EU as a normative (security) actor 
From a constructivist perspective, understandings of the EU and its role in global 
politics are part of the intersubjective international structures (see Wendt, 1994). In 
this context, the EU contributes to the processes of constructing these international 
structures by using opportunities as well as through its “unique presence” (Bretherton 
and Vogler, 2006: 15). As a normative power the EU is able to shape the identities of 
others and change perceptions of what is ‘normal’. The EU can thus be 
conceptualised as a changer of norms in the international system mostly by what it is 
and not what it does or says (Manners, 2002: 252). 
Throughout this study the role of the EU as a normative power9 will be approached 
from two angles. The first perspective looks at the EU as normative power and norm 
entrepreneur. It focuses on the ways in which the EU promotes the RtoP by invoking 
international commitment and by the power of example (Forsberg, 2011: 1197–
1198). From this perspective it will be analysed whether the EU acts as a successful 
norm entrepreneur for the RtoP and can therefore influence EU member states in 
their decisions on what kind of crisis response is appropriate and legitimate.   
The second angle scrutinises whether the RtoP in return also has an influence on EU 
foreign policy and whether it enables or constrains the EU as a security actor. For the 
EU to be able to perform as an actor in the area of security and defence two factors 
are crucial: First, member states remain the key actors within the CSDP and therefore 
security and defence issues are subject to intergovernmental decision-making leaving 
little room for the EU to act independently. To what extent the EU is able to act 
depends, to a large extent, on the political will of the member states.10 Furthermore, 
                                                
9 Throughout this thesis ‘normative’ refers to the use and the influence of norms in general and of the 
RtoP as emerging international norm specifically.  
10 The “political” will of the member states should not be seen as an all-encompassing explanation for 
the impact of the CSDP in practice. Yet, as they remain the key actors within the CSDP, the question 
of whether member states are willing to act under the EU framework when applying the RtoP in 
practice can reveal crucial insights on the role of the EU as a security actor. 
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the EU’s ability to act is influenced by the availability of security and defence 
resources. Chapter 2 will show that the EU has been active in developing civilian as 
well as military capabilities within the CSDP. Member states commitment to 
contribute to the advancement of the EU’s military capabilities, however, have not 
lived up to its expectations created on paper. 
In this context, the concept of the EU as a security actor is defined as the willingness 
of the EU members to act collectively under the EU framework and the existence of 
capabilities adequate for the proposed crisis response. The influence of the RtoP on 
the EU as a security actor will be assessed by an empirical investigation of the EU’s 
practice of the CSDP as well as the role member states envisage for the EU in 
response to mass atrocities. The focus is on the EU’s conflict prevention and crisis 
management policies in response to mass atrocities in its neighbourhood and how 
much room for manoeuvre member states grant the EU as (security) actor. As an 
effective security actor the EU should be able to contribute significantly with its 
available crisis management instruments to putting an end to mass atrocities and 
finding a solution to the crisis.  
From the analysis of the role of the EU in this thesis it will also be possible to draw 
conclusions back on the normative development of the RtoP and its influence in 
general. If the EU is acting as a successful norm entrepreneur and security actor at 
the same time, the RtoP could be seen as an important trigger for action. The analysis 
of the link between the RtoP and the EU is therefore two-fold: First, it will be 
investigated to what extent the EU acts as a norm entrepreneur and is successful in 
convincing its member states of the legitimacy of the emerging international norm. 
Second, the EU’s role as a security actor will be scrutinised by focusing on its 
contribution to the European crisis response and by analysing whether the RtoP can 
be seen as a trigger for decisive EU action. The two-way analysis of the influence of 
the RtoP on EU foreign policy from a constructivist perspective requires in a next 
step defining and conceptualising what (emerging) international norms are. 
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(Emerging) international norms 
International norms differ in terms of status and level of institutionalisation. Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) made the argument that in order to reach the 
status of effective normative frameworks able to affect behaviour, international 
norms need to go through processes of emergence, evolution and institutionalisation 
or internalisation. They understand the evolution of international norms as a three-
stage process, labelled the ‘norm-life cycle’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 895). 
Therein, the first stage is the norm emergence, the second stage involves broad norm 
acceptance and the third stage is called ‘norm cascade’. At the far end of the ‘norm 
cascade’ internalisation occurs. Norms thus reach a taken-for-granted quality or 
become institutionalised so that their matter is no longer subject of debate. 
Emerging international norms, as in the case of the RtoP, are those that have not 
reached the status of clear and precise norms and have not found any 
institutionalisation into international treaties or customary law. Thomas Risse and 
Kathryn Sikkink (1999: 15) found in their research on human rights that “emergent 
international norms are often signalled by international declarations or programs of 
action from international conferences.” The main difficulty at reaching the status of 
institutionalized and precise international norms can sometimes be explained by high 
levels of contestation and disagreement as well as by the consequent impossibility of 
finding approval by the majority of international actors (idem.). Thus, emerging 
international norms are those that have not reached the necessary opinion iuris 
among states to be regarded as customary law. 
Contrary to common strands in the literature on international norms and their 
influence (see for example Björkdahl, 2002; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Percy, 
2007; Raymond, 1997), it is argued that the legal status of a norm cannot be equated 
with a norm’s genuine influence.11 In other words, proving the existence of a norm in 
legal terms is no substitute for analysing its effects on policy. By contrast, from an 
                                                
11 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) argue that in order to be able to effectively affect 
behaviour international norms need to go through the process of emergence, evolution and 
internalization. The latter means that norms reach a taken-for-granted quality or become 
institutionalized in international law for example. 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Introduction  16 
analytical perspective, the existence of a norm in legal terms and its prescriptive 
functions should be seen separately.  
From a theoretical perspective this thesis aims to make a contribution as an original 
analytical assessment of the influence of (emerging) international norms on actual 
political behaviour. Yet, it also seeks to grapple with the question of what constitutes 
a norm. The distinction between a norm’s constitutive and its prescriptive functions 
implies that emerging international norms, such as the RtoP, that have not (yet) 
evolved into legal norms, which are enshrined in a treaty or that are commonly 
viewed as customary legal norms, can also have an effect on actual political 
behaviour. In this context, this study aims to address a gap in the literature on 
international norms regarding the tangible influence of emerging international norms 
on foreign policy. 
In their prescriptive functions (emerging) international norms specify standards of 
appropriate and legitimate behaviour (Katzenstein, 1996: 26). It is assumed that 
norms contribute to the formation of interests on the basis of which a certain political 
action is chosen as policy. From this perspective, an emerging international norm is 
defined as, at least partially, a collective understanding that creates expectations, as 
well as a standard that prescribes what legitimate and appropriate behaviour ought to 
be (adopted from Björkdahl, 2002: 21)12.  
Yet, from the influence of international norms on actual policy, it is possible to draw 
conclusions on the actual existence and the status of a norm. Consequently, the three 
stages of emergence, evolution and internalisation cannot be separated that clearly 
from one another but, in fact, influence each other. Although the focus of this study 
is on the ‘strength’ of norms in terms of their influence on actual political behaviour 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 892), the empirical findings can have important 
implications for the existence of norms in terms of their status and further 
development.  
                                                
12 While norms also have a constitutive function as in determining interests and identities the 
emphasis here is on the regulative effect of norms as in their influence on actual policy (see Björkdahl, 
2002). 
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It is assumed that international norms have explanatory power, not independent of 
the structural environment or the situational context, but in the sense that they order 
the world, shape agendas and (re-)form interests. Instead of accepting or rejecting 
international norms as ‘causal occurrences’, a distinction is made between reasons 
and causes for action. Seeing international norms as reasons rather than causes it can 
be argued that absent the reasons the same ‘causes’ would not have the same causal 
capacity (Yee, 1996: 84). Norms may thus guide behaviour, provide mutual 
expectations about future action, or be ignored. However, they do not affect 
behaviour in the sense of A causes B.  
Furthermore, the explanatory power of international norms is limited by two factors: 
First, international norms are not invalidated by a counterfactual incident. And 
second, the influence of norms cannot be assessed in dichotomous terms (Raymond, 
1997: 218). As Kratochwil suggests, “although we may observe a certain regularity 
that might be caused by some underlying norm, we have no clear idea how this 
hunch can be translated into a causal mechanism so that we can establish the actual 
aetiology between norms and resulting behaviour” (Kratochwil, 2000: 63). Non-­‐‑
norm compliance can amount to violation, though does not necessarily lead to 
invalidation or ineffectiveness of the norm. But if one believed that norms are 
irrelevant, it would be difficult to understand why states almost always provide 
justification for non-compliance.13  
It is acknowledged that the RtoP might be given as a reason for a specific action but 
that the emerging norm as such does not cause exclusively a certain political 
behaviour. Although this study is not explicitly designed to explain the causes of 
European crisis responses to mass atrocities, it should not be ignored that a certain 
foreign policy is always motivated by multiple factors and conditions. Since it is not 
that easy to clearly separate norms and interests from each other in political reality, it 
is vital to address some of the alternative explanations for European responses to 
                                                
13 The question of norm compliance and non-compliance will however only be addressed implicitly. 
While the influence of (emerging) international norms cannot be measured in dichotomous terms and 
a case of non-compliance does not prove a norm as invalid, the criteria of compliance and non-
compliance has not been included in the analytical framework as a distinct indicator. 
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crises in its neighbourhood before moving on to establishing the analytical 
framework designed to explore the influence of the RtoP as an emerging 
international norm. 14  
RtoP’s scope 
Commonly stated motivations for a specific crisis response alongside altruistic 
reasons such as the RtoP are self-interest or national interest. These can be of 
economic or geo-strategic nature or can be in the political interest of the decision-
maker in charge (Krieg, 2013). Seen as exogenously given and not constructed, a 
deeper analysis of the following possible explanations would call for a more rational 
approach. At the same time any of the following explanations or ‘causes’ for a 
specific crisis response might still be legitimised by referring to the RtoP, which is 
precisely what this study will investigate. 
In the case of Libya, economic interests can be related to the availability of natural 
resources such as oil and gas as well as the strategic importance for regional and 
global trade.15 Both Libya and Syria are vital regions for counter-terrorism efforts 
and might pose a perceived threat to the national security of other states. Particularly 
the Gaddafi regime had been a problem for France and the UK before the 2011 civil 
war.  
Gaddafi’s intervention into the internal affairs of Chad in the 1980s led the French 
government to deploy military support to engage directly against the Libyan forces. 
Significantly, France lost an aircraft, Flight UTA 772, as a result of a Libyan bomb 
responsible for the death of all 171 persons on board. In case of the UK, the Gaddafi 
regime assumed responsibility for an attack on the government itself. It supplied the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) with guns and explosives, which they used to bomb the 
Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984 during the Conservative Party conference. 
Likewise, the UK and others (most notably the US) lost many citizens in the Libyan 
                                                
14 The following section addresses causes and motivations for European responses to the crises in 
Libya and Syria since 2011 most commonly stated in the literature. Yet, the account of alternative 
explanations given here does not claim to be exclusive. 
15 According to the 2006 BP statistical review of World Energy, Libya figure the top ten of world oil 
reserves with 39.1 billion barrels. 
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bombing of Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 (Fermor, 2012/13: 342-
3). 
Moreover, the current state of political affairs, such as the popularity of the current 
government as well as upcoming elections can have an impact on a specific foreign 
policy agenda. The response to an external crisis can also be motivated by the need 
of diverting public attention away from domestic political questions. This might have 
been the case for France’s response to the Libyan crisis under Nicolas Sarkozy, who 
was at the time of the Libyan crisis planning to impose highly unpopular austerity 
measures.  
The lack of a more decisive response in the case of Syria could be explained by 
Russia’s undisguised Realpolitik, the sectarian tensions on the ground, Iran’s support 
to the Assad government as well as the military strength of the latter. Therefore 
internal dynamics matter as much as external factors. While in the case of Libya a 
military intervention was, from an operational point of view, not only feasible, there 
was also a greater amount of information on the conflict as well as a more united 
opposition than it was in the case of Syria for example. Externally, consensus among 
members of the international community and the UNSC can play an important role. 
The Libyan crisis has shown further that the support of regional partners and 
organisations can also be crucial.  
The context on the ground in the crisis country is as influential as domestic politics. 
Furthermore, the decisions on how to respond to a specific crisis and whether to 
intervene with military means can be further influenced by strategic and economic 
interests. The response to a crisis outside a state’s own territorial border can therefore 
never be explained by looking at one specific factor. An analysis of all possible 
reasons for European responses to the Libyan and Syrian crisis would go not only 
beyond the scope of this thesis but would also fail to satisfy the main research 
interest behind this study. The original focus of this analysis is to investigate the 
RtoP’s scope of legitimising European crisis responses in general and specifically, 
the decision to authorise (or not) the use of force independent of all other causes for 
action mentioned in the previous paragraphs. The sole objective of assessing the 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Introduction  20 
RtoP’s influence in terms of its legitimising effects provides operational clarity as 
well as fresh insights in how Europe understands and applies the emerging 
international norm. 
1.3 Exploring the influence of international norms 
Before introducing the analytical framework, it is essential to define the terms central 
to this study. Defining the RtoP, as it was developed by the UN, is initially 
straightforward. This thesis will show that, when it comes to the actual 
implementation of the RtoP in practice, understandings of what the emerging norm 
means and entails vary quite widely. Furthermore, while outlining the terms mass 
atrocities and the EU’s neighbourhood is fairly straightforward, defining European 
foreign policy with its different dimensions requires some further elaboration. 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this study, the term European foreign policy is defined as 
encompassing two dimensions:  
1. The foreign policy or external action of the EU institutions and  
2. The member states’ or national foreign policies.16  
European foreign policy is defined as the sum of action of the EU institutions and the 
member states. Therefore the term foreign policy is preferred over the term external 
action, which is particularly linked to ‘communitarized’ external policies of the EU. 
Given the particular nature of the EU, the conceptualisation of EU foreign policy is 
more complex than the definition of a state’s foreign policy. The foreign policy of 
the EU is neither all encompassing nor exclusive. All member states maintain their 
own national foreign policies, which may in part be defined with involvement from 
the EU.  
EU foreign policy is defined as “EU actions that can be considered the output from 
the EU’s multilevel system of governance in foreign policy” (Lucarelli, 2006: 9). 
                                                
16 The term foreign policy refers to a range of measures relevant in the area of security and defence: 
diplomacy, sanctions, humanitarian assistance and military intervention. 
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When referring to member states foreign policies, the term national foreign policies 
will be used. The term European foreign policy refers to the sum of the EU’s 
institutional and member states’ individual foreign policies.  
The distinction between the EU’s and member states’ foreign policies is crucial in 
this framework as the aim is to not only to identify the influence of the RtoP on 
European foreign policy but also to explore the role of the EU as a security actor in 
its neighbourhood. It is assumed that the EU’s role as security actor increases if EU 
actions form a significant part of European responses to mass atrocities. The nature 
of EU foreign policy and its role as a security actor are therefore closely linked.  
The concept of the European Union as a security actor is defined as the willingness 
of the EU member states to act collectively under the EU framework and the 
existence of capabilities that are adequate for the proposed response to mass 
atrocities in its neighbourhood (see chapter 4). The RtoP is defined as an emerging 
international norm. It has been included in several international declarations and 
agreements. Although none of these documents can be seen as binding sources of 
international law,17 there is some evidence of an evolving legalisation of the norm 
(see chapter 2). Still, the RtoP cannot be seen as a consistent single norm but rather 
as a collection of existing expectations and new contested ones. 
The RtoP exists in the guise of three pillars adopted in paragraphs 138 and 139 in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Pillar one refers to the responsibility of 
each state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. For the purposes of this study, the term ‘mass atrocities’ 
includes one or more of these four RtoP crimes. Pillar two consists of the 
international community’s responsibility to assist the state to fulfil its responsibility 
to protect, particularly by helping them to tackle the causes of mass atrocities, build 
the capacity to prevent these crimes, and address problems before they escalate.  
                                                
17 As defined in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) referring to 
“international conventions”, international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”, 
and “general principles of law”. 
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Pillar three states that in situations where a state has manifestly failed to protect its 
population from the four crimes, it is the international community’s responsibility to 
take timely and decisive action through peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian means 
and, if that proves inadequate, other more forceful means in a manner consistent with 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. While pillar one builds on existing 
sources of international treaty and customary law, pillars two and three are less 
determined and leave greater room for interpretation, which will be addressed 
throughout this thesis. 
The European neighbourhood refers to all those countries that are included in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).18 The focus is on crises involving mass 
atrocities in the EU’s neighbourhood because the expectations for the EU to respond 
to a conflict taking place on its doorstep are high not only from the inside but also 
from the outside. Since the financial crisis in 2008 and the outbreak of the Arab 
Spring in late 2010, the United States (US) under Barack Obama has demanded a 
greater security role for the EU outside its borders (see chapter 5; Biscop, 2011b). 
Moreover, the European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003) states that “neighbours who 
are engaged in violent conflict … pose problems for Europe”. It is thus also in the 
EU’s own interest to provide security in its neighbourhood. 
Research question and analytical approach 
This thesis seeks to determine whether the development of the RtoP and the creation 
of the CSDP actually have made a difference in terms of ‘whether’ and ‘how’ the EU 
and its member states have responded to crises in its neighbourhood. Ascertaining 
the impact of a norm on actual policy can only be assessed through empirical 
investigation (see Kratochwil, 1989: 42). This study explores the influence of the 
RtoP as an emerging international on European foreign policy by means of an 
empirical analysis of pre- and post-RtoP cases of mass atrocities since the Kosovo 
crisis in 1999.  
                                                
18 Includes Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Moldova, Morocoo, Palestine, Syria and Ukraine (see http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/, 26 November 2013) 
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Research question 
To what extent does the Responsibility to Protect have an influence on European 
responses to mass atrocities in its neighbourhood? 
For the framework developed here, the most important characteristic of an 
international norm to be influential is that it is considered a legitimate behavioural 
claim (Florini, 1996: 365). International norms are not obeyed because they are 
enforced by a higher authority, but because they are seen as legitimate. The influence 
of international norms can be assessed by showing that these norms are distinctively 
used in foreign policy decisions, in communicating the basis for those choices to a 
wider audience and by implementing the according actions.  
The influence of the RtoP will be scrutinized by analysing to what extent the RtoP is 
seen as legitimating choices in European foreign policies made in response to crises 
involving mass atrocities. The legitimacy of the RtoP will be assessed by looking at 
whether the RtoP appears in European discourses on how to respond to these crises. 
Such an operationalisation of an international norm is independent of its formal 
status or label.  
The legitimacy of the RtoP will be evaluated on the basis of two indicators: The first 
indicator is to analyse whether RtoP is used throughout the decision-making process. 
In this context, discourses will be examined with a focus on whether and how they 
refer to the RtoP. In other words, it will be investigated whether the language of the 
RtoP is used during the decision-making process. The second indicator looks at 
whether the foreign policy decisions are implemented accordingly. Building on the 
first indicator, the crucial question here is whether rhetorical statements are followed 
through in practice. This study investigates therefore not only language but also 
policy implementation. With the aim of assessing the policy impact of the changing 
security conception from state to human security, the analysis examines the extent to 
which rhetorical statements are followed through in practice. 
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Indicators to assess the legitimacy of the RtoP: 
1. Foreign policy decision-making 
2. Foreign policy implementation 
Influence can range from thin to thick and will be measured on the basis of a four-
value scale referring to high, moderate, low and no influence (see Cortell and Davis, 
2002). Starting by the latter, RtoP has no influence if it is absent in the foreign policy 
decision-making process. The emerging norm has some influence if it appears in 
debates on how to best respond to mass atrocities such as in parliamentary debates or 
in bilateral or multilateral consultations between different actors. Moderate influence 
applies if the RtoP is not only used throughout the internal decision-making process 
but also as the basis for the foreign policy decision that is communicated to a wider 
audience. This usually happens in press statements or releases by the head of state or 
government or by the foreign minister. Finally, the RtoP has the highest influence if 
all three indicators apply and actors implement the policies according to their 
discourse. This means, that the previously communicated foreign policy decisions 
are implemented according to the stated aims and purposes. By contrast, if 
implemented policies reveal a different purpose than claimed in the discourse or 
change during the process of implementation the influence of the RtoP remains 
limited and the legitimacy as well as the legality of the actions can be questioned.  
Influence Indicator Operationalization 
No influence No use None 
Low influence Use in foreign policy decision-
making process 
Parliamentary debates, 
bilateral and multilateral 
consultations 
Moderate influence Use as basis for foreign policy 
decision communicated to 
wider audience 
High-level press 
statements on policy 
response 
High influence According implementation of 
policies 
No later change in policy; 
no hidden aim or agenda 
Table 1: Scale to assess norm influence 
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The influence of the RtoP as an emerging international norm on European foreign 
policy is further affected by three factors, which should not be seen as distinct but 
rather as reinforcing and possibly conditioning each other.  
1. RtoP’s interpretation  
2. Norm entrepreneurs 
3. Crisis perception  
The interpretation of the RtoP depends first of all on the determinacy of the norm, 
which refers to how precise it indicates the behaviour it expects in a given situation. 
Containing several dimensions, the RtoP cannot be seen as a single norm but rather 
as a collection of norms. Some components of the RtoP are based on existing norms 
of international treaty or customary law while other parts of the norm remain vague 
in prescription and reference. A joint interpretation of the RtoP can further be 
impaired by contestation due to the existence of conflicting and competing norms. As 
Antje Wiener (2007: 13) suggested, “norms are contested by default”. In the case of 
the RtoP, long-standing traditions of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
interference can be seen as the main conflicting or competing norms. 
Second, the extent to which an international norm is influential, can be affected by 
the existence of norm entrepreneurs and organisational platforms, on which norm 
entrepreneurs may act to promote the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896). 
Norm entrepreneurs can be critical if they call attention to an issue or even create 
issues using language that interprets and dramatises them. The construction of 
cognitive frames is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs’ political 
strategies. In constructing their frames, norm entrepreneurs are confronted by firmly 
embedded existing norms and frames in their attempt to create alternative 
perceptions of both interest and appropriateness (idem: 898). Independent of the 
platform, norm entrepreneurs and organisations need to secure the support of other 
actors. They must try either to convince decision-makers that it is in their own 
interest to adopt the proposed norm or persuade them of the moral superiority of the 
norm (Nadelmann, 1990: 482). Successful norm entrepreneurs are able to frame 
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normative ideas in such a way that they resonate with relevant audiences. The goal is 
to make decision-makers perceive the proposed norm as legitimate and appropriate.  
The UN together with the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) spearheaded by Canada have acted initially as the main norm 
entrepreneurs of the RtoP on the international level. Having promoted the RtoP since 
the 2005 World Summit, the EU can serve as additional norm entrepreneur, 
influencing particularly European responses to mass atrocities by using its normative 
power and fostering a collective understanding of the emerging norm. At the same 
time the RtoP can serve as a trigger for a decisive EU crisis responses increasing the 
EU’s profile as a security actor. 
Third, due to the – at least partial – indeterminacy of the RtoP, interpretation can 
vary not only among actors might but also differ from case to case. Depending on 
how the crisis in question is perceived by other actors, there might be a more or less 
shared understanding of what the RtoP means and entails in that specific case. 
Furthermore, agreement in one case can lead to greater disagreement with regard to 
another crisis. The influence of the RtoP as an emerging international norm is thus 
highly context-dependent. The 2005 World Summit agreed to limit the RtoP to be 
applied in the cases of four crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and ethnic cleansing. The limitation of the RtoP to the four crimes has been further 
affirmed in two cases of RtoP-misuse: the Cyclone Nargis in Burma and the 
Georgian-Russian War (see chapter 3). It is therefore assumed that the extent to 
which a crisis is perceived in one or more of these terms has an effect to the extent 
the RtoP influences foreign policy decision-making and implementation. 
Factor Operationalization RtoP influence 
Interpretation Agreement on what the 
different RtoP components 




of the RtoP’s implications. 
Decreases 
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Factor Operationalization RtoP influence 
Norm entrepreneurs Presence Increases 
 Absence Decreases 
Crisis perception RtoP crimes: genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic 
cleansing 
Increases 
 Any other term Decreases 
Table 2: Factors affecting norm influence  
Presumptions 
On the basis of the link between the above-established factors affecting norm 
influence as well as against the background on the RtoP in theory and in practice 
provided in chapters 2 and 3, four presumptions on the RtoP’s influence can be 
established. The four presumptions will be tested throughout the two in-depth case 
studies on the Libyan and the Syrian crisis in chapter 4 and 5. The aim is to reveal 
whether the RtoP actually makes a difference in whether and how Europe responds 
to mass atrocities in its neighbourhood. 
The revision of four cases of RtoP implementation and non-implementation or abuse 
in chapter 3 will show that a shared understanding of the RtoP, its trigger and 
toolbox has not yet evolved among European countries. However, in none of the four 
RtoP cases analysed in chapter 3 the EU or a member state has acted as successful 
entrepreneur for the RtoP and has therefore convinced other actors that the RtoP is 
the legitimate basis to act on.19 Furthermore, the interpretation of the RtoP seems to 
vary from case to case. Against this background it will be tested throughout the 
empirical analysis (see chapters 5 and 6), whether the presence of a successful norm 
                                                
19 NB: In the case of the Cyclone Nargis in Burma, France tried to convinced its partners that the crisis 
in Myanmar was a RtoP case and that a military intervention was necessary, but failed due to the 
argument that the RtoP was limited to the four crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide 
and ethnic cleansing) as determined in the 2005 Outcome Document and did therefore not apply to 
natural disasters. 
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entrepreneur provides for a greater agreement on what the RtoP means and entails in 
a specific case and in general (see presumption I, box 1). 
While the interpretation of the RtoP is highly-context specific and linked to the type 
of crisis that occurs, the way the crisis in question is perceived is another important 
factor for the RtoP’s influence. If a crisis is perceived from the beginning in RtoP 
terms i.e. as involving the occurrence of mass atrocities the RtoP is very likely to be 
used in the foreign-policy decision-making process. At the same time, agreement on 
the general applicability of the RtoP does not imply that different actors correspond 
with each other on how the emerging norm will be implemented. Furthermore, even 
if there is agreement on the implementation of the RtoP, there might still be a 
mismatch between rhetoric and practice undermining the influence of the RtoP (see 
presumption II, box 1). 
Having promoted the RtoP since its inception in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document, the EU as a normative power can potentially act as a norm entrepreneur 
for the RtoP. If the EU succeeds in persuading national foreign policy decision-
makers that the RtoP is legitimate and appropriate it increases the shared 
understanding as well as the influence of the emerging norm (see presumption III, 
box 1). Remaining the central actors within the area of security and defence, the 
EU’s ability to act will depend further on the political will of the member states and 
the kind of role they envisage for the EU as a security actor. Acting as a norm 
entrepreneur for the RtoP can therefore potentially increase the EU’s role as a 
security actor. Yet, the EU’s role as a security actor in its neighbourhood is further 
linked to the development and the impact of the CSDP. While the EU has developed 
military and civilian capabilities to manage crisis in its neighbourhood (see chapter 
2), it has to be examined in practice whether the available CSDP instruments are 
actually used in practice in relation to the RtoP (see chapters 3-5). 
Finally, the case that the RtoP has no influence at all and/ or is absent in European 
responses to mass atrocities in its neighbourhood also has to be considered (see 
presumption IV, box 1). The absence of the RtoP in the official discourse can imply 
that the RtoP is not perceived as a legitimate and appropriate norm to act upon in a 
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specific case. On the other hand, this presumption could be challenged by the 
argument that the RtoP’s absence in the European foreign policy discourse can also 
signify influence. On this note, RtoP absence in the discourse of a specific actor can 
also imply that this actor disproves the interpretation of the RtoP by other actors in 
the same case. Furthermore it might be the case that other considerations such as 
economic interests prevail over the protection of civilians or that the crisis in 
question does not matter for European security. Finally, the lack of reference to the 
RtoP can be linked to a general uncertainty on how to best respond to a crisis.  
Box 1: Presumptions 
Research design 
This thesis follows the structure of demand, supply and test. It is assumed that, 
amongst other events, the lessons learned from the Kosovo crisis and intervention in 
1999 increased the demand for a new norm of protection for civilians from mass 
atrocities committed by their government, as well as for the development of joint 
European defence capabilities. On the supply side, the international community 
created the emerging norm of the RtoP and Europe started to build a Common 
Security and Defence Policy. While is acknowledged that a number of factors and 
events since the end of the Cold War had an influence on the demand for a new norm 
on humanitarian intervention as well as on the creation of the CSDP, addressing the 
full spectrum of historical explanations would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Arguably constituting the climax of the humanitarian crises in the 1990s, the Kosovo 
crisis constituted a tipping point timely and discursively for the RtoP and the CSDP. 
Furthermore, against the background of Rwanda and Srebrenica, the Kosovo 
experience essentially revived the debate on the need of a new international norm on 
I. The existence of a norm entrepreneur can increase the collective 
understanding of the RtoP in a specific case but not in general.  
II. The EU’s role as norm entrepreneur can reinforce its role as security actor. 
III. The perception of a crisis in RtoP terms (i.e. the four RtoP crimes) 
increases its influence but does not entail the implementation of the RtoP.  
IV. RtoP has no influence at all and/or is absent in the crisis response. 
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how to respond to such grave human rights violations. At the same it exemplified 
once more the EU’s inability to respond effectively to mass atrocities in its 
neighbourhood. Partly inspired by the same events, Kofi Annan promoted the 
development of the RtoP at the UN level, while Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair 
launched a key initiative to create the Common Security and Defence Policy. The 
1999 Kosovo crisis and intervention will serve as a starting point for this analysis. 
Constituting a pre-RtoP crisis and intervention including the Kosovo crisis will 
provide the necessary background in order to be able to assess the influence of the 
RtoP in terms of whether it actually makes a difference in European responses to 
mass atrocities. Yet, the Kosovo crisis should not be understood as the sole trigger 
for the development of the RtoP and the CSDP but rather as an example illustrating 
the trends and dynamics of the 1990s.  
Accordingly, the first part of this thesis focuses on European responses to the 
Kosovo crisis in 1999 and the development of the RtoP and the CSDP in theory and 
in practice. Against this background, the influence of the RtoP as an emerging 
international norm on European responses to mass atrocities will be ‘tested’ on the 
basis of an in-depth case study analysis. A common definition of a case study is: “the 
essence of a case study … is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: 
why were they taken, how were they implemented, and with what result” (Schramm, 
1971, cited in Yin, 2003: 22–23). Throughout this study a case is defined as a crisis 
involving the presumed or actual occurrence of mass atrocities in the EU’s 
neighbourhood. The analytical focus is not on the conflicts as such but on the 
European response to them.  
Case study selection 
The Libyan and the Syrian crisis are chosen on the basis of their assumed variation in 
the influence of the RtoP as an emerging international norm on European responses 
to these conflicts. It is assumed that the two case studies display a different degree of 
RtoP influence, which is reflected in the different policies adopted in response to the 
crises. The choice of the two cases can also be explained by their relevance for the 
RtoP as an emerging international norm and the development of the CSDP. 
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The military intervention in Libya in 2011 was the first time that the UNSC 
authorised the use of military force for the protection of civilians against the will of a 
functioning de jure government on the basis of the RtoP (Williams and Bellamy, 
2012). The Libyan civil war was also the first crisis on the EU’s borders after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. In light of the establishment of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy, the expectations on Europe to manage this 
crisis in its immediate neighbourhood were considerably high. The Libya crisis 
therefore revived not only the debate about the RtoP in general but also its relevance 
for the EU as security actor in its neighbourhood. 
In the Libyan case, member states openly disagreed on how to respond adequately to 
the crisis. Germany decided to abstain in the voting on UNSC Resolution 1973 and 
therefore from any military engagement in Libya. France together with the UK and 
the US, by contrast, took the lead in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya. Although 
the CSDP had been fully operational since 2003, practical crisis management on the 
EU level remained limited to humanitarian assistance. The time frame for the 
analysis of the Libya crisis is from the outbreak of the violence in February 2011 
until October 2011, flagged by former de facto Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s 
death and a de-escalation of the conflict. 
The application of the RtoP in the case of the Libya crisis raised the stakes for the 
international responses to the crisis in Syria since March 2011.20 While the UNSC 
condemned the violence against the Syrian civilians and sent UN observers to Syria, 
it has been unable to agree upon action aimed at halting the mass atrocities. Concerns 
that the NATO-led intervention in Libya went beyond the mandate issued in 
Resolution 1973 have left some UNSC members even more reluctant to place sole 
blame on the government for the crisis and to take robust action to stop the mass 
violence (ICRtoP, 2011). It was only after the “red line” set by the US, for the use of 
chemical weapons of mass destruction against the civilian population, was crossed 
on 21 August 2013, that the option of a military intervention was put back on the 
                                                
20 At the time of writing the Syrian crisis was still ongoing, therefore an artificial but justifiable end 
point was set for the analysis of the case study. 
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table. However, arguments in favour of intervention on the basis of the RtoP became 
blurred by claims about the necessity to punish the Syrian government. While the EU 
has been engaged in responding to the Syrian crisis with political and economic 
instruments, its profile as security actor remained even lower than in the Libyan 
crisis. The time frame for the analysis of the Syrian case study is set from March 
2011 to September 2013 when the US, Russia and Syria agreed on the defection of 
the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal. 
Units of analysis 
The chosen units of analysis are the relevant UN and EU institutions as well as the 
three biggest EU member states France, Germany and the UK21. This choice is 
motivated by the necessity to analyse the impact of international norms that are 
powerful enough to decide whether to invoke or contest the legitimacy of norms. 
While member states have always been the central actors in the area of European 
security and defence, France, Germany and the UK, in particular, played a crucial 
role in the creation and constant further institutional development of the CSDP. 
Concentrating on the ‘Big 3’ when analysing the influence of the RtoP through a 
number of case studies, provides constancy since the French, German and British 
positions were equally vital from Kosovo to Syria, they can serve as an indicator for 
European unity and can possibly be trend setting within the EU. The focus on the 
‘Big 3’ therefore aims at serving as a proxy when evaluating the impact of the RtoP 
on European foreign policy. Inside the member states, the analysis of foreign policy 
decision-making will be limited to the official discourse of the respective heads of 
state or government, the foreign minister, the permanent representatives (Perm Rep) 
to the UNSC and parliamentary debates. 
                                                
21 The theoretical and analytical framework developed and applied in this thesis focuses on the 
construction of European foreign policies in response to crises in its neighbourhood and the influence 
of the RtoP therein. The aim is not to answer why certain policies have been adopted on the basis of 
for example different ideologies or interests incumbent to specific governments. The changes in 
national administrations in terms of personnel and party affiliation will therefore be noticed (see table 
4 below) but will not play a role in the actual analysis. 
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Actor France22 Germany23 United Kingdom24 












Alain Juppé (UMP)/ 





UN Perm Rep Gérard Araud Petter Wittig Sir Mark Lyall 
Grant 
Parliament30 Assemblée Nationale Deutscher Bundestag House of Commons 
Table 3: Key actors in German, French and British foreign policy 
On the EU level the analysis focuses on the EU institutions that are most relevant for 
the foreign policy of the EU and who communicate their foreign policy decisions 
publicly31 (listed in table 4). 
                                                
22 Occasionally statements of further members of the French government will also be taken into 
account: Laurent Wauquiez (Secretary of State for European Affairs under Sarkozy); Michèle Alliot-
Marie (Minister of the Interior under Sarkozy); François Fillon (Prime Minister under Sarkozy); Jean-
Marc Ayrault (Prime Minister under Hollande); Jean-Yves le Drian (Defence Minister under 
Hollande) 
23 In addition to the statements made by the main actors in German foreign policy, utterances made by 
Werner Hoyer (Minister of State at the Foreign Office under Westerwelle from 2009 to 2013) will 
occasionally also be referred to. 
24 Additional statements that will be taken into account are by Alistair Burt (Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office form 2010 to 2013) and Jeremy Brown 
(Minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 2010 and Minister of State at the Home 
Office from 2012-2013). 
25 Union for a Popular Movement. 
26 As President of France Nicolas Sarkozy was in power from May 2006 until May 2012 when his 
successor François Hollande took over. 
27 French Socialist Party. 
28 British Conservative Party. 
29 Alain Juppé served as Foreign Ministers under President Sarkozy from 2011 to 2012. After the 
elections in May 2012, Laurent Fabius was appointed Foreign Minister under President Hollande. 
30 Members of the respective national parliaments will be cited with their first and last name 
throughout the empirical chapters of this study. 
31 There are further relevant institutions within the CSDP particularly the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) as well as the military and civilian crisis management structures. However most of 
their documents and communications are confidential and not publicly available. While this study 
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Institution Cast Foreign policy function 
The European Council 
(EC) 
Heads of state or 
government 
Key role in strategic 
direction, scope and main 
decisions of EU foreign 
policy. 
The Foreign Affairs 
Council (FAC) 
Foreign Minister of the 
member states + HR 
Foreign policy decisions 
The High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR) 
Lady Catherine Ashton Conducts CFSP as 
mandated by the FAC; head 
of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) 
The Permanent President 
of the European Council 
Herman Van Rompuy External representation 
European Commission 
(COM) 
One member per 
member states + 
president 
Humanitarian assistance 
and civilian protection 
European Parliament (EP) Directly elected 766 
members 
Opinion on foreign policy 
issues through reports, 
resolutions and 
parliamentary questions 
Table 4: Key actors in EU foreign policy 
Finally, the analysis takes into account the discourse of the UN institutions such as 
the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). While the latter 
has been an important forum of debate for the application and further development of 
the RtoP as an emerging norm, the UNSC is the main authority responsible for its 
implementation. The positions of the permanent members of the UNSC (P5) – 
France, UK, the US, China and Russia – are crucial for the implementation of the 
RtoP as either of them can veto a UNSC resolution any time. Furthermore, the US is 
still a key actor in international security in terms of military capabilities and 
resources. The military intervention in Libya in 2011 was another proof that Europe 
is still reliant on the military capacities and structures of its transatlantic partner. 
                                                                                                                                     
focuses on the official discourse on European response to mass atrocities, these further institutions 
were excluded from the analysis. 
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Methods of analysis 
Part two of this study traces the influence of the RtoP on European responses to the 
crises in Libya in 2011 and in Syria from 2011 to 2013. Instead of considering all the 
available information, the analysis of the two cases is structured according to a set of 
indicators, which derive from the previously developed theoretical and analytical 
framework.32 In line with chosen units of analysis, both case studies focus on the role 
of the UN, the EU, France, Germany and the UK. The analysis of the crisis response 
of each actor is divided in two parts: crisis perception and foreign policy response. 
The division between each actors’ description of the crisis and its actual foreign 
policy response paves the way for assessing the influence of the RtoP according to 
the previously developed scale. On this basis, it will be possible to reveal whether 
rhetorical claims are followed through in practice. The case study analyses of the 
Libyan and the Syrian crisis will be structured as follows: 
1. Role of the UN 
a) Crisis perception 
b) Crisis response 
2. Role of the EU 
a) Crisis perception 
b) Crisis response 








                                                
32 See George and Bennett (2005: 67-72) for a detailed introduction of the method of structured 
focused comparison of case studies. 
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The case study analysis is further based on the methods of process-racing and 
discourse analysis. The former will be applied to trace the different stages in the 
European foreign policy decision-making process, on how to respond to the crises in 
Libya and in Syria. In line with the constructivist perspective adopted in this thesis, 
the method of process-tracing will be combined with a method of discourse analysis, 
which focuses on the examination of the official UN and EU discourses, as well as 
the discourses of the three biggest EU member states – France, Germany and the UK. 
The analytical focus of this study is on investigating the influence of the RtoP in 
terms of whether it is seen as a legitimate behavioural claim in front of a broad 
national and/ or European audience. The analysis therefore concentrates on 
examining the official discourse available in publicly accessible documents issued by 
the French, German and British governments as well as by the EU and the UN.  
When tracing the legitimacy of the RtoP through a number of illuminating case 
studies from 1999 to 2011, centring on the official discourse appears to be a reliable 
and valid method. It is reliable due to the availability of comparable data across the 
different cases and valid as to the main aim of study of assessing the influence of the 
RtoP on European crisis responses in terms of its legitimacy.33 
The method of process-tracing is used as a method that seeks to trace the intervening 
steps by which international norms influence political behaviour. The aim is to reveal 
the extent to which international norms influence actors’ “receptivity to and 
assessment of incoming information about the situation, his definition of the 
situation, his identification and evaluation of options, as well as, finally his choice of 
a course of action” (George, 1979: 113). It therefore seems a plausible procedure for 
establishing an explanatory link between norms and policies. At the same time, 
detecting the intervening steps in the foreign policy decision-making process does 
not reveal whether or how norms cause action. The focus is on how a certain policy 
response became politically possible rather than why it happened.  
                                                
33 In line with the operationalization of influence of the RtoP as legitimacy in front of a broader 
national and/or European audience, the author predominantly refrained from conducting interviews 
with member states and/or EU officials. 
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The analysis of the Libyan and the Syrian crises (see chapter 5 and 6) traces the 
different stages in the European foreign policy decision-making process on how to 
respond to the conflict. Tracing this process aims at revealing how the outcome was 
influenced by the RtoP.34 It involves exploring the discourse and the policies 
implemented by the actors chosen for the analysis (the UN, the EU, France, Germany 
and the UK). The start and end point for the process-tracing are the set time frames 
for the case study analysis. As the proposed and debated responses to the crises as 
well as the arguments used to justify a specific course of action constitute relevant 
evidence in this framework, the method of process-tracing will be combined with a 
method of discourse analysis.  
Drawing on Martha Finnemore’s study on humanitarian interventions (1996: 306) it 
is argued that the explanations actors give for why and how they respond to a 
specific crisis can constitute possible indicators of the influence of the RtoP. 
Accordingly, if actors claim that a certain foreign policy measure is adopted in order 
to protect the civilian population from mass atrocities then this can count as an 
instance of RtoP. This does not completely solve the problem of whether this action 
was carried out on the basis of another interest but it is analytically useful as it shows 
that the RtoP is seen as legitimate.  
The method of discourse analysis allows the integration of different dimensions and 
perspectives of the subject studied by taking into account the intertextual and 
interdiscursive relations between different discourses as well as the institutional 
frames of a specific context of situation35 (Wodak, 2008: 2). The core of the 
discourse analysis is “the systematic and explicit analysis of the various structures 
                                                
34 NB: According to George and Bennet (2008: 217), “the method of process-tracing need to consider 
the possibility of alternative processes that lead to the outcome in question. It is important to examine 
the process-tracing evidence not only on the hypothesis of interest, but on alternative hypotheses that 
other scholars, policy experts and historians have proposed.” Focusing on the hypothesis of interest 
can create a confirmation bias and lower the explanatory power of the chosen hypothesis. Therefore, 
the introduction tried to foreclose a range of alternative explanations previously (see section on 
‘RtoP’s scope’ under 1.2). 
35 Intertextuality refers to the fact that all texts are linked to other texts, both in the past and in the 
present. Interdiscursivity indicates that discourses are linked to each other by common topics or sub-
topics. (Wodak, 2008: 3) 
 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Introduction  38 
and strategies of different levels of text and talk” (Van Dijk, 2007, quoted in Wodak, 
2008: 3). Discourse is defined as “linguistic action, be it written, visual or oral 
communication, verbal or non-verbal, undertaken by social actors in a specific 
setting determined by social rules, norms and conventions” (Wittgenstein, 1967 and 
Austin, 1962 quoted in Wodak, 2008: 5) 
In line with the constructivist theoretical framework adopted in this study, discourse 
is seen as social activity by which actors make meaning of a particular situation with 
the use of language. Analysing discourse means looking at patterns, commonalities 
and relationships that concern different texts and occasions. Discourse is therefore 
more abstract than text, which can be described as one specific and potentially 
unique realisation of a discourse (Wodak, 2008: 6). In this context, a text creates no 
sense in itself but only in connection with knowledge of the world and of the context. 
The qualitative discourse analytical approach used throughout this thesis focuses on 
the analysis of political rhetoric (Reisigl, 2008). Political rhetoric analysis refers to 
the “analysis of the use of rhetorical means of persuasion by professional politicians” 
(Reisigl, 2008: 97). It distinguishes between three different dimensions of ‘political’: 
polity, politics and policy. The polity dimension constitutes the structural framework 
for political action. It manifests itself in basic political norms, principles, rules and 
values of a political system, as well as in the legal procedures and political 
institutions. Policy involves the content-related dimension of political action and 
refers thus to specific foreign policy instruments such as diplomacy, sanctions or 
military interventions. Politics refers to the articulation of political interests and 
positions. The main goals of political rhetoric are political justification and 
legitimation (idem.)  
In accordance with the focus of this study the political rhetoric analyses examines the 
official discourses of the European foreign policy makers in response to the crises in 
Libya and Syria. The choice of categories for the political rhetoric analysis is 
connected to the indicators chosen for the case study analysis. Under the first 
denominator ‘the role of the UN and the EU’, the respective discourses and 
responses will be scrutinised in terms of their promotion of the RtoP. The focus here 
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is also on how the UN and the EU perceive their own responsibility as well as the 
responsibility of others. Moreover, it will be analysed to what extent the RtoP is 
contested by referring to conflicting or competing norms such as sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and non-interference.  
With regard to the ‘crisis perception’, the discourse analysis looks at how the crises 
in Libya and Syria are depicted. It focuses specifically on the terms with which the 
crises are described i.e. as armed conflicts or civil wars. Further it looks at how 
human rights violations are depicted and to what extent the crisis is linked to one or 
more of the four RtoP crimes. It further takes into account proposed and debated 
courses of actions and the ways they are legitimised. Specifically, the extent to which 
the choice of the respective foreign policy tool is based on the RtoP will be 
investigated. Finally, under the indicator ‘foreign policy response’, discourses on the 
implementation will be compared with previous discourses on how best to respond to 
the crisis in question. This category scrutinises the conformity of discourse and 
action and focuses on whether the previously stated aim of a proposed policy is 
actually implemented or whether the policy is amended ex post. 
Step Indicator for case study 
analysis 
Categories for discourse 
analysis 




implementation of the RtoP. 
2 Crisis perception Description of the crisis and 
proposed actions. 
3 Foreign policy response Conformity of discourse and 
action, achievement of 
previously stated aims, ex 
post legitimation. 
Table 5: Steps and categories for discourse analysis 
                                                
36 Influence as norm entrepreneurs depends further on the type of document: in case of the UN, a 
binding UNSC Resolution has greater influence as a press statement or a non-binding UNGA 
Resolution; in case of the EU the political weight of binding CFSP decisions and FAC conclusion is 
higher than of press statements or non-binding EP resolutions. 
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Data collection 
The process-tracing and discourse analysis focuses on official documents (speeches, 
press releases, parliamentary debates) of the respective French, German and UK 
governments on their response to the Libyan and the Syrian crises in accordance to 
the above-established key actors in the respective national foreign policies (see table 
3). Furthermore, documents issued by the relevant EU institutions (Council 
conclusion, statements, press release and fact sheets by the HR, the EEAS, the 
President of the European Council, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament) as well as reports, resolutions and statements of the UN institutions 
(UNSC and UNGA) have been collected. For each of the specific time frames of the 
crises in Libya and in Syria, approximately 250 official documents have been 
collected and analysed.  
The primary sources have been complemented by scholarly literature on the RtoP, 
the CSDP, and French, German and British foreign policies. Finally, for the 
background on the Libyan and the Syrian crises also Think Tank policy analyses, 
media reports and newspaper articles have been taken into account. By the time of 
finishing this thesis the Libyan crisis dated back almost two years and has since then 
been covered extensively by scholars, think tankers and journalists. The Syrian crisis, 
by contrast, was at the time of writing still ongoing. Originally, the time frame for 
the Syrian crisis was set from March 2011 – the outbreak of the violence – to July 
2012 – the third Russian and Chinese veto in the UN Security Council – and until 
Summer 2013 it seemed very unlikely that the option of a military intervention 
would be seriously considered by members of the international community. As RtoP 
increasingly started to reflect in international and European discourses once US 
President Barack Obama threatened the Assad government with a military 
intervention, it seemed only logical to extend the time frame for the Syrian case to 
September 2013. At the same time, the recency of the second case study implies a 
lower number of secondary sources and scholarly analyses of the Syrian crisis. 
Therefore, a slight imbalance between the data available on the Libyan and on the 
Syrian crisis has to be acknowledged. 
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1.4 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis consists of two parts – background and case study analysis – each 
consisting of two chapters. Part I (chapter 2) starts by looking at the lessons learned 
from Kosovo and the development of the RtoP and the CSDP. It focuses on 
European responses to the Kosovo crisis and their positions on the military 
intervention that was conducted without authorization by the UN Security Council. 
The legality and the legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention will be highlighted. 
Furthermore, chapter 2 traces the development of the RtoP as deriving from the 
previously existing norm of humanitarian intervention. Finally, the chapter looks at 
the EU’s role as evolving security actor. It examines specifically the development of 
the CSDP and the EU’s understanding of responsibility in relation to the RtoP and 
the use of force. 
Building on the historical narrative traced in chapter 2, chapter 3 elaborates on the 
practical application of the RtoP and the CSDP. It focuses on the question of whether 
a collective (European) understanding of what the RtoP means truly exists, and 
whether it emerged prior to the Libyan and Syrian crises in 2011. Chapter 3 reviews 
four cases of RtoP application and non-application in the period from 2005 to 2010: 
The Darfur crisis, the post-election violence in Kenya, Cyclone Nargis in Burma and 
the Russian-Georgian War.  
Part II applies the theoretical and analytical framework developed here to explore the 
influence of the RtoP on European responses to the crisis in Libya from March to 
October 2011 (chapter 4) and the Syrian crisis from March 2011 to September 2013 
(chapter 5). Based on the background established in part I, the in-depth case study 
analysis aims at revealing whether the RtoP as an emerging international norm 
actually makes a difference in whether and how Europe responds to mass atrocities 
in its neighbourhood since the Kosovo crisis in 1999. 
Chapter 6 draws conclusions on the different degrees of RtoP influence, in terms of 
its rhetorical use and practical application, in both case studies. It also evaluates what 
has changed in comparison to the Kosovo crisis and the old norm of humanitarian 
intervention. It further validates or rejects the four presumptions introduced 
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previously. Finally, Chapter 6 also discusses further existing scholarly arguments on 
the influence of the RtoP on international responses to both crises and predictions 
about the further development of the emerging norm.  
The conclusion returns to the meta-question of this thesis: it assesses the policy 
impact of human security and its link to the RtoP, on the basis of the results from the 
case study analysis and comparison. The final chapter of the thesis also addresses the 
usefulness of the theoretical and analytical framework as well as its limitations. It 
moreover provides an outlook on further research in the area of human security, the 
RtoP, CSDP and beyond. Finally, it briefly illustrates the most recent developments 
on the security situations in Libya and Syria, just prior to the completion of this 
thesis by means of a short press review. A glance at the situations in Libya and Syria 
post-RtoP application or consideration can arguably provide further insights on the 
influence of the RtoP in the ‘real world’ and on the ground. 
The RtoP has been on the international agenda for over a decade now and arguably, 
no single work can capture the significance of the emerging international norm for 
past and futures developments in international relations. Yet, this thesis seeks both 
breadth and depth in the analysis of the RtoP’s influence on European foreign policy-
making. With the aim of assessing whether the RtoP has made a difference since its 
creation in 2001, this study provides an overview of the RtoP’s development and 
practical application from 2001 to 2011.  
Furthermore, spurred by a revived debate on the RtoP in light of the Arab Spring 
since late 2010, this thesis offers an in-depth analysis of two case studies – the 
influence of the RtoP in the Libyan and the Syrian crisis since 2011. The introduction 
has set out the relevance of studying human security and the RtoP in academic and 
practical terms. Since both concepts derive from the policy world and are designed to 
be applied in international relations, assessing their significance empirically becomes 
imperative.    
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PART I 
Chapter 2: Lessons learned from Kosovo? 
Developing the RtoP and the CSDP  
The international responses to the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s and 
to Bosnia in particular were in the eyes of many Europeans a collective failure 
(Rupnik, 2011: 17). The ‘hour of Europe’, the memorable phrase coined by Jacques 
Poos, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Luxembourg and President of the EU Council 
in July 1991 (quoted in idem), never arrived. The EU was unable to prevent genocide 
and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Yet, the Kosovo experience was also increasing 
the demand for Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Peterson, 
2003: 89). Arguably contributing to the ethos of the EU’s development as a security 
actor but also to the debate on humanitarian interventions, this chapter departs from 
the lessons learned from the Kosovo intervention in 1999. Against this background, 
it traces the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) as an emerging 
international norm and the development of the EU’s CSDP.37  
In order to be able to assess whether the RtoP and the CSDP actually make a 
difference, this chapter establishes the historical background that is needed for this 
comparison. The emphasis of this chapter is therefore more on breadth than depth. It 
focuses on the extent to which the RtoP derives from the previous norm of 
humanitarian intervention and on whether the developments of the RtoP and the 
CSDP have had an impact on the role of the EU as a security actor. While this 
chapter is dedicated to the development of the RtoP and the CSDP from a historical 
perspective, the following chapter will scrutinize the RtoP’s and CSDP’s practical 
application as they evolved up until the time of the Libyan crisis in 2011.  
                                                
37 The 1999 Kosovo crisis and intervention should not be seen as the main cause for the creation of the 
CSDP or the RtoP. There were certainly many reasons for the further integration of security and 
defence policies within the EU, namely the end of the Cold War, a new security environment and the 
fear the US would turn its focus away from Europe as well as a debate about the ‘raison d’être’ of 
NATO (see Koenig, 2010). The Kosovo crisis is rather used as an example highlighting previously 
existing flaws and trends in EU foreign policy and the humanitarian intervention debate. 
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The chapter starts by examining the norm of humanitarian intervention and its 
application to the Kosovo crisis in 1999. In line with the focus of this thesis, a 
particular emphasis will be put on European responses (Germany, France and the 
UK) to the Kosovo crisis. Against this background, the chapter proceeds by tracing 
the development of the newly emerging international norm – the RtoP. In the third 
part, the creation and institutional evolution of the CSDP inspired by Europe’s 
inability to react to the Kosovo crisis will be outlined. The fourth part will draw 
some preliminary conclusions on the theoretical developments in the transition from 
humanitarian intervention to the RtoP. 
2.1 Humanitarian intervention and the 1999 Kosovo 
crisis 
Introduction 
Questions surrounding the existence of a legal right of humanitarian intervention, 
related to ethical considerations and the meaning of morality have been widely 
debated in the scholarly literature (see for example Chesterman, 2002; Pattison, 
2008; Bellamy, 2011b). Looking at the practice of humanitarian intervention over the 
course of history reveals distinctive patterns that correspond, broadly, to 
interventions in the 19th century, the post UN Charter era and the more recent post-
Cold War period. During the 18th and 19th century, philosophers of political 
liberalism such as John Stuart Mill related the concept of humanitarian intervention 
to the concept of human rights (Parekh, 1997: 142).38 The lack of a general 
prohibition of the use of force within international relations, could be taken as an 
early justification for the existence of the practice of humanitarian intervention. The 
attempt to outlaw the use of military force between sovereign states after World War 
I led to a slight decline of the practice during the first half of the 19th century (idem). 
The UN Charter laid down a new approach towards the concept of humanitarian 
intervention, turning the non-intervention principle into a universal norm of 
international law. Exceptions would allow the use of military force only in case of a 
                                                
38 The concept of humanitarian intervention can be traced back even further to the 16th and 17th 
century and the discussion on ‘just wars’ particularly by Hugo Grotius (Welsh, 2012: 187) 
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threat to international peace and security or in compromise of states’ right to self-
defence if authorised by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Since 
1945, the UNSC has thus had the right to authorise the use of force and intervention 
in the domestic affairs of a state with the aim of ending gross human rights violations 
– but only under the condition that those constitute a threat to international peace and 
security (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006).  
The end of the Cold War and the increasing number of internal armed conflicts and 
civil wars have led to a substantial change in approach to humanitarian intervention. 
It can be seen in the growing number of UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII 
imposing economic sanctions or authorising the use of force (MacFarlane and 
Khong, 2006). In line with the evolving role of the UN, multilateralism became an 
additional condition for humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War period 
(Seppä, 2011). Consensus concerning the question of when to intervene in a 
domestic crisis has not emerged among states or within international organisations, 
including the UN (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006). The UN practice was developed 
on a case-by-case basis and thereby initially refrained from developing criteria for 
humanitarian interventions. Nevertheless, the practice of intervention without 
authorisation by the UNSC has not disappeared, one of the most well-known 
example being NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999.  
NATO’s action in Kosovo is one of the most controversial interventions of the 
1990s. Undertaken in 1999, it heated up the debate on authority, especially in the 
context of evolving state practice. Authorization of intervention in Kosovo seemed 
improbable because of the opposition of China and Russia. In fact, it was not even 
ever formally requested. NATO governments bypassed the UNSC and used 
‘humanitarian necessity’ as their legitimate justification. The 1999 Kosovo 
intervention therefore involved a denial of traditional notions of national sovereignty. 
In the aftermath the intervention was widely referred to as ‘illegal but legitimate’ 
(see for example Badescu, 2011: 62). 
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Summary of the crisis 
Ethnic Albanians, who comprised 80 per cent of Kosovo’s population, actively 
opposed Serbian rule after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia39 (Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo (IICK), 2000: 317). Slobodan Milosevic’s 
government40 in Belgrade vehemently discriminated against the Albanian population, 
depriving it of political and economic opportunities. In response to the 
discrimination, a non-violent resistance movement led by Ibrahim Rugova 
established parallel, unofficial and political structures for Albanians in Kosovo. 
Although it was fairly successful at providing services, the movement failed to 
advance the cause of Kosovar independence from Serbia. The failure became 
obvious in 1995 when the Dayton Agreement41, which gave neighbouring Bosnia 
and Herzegovina its independence, excluded any nod to Kosovar’s political 
aspirations. In response, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged and by 1997 it 
was openly advocating violence as the only route to independence. Aware that it 
lacked popular support and was weak compared to the Serbian authorities, the KLA 
deliberately provoked Serbian police and Interior Ministry attacks on Albanian 
civilians, with the aim of garnering support, specifically military intervention 
(Seybolt, 2008: 79). Violence escalated through most of 1998 (Posen, 2000). 
Responding with diplomacy, European and US governments, initially sent mixed 
signals about their objectives (IICK, 2000: 131-61). In October 1998 Milosevic and 
the KLA agreed on a ceasefire, the withdrawal of some Serbian security forces and 
the deployment of international monitors under the authority of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Weller, 1999: 274). The unarmed 
                                                
39 Yugoslavia’s dissolution was the result of a series of political upheavals and conflicts in the early 
1990s after a political crisis in the 1980s. The breakup of Yugoslavia resulted in several inter-ethnic 
wars initially primarily affecting Bosnia and Croatia. After the end of World War II Yugoslavia was 
established as a Federation and divided into six Republics: Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia. The Kosovo Albanians starting to demand their autonomous province in 
the 1980s, resulting into ethnic tensions between Albanians and Serbs that lasted throughout the 
decade (for a detailed account of European reactions to the breakup of Yugoslavia see Almond, 1994 
and Glenny, 1996). 
40 President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. 
41 The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed in Paris on 14 December 
1995, aimed at ending the Bosnian War (1992-1995). 
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Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) managed temporarily to constrain the KLA and 
Serb security forces while diplomats aimed for a political settlement. In the 
meantime, the KLA used the hiatus to strengthen its forces. In response the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) stationed army units on the Kosovo border (Seybolt, 
2008: 80). 
Violence increased again by December 1998 (IICK, 2000: 79). While the 
governmental and public debates about how to respond to the Kosovo crisis 
continued, the US government under Bill Clinton sought to confront the KLA and 
the FRY with an ultimatum during the negotiations in Rambouillet, France, in 
February 1999 (IICK, 2000, annex 3). The terms of the draft Rambouillet agreement, 
set out by the Contact Group42, were more favourable to the Kosovar Albanians. 
Therefore Milosevic rejected them (idem: 153). The Rambouillet talks were followed 
by a number of military operations. In March 1999, NATO launched Operation 
Allied Force (OAF), a coercive bombing campaign over Kosovo and the rest of 
Serbia. 
As soon as the NATO operation began, Serbian security forces started to strategically 
expel the Albanian population of Kosovo (Ball et al, 2002). As the KVM and all 
international aid personnel had withdrawn, there was no foreign presence to restrain 
the Serbian security forces’ actions. Military, Interior Ministry and police forces 
systematically cleared villages and towns, driving hundreds of thousands of people 
towards the border with Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM). As part of the expulsion campaign, Serbian forces killed 10.000 – 12.000 
Kosovar Albanians (Ball et al, 2002: 6). In addition some 863.000 people became 
refugees and 590.000 were internally displaced. Over 90 per cent of the Kosovar 
population were forced to leave their homes. It was the largest population 
displacement since the aftermath of the Second World War (IICK, 2000: 90, 201). 
NATO then engaged in two humanitarian operations to address the need of hundreds 
of thousands of refugees: Operation Allied Harbour provided logistical assistance 
                                                
42 Including France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US. 
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and direct aid in Albania, and Operation Joint Guardian did the same in the FYROM. 
When the war ended, the UNSC authorized NATO to send a ground force into 
Kosovo, known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The operation was designed to protect 
aid operations, protect the population and create a stable security environment for the 
international administration of the province.  
The four NATO operations deployed to Kosovo involved different types of 
intervention ranging from logistics to coercion. Each of them met with different 
degrees and failure (Seybolt, 2008: 81). 43 NATO initiated OAF on 14 March 1999 
under the authority of the North Atlantic Council. Its two objectives were to coerce 
Milosevic to accept a political plan for Kosovo’s autonomy and to prevent the 
Serbian government from killing and expelling Albanians, which would provoke a 
refugee flow that could destabilise neighbouring Albania and FYROM. The political 
objective was partially achieved, but the humanitarian impact of the operation was 
the opposite of what NATO political leaders intended (Hehir, 2009: 259). 
The short-term humanitarian outcome was negative. NATO air strikes did not save 
any lives and caused between 600 and 5000 Serbian military deaths, 400 to 600 
Serbian civilian deaths, and an unknown (but probably smaller) number of Kosovar 
Albanian civilian deaths (IICK, 2000: 306). OAF had an indirect role in thousands 
more civilian deaths because it provoked the Serbian security to attack. It must be 
clarified that NATO action did not cause the attack, which FRY officials had 
prepared in advance, however OAF strongly influenced the timing and the intensity 
of the attack that killed thousands and caused a sudden and massive refugee flow. 
However, the IICK (2000: 295) concluded that 
Although the intervention produced temporary and severe worsening of 
the ordeal faced by the Kosovar Albanians, over time it adverted their 
worst fears of ethnic cleansing, and had the emancipatory effect for 
                                                
43 During OAF, five US guided bombs hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, ‘accidentally’ according 
to then US President Bill Clinton. The bombs were intended to hit Yugoslav Federal Directorate for 
Supply and Procurement nearby the Chinese Embassy (see  
http://congressionalresearch.com/RS20547/document.php, retrieved 18 February 20). 
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them of dismantling the oppressive Serb police and paramilitary 
structure. 
European crisis responses 
France 
France was the first to recognize Yugoslavia diplomatically in 1996 and until the 
beginning of 1999 Paris had largely shown sympathy for Serbia’s arguments 
concerning Kosovo. The French government under Jacques Chirac organised 
conferences in Rambouillet and in Paris in February 1999 and worked on a 
diplomatic solution (Stahl, 2008: 10). After the failure of the conferences and in view 
of unceasing reports of further atrocities in Kosovo, the US, the UK and Germany 
were increasingly willing to take severe actions against Milosevic. Additionally, 
Russia blocked the UNSC and the contact group – institutions favoured by France. 
Chirac and his government decided in favour of a military intervention under the 
guidance of the US, as in the case of the Second Gulf War and in Bosnia in 1995. 
France joined the NATO led military actions and actively participated in the air raids 
over Kosovo (Fortmann and Viau, 2000: 98). 
The French government justified its participation in the intervention by relating the 
Kosovo crisis to its own security interests. France argued that a further escalation of 
violence in Kosovo would aggravate the refugee problem and would evoke the threat 
of a creation of a Greater Albania, which would destabilise the entire region:  
…our military determination and our humanitarian commitment are 
part of a larger perspective – a true political and diplomatic vision. 
This is really about the preservation of balance on our continent.44 
(Chirac, 12 April 1999) 
The war opponents (anti-frappes) emphasized the omnipotence of the US and the 
powerlessness of Europe. The air raids were interpreted as if mainly the US had 
                                                
44 « …Notre détermination militaire et notre engagement humanitaire s’inscrivent dans une 
perspective plus large, dans une véritable vision politique et diplomatique. Ce qui est en cause, c’est 
l’équilibre même de notre continent. » (Author’s own translation; applies to all quotes derived from 
French and German official documents or speeches.) 
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intended and initiated them while Europe and France had only acquiesced reluctantly 
(Stahl, 2010: 54). The anti-frappes’ second objection focused on the legitimacy of 
the NATO attacks. For the first time after World War II, so they argued, there was a 
military operation against a sovereign state, which had neither started a war nor 
threatened one of NATO’s member states. Furthermore it was criticised that attacks 
defied the principle of sovereignty. It was moreover claimed that the operation 
violated international law as it contravened the UN Charter and was not covered by a 
UNSC Resolution. Hence, the attacks contradicted those values, which they 
pretended to stand for. Moreover, the missing international legitimisation was not 
compensated by national legitimisation. On the opposite side, French decision-
makers decided on and initiated the attacks without prior consultation of the 
Assemblée Nationale (Stahl, 2008: 12) 
However, the debate in parliament on 26 March 1999 clearly showed that all other 
parties – apart from the communist and the leftist republican Mouvement de citoyens 
(MDC) – as well as the ‘nouveau philosophes’ and the vast majority of the political 
advisors in foreign affairs supported the intervention (idem.). Due to increasing 
criticism, the President entered the debate through televised speeches and the Prime 
Minister intervened through speeches in parliament and interviews. President Chirac 
said that what was going on in Kosovo was a “monstrous ethnic cleansing, planned 
and carried out with the greatest possible cynicism and greatest possible brutality by 
the Serbian regime.”45 (Chirac, 6 April 1999)  
French representatives of government supported by popular intellectuals considered 
the current situation to be similar to past conflicts in the Balkans: the lessons from 
the war in Bosnia (France’s representative at the UN, 24 March 1999), the stations of 
horror in Vukovar, Sarajevo and Srebrenica (Jospin, 26 March 1999) and the 
massacre of Raçak (Robert, 26 March 1999; Jospin, 26 March 1999). The 
intervention in Kosovo was described as “guerre juste” (Hervé de Charette, 27 April 
1999). To shy away from an intervention would be no less for France “to lose her 
                                                
45 « …monstrueuse opération d’épuration ethnique planifiée et conduite avec le plus grande cynisme 
et la plus grande cruauté par le régime serbe. » 
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soul” (Chirac, 26 March 1999). Therefore, France’s intervention was a “combat de 
l’honneur” (idem). The socialist prime minister agreed with Chirac that Kosovo was 
no longer an international conflict but a national matter that touched upon the 
foundations of the French nation (Jospin, 27 April 1999). 
Furthermore, the French President considered the actions against Serbia to be of a 
new quality that would raise the issue of intervention above traditional 
considerations: 
… this war … is exemplary. It is not grounded in economic or strategic 
aims, but in a moral conception of the nations.46 (Chirac, 3 May 1999) 
The airstrikes were arguably not aimed at the people of Serbia, but against their 
oppressors. Thus, Chirac and Jospin succeeded in countering the anti-frappes’ 
arguments. Their line of argumentation combined moral values and historical 
experiences (Stahl, 2010: 61). The French government emphasised the brutality and 
exceptionality of the Kosovo crisis and referred to the lessons that should be learned 
from past atrocities in Bosnia, in order to justify the international intervention in 
Kosovo. Questions of the legality and the legitimacy of the military operation were 
only raised by the opposition.47  
Germany 
The escalation of the Kosovo crisis hit Germany in a volatile situation on the 
domestic front (Stahl, 2008). The administration of Helmut Kohl (CDU48), which 
had already been voted out, was formerly still in office, and the newly elected red-
green coalition had not yet been constituted. However, in both camps there was a 
consensus between the old and the new government that Germany would participate 
in the NATO-led air campaign on Yugoslavia without UNSC mandate.  
                                                
46 « …le combat…est exemplaire. Il n’est pas fondé dans les arrières pensées économique ou 
stratégique, mais sure une conception de la morale et de l’honneur des nations. » 
47 Early April 1999, close to 80% of those interviewed were content with the government’s policy on 
Kosovo (Cristophe et al., 1999). 
48 Christian Democratic Union.  
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One of the initial rather interest-based lines of argumentation of the proponents of 
military intervention was based on a debate established in the beginning of the 1990s 
– the so-called “out-of-area debate” which proposed an incremental expansion of 
German military involvement abroad (Stahl, 2008: 8). The outgoing Minister of 
Defence Volker Rühe as well as the head of the CDU/CSU49 faction, Wolfgang 
Schäuble emphasised the importance of Germany’s commitment to its allies 
(Bündnisverpflichtung). They cautioned further against a German special path 
(Sonderweg) that is Germany’s refusal to show solidarity and act responsibly. 
The lessons from the Bosnian conflict as well as Germany’s history were substantial 
for outgoing Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel’s (FDP50) argumentation concerning the 
legitimisation of the German participation:  
Those who do not stop the evil will take the blame for it; the lesson of 
Bosnia is also the lesson of our own German past. It also applies to 
Kosovo. We must not simply say that there should not be a second 
Bosnia, but we must ensure that there will not be a second Bosnia.51 
(Kinkel, 16 October 1998) 
The Kohl government verdict in the early 1990s, that no German soldier shall be 
deployed to regions where soldiers of the Wehrmacht fought during World War II, 
was rejected by Chancellor-elect Gerhard Schröder (SPD52): 
I have a lot of respect for those who ask: Is it sensible for Germans to 
take part in view of World War II? The question whether Germans 
should participate can be asked; and it is not a cynical question. 
However, I believe that one can reverse the sentence: especially if there 
                                                
49 Christian Socialist Union (sister party to the CDU). 
50 Liberal Democratic Party. 
51 „’Wer das Böse nicht stoppt, wir schuld am Bösen’ [ist] die Lehre aus Bosnien, aber es ist auch die 
Lehre ... aus unserer eigenen deutschen Geschichte. Sie gilt auch für den Kosovo. Dort dürfen wir 
nicht nur sagen, dass es kein zweites Bosnien geben darf, sondern wir müssen dafür sorgen, dass es 
kein zweites Bosnien gibt.“ 
52 Social Democratic Party. 
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is historical guilt with respect to this region one can also redeem it by 
helping to prevent further killing.53 (Schröder, 24 February 1999) 
In a speech at the party convention of the Greens in Bielefeld in May 1999, which 
had been specifically summoned, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer got to the heart 
of the matter when he drew the lessons from his life and the German past. He 
recalled Srebrenica and Auschwitz, and arson attacks on a home for asylum-seekers 
in Solingen, Germany, to conclude his argumentation with the statement: “no more 
war, no more Auschwitz, no more genocide, no more fascism” (Fischer, 13 May 
1999). However, many adherents of an absolute restraint of military force did not 
share his re-interpretation. Christian Ströbele (The Greens) avowed: “I am ashamed 
of my country, which is waging war in Kosovo again and which is throwing bombs 
on Belgrade again.”54 (Ströbele, 25 March 1999). The chairmen of the parliamentary 
group of the PDS Gregor Gysi added: “In this century, Germany no longer has any 
right at all to throw bombs on Belgrade”55 (Gysi, 26 March 1999).  
Similarly to France, only opponents to the intervention in Kosovo discussed 
questions of legality and legitimacy. The incumbent government justified its 
participation in the military operation mainly on the grounds of Germany’s historic 
responsibility. The opposition used the same historical arguments against German 
involvement in the Kosovo intervention. The Kosovo intervention represented the 
first active participation of the German military after World War II.56 
The United Kingdom 
British policy-makers almost enthusiastically supported military intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated on 23 March 1999 at 
                                                
53 „Ich habe großen Respekt vor denjenigen, die fragen: ist es angesichts der Geschichte des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges vernünftig, dass die Deutschen dabei sind? Die Frage, ob die Deutschen dabei sein sollen, 
kann man stellen, und es ist keine zynische Frage. Aber für mich gilt, dass man diesen Satz auch 
umkehren kann: gerade wenn es eine historische Schuld in dieser Region gibt, kann man sich auch 
dadurch abtragen, dass man weiteres Morgen verhindern hilft.“ 
54 „Ich schäme mich für mein Land, das jetzt wieder im Kosovo Krieg führt und das wieder Bomben 
auf Belgrad wirft.“ 
55 „Deutschland hat in diesem Jahrhundert überhaupt kein Recht mehr, Bomben auf Belgrad zu 
werfen.“ 
56 In April 1999, 63 per cent supported Germany’s participation in the NATO campaign, whereas 34 
per cent opposed it (Ramet and Lyon, 2001: 92). 
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the House of Commons that “on the assumption [diplomatic efforts] produce no 
change in President Milosevic’s position and the repression in Kosovo by Serb forces 
continues, Britain stands ready with our NATO allies to take military action”. The 
main reasons for Britain’s support was to avert “what would otherwise be a 
humanitarian disaster in Kosovo”. Blair underlined his argument at first by 
describing the refugee situation. He explained that  
10 per cent of the population are now homeless as a result of 
repression by Serb forces. 65.000 people have been forced from their 
homes in the last month, and no less than 25.000 in the four days since 
peace talks broke down. Only yesterday, 5.000 people in the Srbica 
area were forcibly evicted form their villages. (Blair, 23 March 1999) 
Furthermore, he referred to the number of deaths: “Since last summer 2000 people 
have died” (idem). Similar to France and Germany, the Prime Minster recalled the 
lessons learned from history: 
We act also because we know from bitter experience throughout this 
century, most recently in Bosnia, that instability and civil war in one 
part of the Balkans inevitably spills over in the whole of it, and affects 
the rest of Europe too (idem). 
Due to the number of refugees of about 1 million, Blair concluded, that a solution to 
the conflict was in Europe’s strategic interest. 
On 14 April 1999, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook justified Britain’s participation in 
the NATO intervention in Kosovo by referring to British security in relation to the 
role and the credibility of NATO: 
Our national security depends on NATO. NATO now has a common 
border with Serbia as a result of the expansion to embrace Hungary 
and other countries of central Europe. Our borders cannot remain 
stable while such violence is conducted on the other side of the fence. 
NATO was the guarantor of the October agreement. What credibility 
would NATO be left with it we allowed that agreement to be trampled 
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on comprehensively by President Milosevic and did not stir to stop 
him? (Cook, 14 April 1999) 
At the same time, Cook also made references to the experiences during the Second 
World War and emphasized Britain’s historical responsibility as well as the 
consequences of inaction: 
… in 1945 when together we surveyed what we found in Europe, we 
found death camps, we found indecent bureaucracy of the 
extermination programme, pathetic survivors and millions of victims 
and we said then: ‘Never again’. That is the pledge that we must 
honour in Kosovo, because in the past two weeks we have again borne 
witness to forced movements by train, to thousands hungry and squalid 
in makeshift camps, to pathetic masses shorn of their homes and their 
papers for no reason other than ethnic identity. Had we done nothing in 
response, we would have been complicit in that evil. Had we done 
nothing, we would have betrayed the modern Europe we are trying to 
build (Cook, 14 April 1999). 
Tony Blair’s Chicago speech on 22 April 1999 has been described as “a key 
‘moment’ in the history of the liberal interventionist discourse” (Daddow, 2009: 
549). In his address Blair highlighted the threats that both Saddam Hussein and 
Milosevic posed to the international order and called on NATO to maintain its 
credibility by standing firm over Kosovo, which “would ensure that others do not 
make the same mistake in the future” (Blair, 22 April 1999). He encouraged to 
rethink the notion of sovereignty in international relations and called for 
consideration to be given to identifying “the circumstances in which we should get 
actively involved in other people’s conflicts”. Blair raised five questions that would 
need to be answered prior to any intervention taking place:  
Are we sure of our case? Have all diplomatic options been exhausted? 
Can military operations be sensibly and prudently undertaken? Are we 
prepared for the long term? And are there national interests involved? 
(idem). 
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Against this background, Blair left no doubt that a military intervention in Kosovo 
would be justified. In line with Chirac, Blair explained that the intervention was “a 
just war based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil 
of ethnic cleansing stand” (idem.). Therefore, the principle of non-interference “must 
be qualified in important aspects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal 
matter” mainly because the atrocities might trigger “massive flows of refugees which 
unsettle neighbouring countries” (idem.). According to Blair, they can be identified 
as “threats to international peace and security” which are simultaneously threats to 
national security. He concluded that this new doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
was “the best way of defending [British] interests and the moral way of promoting 
our values” (idem.) 
The opposition generally supported the approach taken by the government. However, 
William Hague reminded that NATO’s credibility was at risk also because “decisive 
action” had not already taken place earlier (Hague, 23 March 1999). Criticism of the 
intervention was based on the lack of UNSC authorisation. Members of Parliament 
claimed that “the British government and other NATO governments are defying the 
charter, to which they are committed, and breaking international law” (Tony Benn, 
House of Commons, 23 March 1999). Finally, concerns were raised that there was no 
regional demand for the military operation and that peaceful means might not have 
been exhausted completely (Alice Mahon, House of Commons, 23 March 1999).57  
The European Union 
During the General Affairs Council from 21 to 22 February 1999, held in 
Luxembourg, the EU urged “the parties to the conflict to come to a comprehensive 
agreement including on the security aspects in the time remaining” (Council, 21-22 
February 1999). The Council moreover “confirmed its preparedness to take the 
necessary action against any party responsible for a breakdown of the peace efforts at 
Rambouillet” (idem). Emphasising the need of a political solution to the crisis, the 
Council affirmed further that it “remained prepared to play an essential role in the 
                                                
57 By April 1999, 68 per cent of the British public supported the intervention in Kosovo (The 
Economist, 1999). 
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implementation of an agreement, including in the civil implementation structures, not 
least through efforts of economic reconstruction and community building” (idem). 
Although an immediate end to the crisis did not seem tangible in mid-February 1999, 
the EU signalled its “readiness…to devote significant resources to helping all the 
people of Kosovo to rebuild their lives in security” (idem). 
As the Kosovo crisis escalated in March 1999, heads of EU member states and 
government agreed that  
on the threshold of the 21st century, Europe cannot tolerate a 
humanitarian catastrophe in its midst. It cannot be permitted that, in 
the middle of Europe, the predominant population of Kosovo is 
collectively deprived of its rights and subjected to grave human rights 
abuses. (European Council, 24-25 March 1999) 
The Berlin European Council stressed further that  
the countries of the European Union, are under a moral obligation to 
ensure that indiscriminate behaviour and violence, which became 
tangible in the massacre at Raçak in January 1999, are not repeated 
(idem). 
While no explicit statement on the question of military intervention was made, the 
EU felt responsible for dealing with the refugee problem as well as for providing 
“peace and cooperation in the region” as “the way to guarantee our fundamental 
European values, i.e. respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, 
international law, democratic institutions and the inviolability of borders.” Without 
specifying with what means peace and security would be achieved, the EU displayed 
itself mainly as civilian and normative power58 in response to the Kosovo crisis. 
However, taking place in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood the Kosovo crisis was 
a particular security concern. Within the EU, the security concerns were related 
strongly to the fear that violence and civil war could spill over into other former 
                                                
58 For a discussion on the EU’s role as a civilian or normative power, see chapter 4. 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Background I: RtoP and CSDP in theory   58 
Yugoslavian republics and other Balkan countries leading to large numbers of 
refugees and destabilisation of the whole region. Yet, the EU’s institutional response 
to the Kosovo crisis in 1999 remained mainly rhetoric. 
Legality and legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention 
The UNSC did not pass a resolution authorising military force in Kosovo in March 
1999 leading to considerable controversy about the legality and the legitimacy of the 
intervention. An attempt by Russia, Belarus and India at introducing a draft 
resolution condemning the NATO intervention failed by twelve votes to three, 
Russia, China and Namibia voting in favour.59 The NATO-led military intervention 
in Kosovo was thus neither sanctioned nor condemned by the UNSC but still sparked 
an extensive discussion on the lawfulness of the NATO campaign. Some 
commentators found the NATO intervention lawful, while others disagreed, judging 
it an illegal intervention that is breaching international law. Still others assessed the 
intervention as unlawful but legitimate constituting an action that would eventually 
be held as lawful.  
David Chandler (2006: 17) advanced the view that the NATO operation breached 
two central provisions of the UN Charter:  
• Article 2(4) stating that “all members shall refrain…from the threat or the use of 
force against the integrity or political independence of any state”; and  
• Article 2(7) prohibiting intervention in matters falling essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state subject to UNSC action under Chapter VII 
(principle of non-interference).  
Furthermore, Chandler argued that the right of self-defence was not applicable, as no 
NATO member was threatened by the instability within Kosovo and the UNSC did 
not invoke Chapter VII. The 78-day bombing campaign against Kosovo was 
therefore an assertion by NATO countries of a right to intervene and to wage war 
                                                
59 The draft resolution stated that “such unilateral use of force constitutes a flagrant violation of the 
United Nations Charter, in particular Articles 2(4), 24 and 53” (UNSC, 26 March 1999). 
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without UNSC authorisation on the humanitarian ground of human rights protection 
(Chandler, 2006). 
The initial discussion of the legality of the NATO intervention by the IICK ended 
inconclusively with an appreciation of the difficulty of reconciling what was done to 
protect the people of Kosovo with the core prohibition on recourse to non-defensive 
force that has not been authorized by the UN. At the same time, the Commission 
took the view that the pattern of Serb oppression in Kosovo, the experience of ethnic 
cleansing a few years earlier in Bosnia, and the lack of an international response to 
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 combined, create a strong moral and political duty 
on the part of the international community to act effectively in response to the gross 
human rights violations (IICK, 2000). While diplomacy failed to put an end to the 
conflict, the international community was left with the options of doing nothing or 
mounting a military intervention under NATO command.  
The perspective adopted by the IICK supports the general assessment of the NATO 
campaign as illegal, yet legitimate. Such a conclusion relates to the controversial idea 
that a ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention is not consistent with the UN Charter if 
conceived as a legal text, but that it may, depending on the context, nevertheless, 
reflect the spirit of the Charter as it relates to the overall protection of people against 
gross abuse (idem). At the same time, humanitarian intervention may also be 
legitimately authorized by the UNSC but will still often be challenged legally from 
the perspective of the Charter obligations to respect the sovereignty of the member 
states.  
In the aftermath of the controversial military campaign a debate ensued over whether 
the event marked a turning point in the law on humanitarian intervention and a 
departure from the strict conditions established in the UN Charter for the permissible 
use of force in international relations. One view was that even though the 
intervention could be justified on compelling moral and political grounds, Kosovo 
should not be considered a precedent for eroding the norms of international law on 
the prohibition of force and the principles laid down in the Charter (Simma, 1999). 
Others argued that although the non-authorised NATO intervention constituted a 
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breach of the UN Charter, such breach could be seen as evidence of the emergence of 
a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This new norm would legitimize the use 
of force to impede a state from committing mass atrocities when the UNSC is 
incapable of responding to the crisis because of the veto (Cassese, 1999: 23).  
A third view was that, in principle, the breach of existing rules of international law 
could lead to a transformation of the law. However, on factual and legal grounds, the 
NATO intervention lacked the basic requirement of an opinio iuris60 for the 
emergence of a new norm of international law (Francioni 2000; 2005). Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), in turn, suggested that the development of 
new norms depends crucially upon particular states acting as norm entrepreneurs 
who attempt to convince other states to adopt the norm concerned. In this context, 
Nicholas Wheeler (2000: 147) argued that NATO members, notably the Blair 
government, were advancing a new norm of humanitarian intervention without 
explicit UNSC authorisation. But, in the Kosovo case, NATO governments refused 
to acknowledge that they were challenging existing norms of the UN charter and thus 
never acted as full-blown norm entrepreneurs (idem). Finally the use of cluster 
bombs and the reliance by NATO on a high-altitude rule of engagement for its 
bombing sorties so as to minimize the risk of casualties to itself have been criticised 
and put the legitimacy of the NATO intervention into further question (Welsh, 2012).  
Since the 1999 Kosovo intervention, members of the international community have 
begun advocating a right to undertake intervention to stop mass atrocities from 
occurring. In line with the debate surrounding the Kosovo intervention, their central 
concerns rested with whether the current regulations on the use of force in the UN 
Charter met the challenges of the post-Cold War world. In particular, they were 
concerned with the demands of addressing the rising numbers of humanitarian 
emergencies (Badescu, 2011). The post-Kosovo demand for a new norm on the 
protection of people from mass atrocities eventually resulted in the creation of the 
RtoP. 
                                                
60 In international law, an opinio juris (an opinion of law) is the judgment of whether a state acted in a 
particular because it was legally obliged or not (Bederman, 2001: 15-16) 
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2.2 RtoP – a new international norm? 
Post-Kosovo: the development of the RtoP 
Hitting the peak of the humanitarian intervention disasters throughout the 1990s, a 
revived debate ensued after the 1999 Kosovo crisis and intervention on how to 
ensure the protection of civilians from mass atrocities. Reacting to member state calls 
on a reform of existing principles on humanitarian intervention, former UN Secretary 
General (UNSG) Kofi Annan challenged the traditional view of state sovereignty and 
the non-intervention principle claiming that the principle of sovereignty contained in 
the UN Charter should be reinterpreted as responsibility to protect individuals61. In 
his Millenium Report to the UN General Assembly in 2000, Annan argued  
If humanitarian is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity? 
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS)62 launched the debate about the responsibility to protect doctrine. In the 
correspondent report from December, the Commission captured that based on the 
concept of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, states have 
primarily the responsibility to protect their own citizens. But when states cannot or 
would not (anymore) protect their citizens in the face of serious crises, the 
responsibility shifts towards the international community. The responsibility of the 
international community therefore includes three elements: “To prevent, to react in 
the event that prevention failed and to rebuild societies where protection has failed” 
                                                
61 The notion of sovereignty as responsibility, which can be seen as the precursor of the development 
of the RtoP, was originally coined by Francis Deng in 1996. According to Deng, sovereignty does not 
constitute an absolute right but should rather be seen as a conditional right. He argued further that 
when states do not conduct their internal affairs according to internationally recognized standards 
other states do not only have the right, but also the duty to intervene. He added that those governments 
that fail to protect their people shed their sovereignty. As a result, sovereignty was redefined as the 
responsibility to protect the people in a given country (Deng et al., 1996). 
62 Members of ICISS: Gareth Evans (Australia), Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria), Gisèle Côté-Harper 
(Canada), Lee Hamilton (United States), Michael Ignatieff (Canada), Vladimir Lukin (Russia), Klaus 
Naumann (Germany), Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa), Fidel V. Ramos (Philippines), Cornelio 
Sommaruga (Switzerland,) Eduardo Stein Barillas (Guatemala), Ramesh Thakur (India). 
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(MacFarlane and Khong, 2006: 178). In the report, RtoP was conceived as an attempt 
to reconcile the ambiguity surrounding cases of proposed military intervention as in 
the case of Kosovo by establishing thresholds based on traditional ‘just war’ 
principles. 
Intervention was recommended when passing the threshold of a ‘just cause’, namely 
in the case of large-scale loss of life and/or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, “actual or 
apprehended” (ICISS, 2001:XII), caused by the state or facilitated by neglect or 
incapacity. In addition to this threshold, the Commission defined ‘precautionary 
principles’. Hence, an intervention should be based on the ‘right intention’, 
meaning that the primary purpose of the intervention is the protection of human 
beings. The option of an intervention should be the ‘last resort’ since other non-
military options have to be exhausted beforehand. The means of the intervention 
should be ‘proportional’ in scale, duration and intensity being the minimum 
necessary to secure human protection. And the intervention should have ‘reasonable 
prospects’ referring to the existence of a reasonable chance of success. A particular 
thorny point was the question of ‘right authority’ and the legitimacy of 
interventions not authorised by the UNSC, on which the ICISS was unable to reach a 
clear agreement and thereby established a three-layered distribution of responsibility. 
If the state (primary level) and the domestic authorities in partnership, with outside 
agencies (secondary level) failed to avoid a humanitarian crisis and the responsibility 
consequently shifts to the international community (third level), the report holds the 
view that the primary legal authority lays with the UNSC.  
The Report also established a mechanism to avoid a gridlock in the Security Council,  
by proposing a “code of conduct” for the use of veto concerning actions on the basis 
of the RtoP in the sense of a “constructive abstention” (ICISS, 2001: XIII). In cases 
where vital national interests were not claimed to be involved”, a permanent member 
of the UNSC would not use its veto right to hinder the agreement on a resolution 
(idem.). Finally, the report emphasised the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ and that 
interveners should have a strategic plan about how they intend to ‘rebuild’ post-
conflict societies. 
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In September 2003, the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
commissioned by Kofi Annan endorsed the emerging norm, including its criteria and 
precautionary principles, but abandoned the idea of including a “constructive 
abstention”. The panel produced their report, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, in 2004, and it was the basis for preparing a UN reform package 
leading up to the 2005 World Summit. Over 170 heads of government participated in 
the discussion from 14-16 September 2005, leading to the World Summit Outcome 
Document, which was formally adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/1 
(2005). In paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document, the UN member states 
agreed to the three major components of RtoP: (1) formal recognition of the 
responsibility of sovereigns to protect their own populations; (2) a commitment to 
develop the institutional capacities and behaviours necessary to prevent genocide and 
mass atrocities, assist states in the fulfilment of their responsibility, and improve the 
effectiveness of peaceful and consensual measure; (3) a reaffirmation of the idea that 
the Security Council has the authority to intervene if deemed adequate: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. 
The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and 
help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United 
Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also 
has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
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relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to 
continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary 
and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before 
crises and conflicts break out. 
The next important step in the RtoP’s development was its inclusion in UNSC 
Resolution 1674 in April 2006. In operative paragraph 4 of that Resolution, on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflicts, the SC “reaffirms the provisions of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding 
the Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity.” In 2009, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon released a report on “Implementing the responsibility to protect” proposing a 
comprehensive strategy for the implementation of what he then called the RtoP’s 
three pillars:  
• Pillar one refers to the responsibility of the state to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and from 
their encouragement.  
• Pillar two consists of the international community’s responsibility to assist the 
state to fulfil its responsibility to protect, particularly by helping them to tackle 
the causes of genocide and mass atrocities, build the capacity to prevent these 
crimes, and address problems before they escalate.  
• Pillar three states that in situations where a state has manifestly failed to protect 
its population from the four crimes, it is the international community’s 
responsibility to take timely and decisive action through peaceful diplomatic and 
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humanitarian means and, if that proves inadequate, other more forceful means in 
a manner consistent with Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. 
The report was well received, as the ensuing debate in the General Assembly attests 
where a vast majority of the member states reaffirmed their commitment to the 
prevention and halting of mass atrocities. Over 50 states endorsed the proposed 
three-pillar strategy and there was unanimity on the importance of the first two 
pillars and the fundamental obligation to prevent mass atrocity crimes. The member 
states also agreed on restricting the scope of the RtoP to the four crimes of genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. There was less agreement 
on the third pillar. Particularly non-Western governments argued that emphasis 
should be put on peaceful measures, under Chapter VI and VIII of the UN Charter, 
instead of coercive measures under Chapter VII (Bellamy, 2011b: 44). 
The following debates in the GA in 2010 and 2011 concentrated on the aspects of 
early warning and the role of regional organizations in implementing RtoP. The 
importance of prevention in pillar two was stated in both occasions. During the latest 
debate a number of countries raised concerns and reservations about the manner in 
which NATO has used force to implement Resolution 1973 in Libya. These concerns 
point to the necessity of putting in place a more effective framework to protect 
populations in the midst of an armed conflict. Moreover it was stressed that pillar 
three, referring to timely and decisive action in the face of the four respective crimes, 
included peaceful, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian means. The use of force 
should be seen as a last resort (ICRtoP, 2011). 
Criticism of the RtoP 
Since the very beginning, the RtoP has been subject to criticism. Many, especially 
non-Western countries, see the RtoP as a dangerous and imperialist doctrine that 
undermines the sovereignty and political autonomy of the weaker states (Evans, 
2007). They believe that the RtoP poses a threat to state sovereignty by misusing the 
concept of human rights protection, establishing a new form of colonialism (idem). 
RtoP is accused to be used by the powerful states (meaning those who have the 
means to intervene) as a “Trojan Horse” for hard interests in other weaker states. 
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This is also related to the exclusive authority of the UNSC to mandate the use of 
force. Conversely to its proclaimed purpose, the new norm has been criticised for 
offering little actual protection to vulnerable population, reducing it to a rhetorical 
posturing (Bellamy, 2010). 
The 2009 implementation proposal gave rise to more concerns. Ramesh Thakur, 
former member of the ICISS, criticised Annan’s report with regard to three aspects 
(Thakur, 2009). First, Thakur argued that it was unrealistic to see the three pillars 
being of equal strength and weight and that the most important pillar should be the 
states’ own responsibility. On the other hand, the most critical one was the 
international community’s response to the outbreak of mass atrocities. On this note, 
Thomas Weiss (2001: 424) pointed out that the term ‘international community’ was 
rather vague. Therefore it remained unclear to whom exactly the responsibility to 
protect shifts and more specifically, who has the right to intervene. Second, Thakur 
contended – in line with Jennifer Welsh (2010: 55) – that since the Secretary General 
favoured prevention over protection, states are likely to (already) shy away from 
preventive measures that interfere in their domestic affairs. And third, the report 
failed to clarify a number of key questions related to the implementation of the RtoP 
such as: When should RtoP be activated as an international responsibility? What are 
‘RtoP triggers’? Which principles guide the use of force? (Thakur, 2009) 
In light of the development of the RtoP and its criticism, the question arises to what 
extent the RtoP can actually be seen as an international norm. In order to be able to 
assess the influence on the RtoP on actual policy-making it has to be defined further 
it terms of its status of a norm and its implications. The following section will 
therefore concentrate on the legal status and the determinacy of the RtoP as an 
emerging international norm. 
RtoP as a norm 
None of the documents in which the RtoP has been treated in depth can be seen as 
binding sources of international law, as defined in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ).63 The extent to which the RtoP can be seen as a 
legal norm has consequently to be analysed on a more refined basis. Jennifer Welsh 
and Maria Banda (2010) scrutinized whether the inclusion of the RtoP in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document represents a moment of legislation 
differentiating in negative and positive duties. As to the first category, Welsh and 
Banda (2010) suggested that a great deal of legalization has already occurred. 
Carsten Stahn (2007: 101), on the other hand, argued that the Outcome Document 
“leaves considerable doubt whether and to what extent states intended to create a 
legal norm”. Stahn saw the inclusion of the RtoP in paragraphs 138 and 139 rather as 
a “curious mixture of political and legal considerations” that points towards a 
common lack of clarity about the meaning of the concept (idem: 108). 
According to Alex Bellamy (2010), there is some evidence in the area of 
international law that a positive duty towards the RtoP exists. First, the International 
Court of Justice in Bosnia vs. Serbia found that states have a legal obligation to take 
all measures reasonably available to them to prevent genocide (ICJ, 2007). Second, 
the Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions (1949) requires that states “ensure 
respect” to international humanitarian law as well as obey it themselves. Third, the 
International Law Commission (ILC) proposed Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC, 2001). Fourth, following an 
independent enquiry, the UNSG recognised the organisation’s failure to prevent 
genocide in Rwanda as a failure of the whole system. And fifth, the UNSC included 
its first explicit reference to RtoP in Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflicts. The key significance of the latter stems from Article 25 of the UN 
Charter, which states that “the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decision of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.” Although Resolution 1674 falls short of a formal decision requiring that 
                                                
63 Refers to “international conventions”, “international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”, and “general principles of law”. 
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member states implement the RtoP, Bellamy (2010) argues that it can be seen as part 
of an ongoing process of legalisation.64 
A consensus of the General Assembly – as it has been reached during the 2009 
debate on Annan’s implementation report – can be seen as a proxy for existence of 
an international opinio iuris. Accompanied by a consistent state practice, the GA’s 
statements may reveal the existence or the emergence of new rules of customary 
international law. The analysis of the RtoP as a legal norm therefore has to look at its 
practical implementation. A consistent implementation of the RtoP, however, 
depends first of all on its determinacy. The more precisely a norm indicates the 
behaviour it expects in a given situation, the more likely it will be applied 
consistently (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).  
The definition of the RtoP used throughout this study is the one stated in the 
Outcome Document, defining the three pillars of the RtoP. Containing several layers, 
RtoP cannot be seen as a single norm, but rather as a collection of shared expectation 
and values. While the first pillar can be seen as a reaffirmation of existing norms, it 
is much less clear what rights and duties pillars two and three place on the 
international community’s responsibility of prevention and assistance. The 
indeterminacy of pillars two and three can be seen as the result of the member states’ 
disagreement of what ought to be expected and an interest in preserving flexibility 
for the future (Bellamy, 2010).  
Reviewing cases of RtoP implementation and non-implementation between 2005 and 
2010, chapter 3 will show that a consistent state practice has not (yet) emerged. In 
fact, analysing the RtoP in practice reveals states’ differing expectations and 
understanding of the rights and duties derived from the RtoP. RtoP is thus still 
widely seen as an emerging international norm with limited legal implications. 
Although not obtaining the legal label the RtoP can still have an influence on actual 
policies in response to mass atrocities, as this study aims to show. 
                                                
64 For a detailed discussion on the legal status of UNSC Resolutions see (Kelsen, 1954). 
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One of the main concerns raised after the experience of the Kosovo intervention in 
1999 was whether the current regulations on the use of force in the UN Charter still 
met the challenges of the post-Cold War world (Toope and Brunnée, 2010). As 
elaborated previously, the questions of military intervention presented a particularly 
thorny issue in the development of the RtoP. It has furthermore been suggested that 
the recent application of the RtoP in Libya and its consideration in Syria reveal that 
the emerging norm has become increasingly linked to the issue of military 
intervention. The role of the use of force within the RtoP will therefore be discussed 
separately throughout the next section.  
RtoP and the use of force 
The definition of the RtoP in the 2005 Outcome Document did not introduce any 
new right or ‘responsibility’ of military intervention for individual states. Rather, it 
keeps recourse to force firmly in the hands of the UNSC (Toope and Brunnée, 2010). 
The Document leaves open, however, whether collective action “in accordance with 
the Charter, including Chapter VII” presumes that a situation involving the listed 
four crimes must first be found to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, whether all such situations would constitute threats to peace and security 
per se, or whether the UNSC can intervene whenever a state is “manifestly failing” 
to protect (idem.; quotes from paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document, 2005). It 
also remains unclear to what extent the UNSC has an obligation to intervene if 
necessary to protect populations form the listed crimes. The Document’s reference to 
“case-by-case” decisions on the use of force would seem to suggest there is no such 
obligation.  
In light of the weaknesses in the RtoP as articulated in the 2005 Outcome Document, 
the 2009 General Assembly debate raised concerns by many members, particularly 
about the use of force element in the emerging norm. The strong emphasis in the 
Secretary General’s Implementation Report on the need for guidelines on the use of 
force underscores these concerns. The call for non-use of the veto in cases involving 
one of the four RtoP crimes can also be related to the use of force considerations. 
The veto power of the five permanent members of the UNSC undermines the 
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generality of the protective force option and weakens the potential for consistent 
decision-making in the Council (Peters, 2012: 201). Although recognising RtoP’s 
indeterminacy regarding the use of force in its different aspects, none of the above 
addressed concerns have resulted in a substantial change or amendment of the RtoP. 
At the same time, Bellamy (2008) argued that the RtoP can make three contributions 
to the issue of military intervention. First, the RtoP aims at replacing the old norm of 
humanitarian intervention with a broad range of measures directed most importantly 
at preventing mass atrocities. Only if those measures fail, the use of military force 
will be considered. Second, by including political and diplomatic strategies, 
alongside legal, economic and military instruments, the RtoP advocates a 
comprehensive crisis response that can counter the temptation to envisage complex 
humanitarian emergencies in exclusively military terms. Third, by drawing attention 
to the protection of civilians from mass atrocities, RtoP can provide a new 
framework for the implementation of policies – “if translated ‘from words into 
deeds’” (Bellamy, 2008: 630). Whether these contributions, that the RtoP can make, 
have an influence on the practice will be investigated throughout the next chapters of 
this thesis.  
The previous sections have elaborated on the emergence of the RtoP as a new 
international norm in response to the experiences of the Kosovo intervention and 
claims about a reform of the existing normative framework for humanitarian 
interventions. The Kosovo war was, however, also a significant driver for the 
creation of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the EU’s role as a 
security actor in its neighbourhood. These developments will be examined in the 
following sections. 
2.3 The EU as evolving security actor 
The role of Kosovo and the RtoP 
Lessons learned from the EU’s failure in the Balkans, among them the need to 
establish autonomous military power, amplified in the wake of the Kosovo crisis.  
The EU’s recurring inability to act served as a wake-up call for the EU to meet the 
expectations and responsibilities set out in the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Background I: RtoP and CSDP in theory   71 
(CFSP), not only on a rhetorical level but also in practice. Since the Maastricht 
Treaty (1993), one of the main objectives of the EU was  
to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through 
the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including 
the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence. (Article B, TEU Maastricht) 
As the Kosovo crisis escalated through 1998, British and French concerns over the 
EU’s continued lack of hard power, primarily military capabilities, intensified to 
such an extent that in December they launched the key initiative that would 
transform the EU’s international role (Shepherd, 2009: 517). At the Franco-British 
summit in St Malo, Chirac and Blair declared that the EU “must have the capacity 
for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis” (Franco-
British Summit, 1998). The Kosovo experience contributed to the ethos of the 
subsequent construction of a joint European security and defence policy. Some of 
lessons learned from the Kosovo crisis are reflected in the early institutional and 
instrumental set-up of the CSDP. Yet, the establishment of the CSDP was also 
influenced by NATO’s transformation and move towards a more global role as well 
as internal EU dynamics between the member states. Furthermore, the following 
sections will show that the development of European security and defence 
capabilities was also informed by the parallel advance of the RtoP.  
The development of the CSDP 
At the Cologne summit in June 1999, the 15 EU member states officially launched 
the ‘common European policy on security and defence’ linking its core purpose to 
the Petersberg tasks. Agreed upon in 1992 by the Western European Union Council 
of Ministers, the Petersburg tasks defined the type of military action that the EU 
could undertake in the area of conflict management: humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peace-making. The CSDP was supposed to permit the EU the ability “to take 
decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks” 
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through the development of “a capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces” (European Council, 4 June 1999). This capacity would not 
be detrimental to NATO, it would be in accordance with the principles of the UN 
Charter and would entail the EU playing “its full role on the international stage”. 
The following December Council established the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) 
which envisaged an army corps of 50,000 – 60,000 troops, 100 ships and 400 aircraft 
deployable at 60 days’ notice and sustainable for a year. This ambition was explicitly 
modelled on NATO’s crisis management operations in the Balkans (Shepherd, 2009: 
517). The aim was that, by 2004, the EU would be able to manage two conflicts 
simultaneously: one ‘hard’ mission of separating belligerent forces, and one ‘light’ 
mission such as a humanitarian operation. 
Since the Franco-British summit at Le Touquet in February 2003 the focus has 
turned to a somewhat neglected component of the HHG, the aim “to provide smaller 
rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness” (European 
Council, 11 December 1999). The UK and France called for European improvements 
in “planning and deploying forces at short notice, including initial deployment of 
land, sea and air forces within 5-10 days” (Franco-British summit, 4 February 2003). 
In February 2004, the UK, France and Germany, translated this into the ‘battlegroup’ 
concept, a key element of the EU’s 2010 Headline Goal.65 As national or 
multinational configurations, the battlegroups were designed as a “minimum 
militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of 
stand alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations” (European 
Council, 2 November 2006). Alistair Shepherd (2008: 518) argued that the 
illustrative scenarios for the battlegroups matched the Kosovo requirements and the 
EU’s subsequent efforts to rectify the shortcomings exposed during that crisis: 
separation of parties by force, conflict prevention, stabilization, reconstruction and 
military advice to third countries, evacuation operations in non-permissive 
                                                
65 The battlegroups are on paper battalion-sized units 1,500 strong, deployable within 5-10 days and 
sustainable for 30 days with the possibility of extending that to 120 days; in any six month period 
there are two battlegroups on standby at very high readiness for almost simultaneous deployment to 
undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks. 
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environments and assistance to humanitarian operations (EU Council Secretariat, 
November 2006). 
Another lesson from the Balkans and Kosovo specifically was the necessity of non-
military crisis management.66 The European Council emphasised the need for “the 
enhancement and better coordination of … non-military crisis response tools”, 
arguing that “developments inter alia in Kosovo have for their part underlined the 
importance of this task” (European Council, 11 December 1999). The 2000 Feira 
European Council outlined four priority areas for civilian management capabilities: 
police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection; and a set of 5000 
police officers, 1000 deployable in 20 days by 2003. The EU’s Helsinki statement on 
‘non-military crisis management’ stressed the need to strengthen the synergy and 
responsiveness of national, collective and NGO resources, to enhance EU links with 
other organisations, and to promote EU autonomous action and inter-pillar 
coherence.  The June 2004 European Council set out the Civilian Headline Goal 
(CHG). The quantitative component was met at the November 2004 commitment 
conference, where 5761 police, 631 rule of law experts, 562 administration experts 
and 4988 civil protection personnel were pledged. 
The 2008 CHG also highlighted the growing civil-military focus of the ESDP, 
emphasising first a need to be able to “deploy civilian means simultaneously with 
military means at the outset of an operation” and second that “close cooperation and 
coordination with … military efforts have to be ensured throughout all phases of 
[operation]. When necessary, civilian crisis management mission must be able to 
draw on military enabling capabilities.” (Council of the EU, 17 December 2004) 
Furthermore, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) stated that  
none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by 
purely military means … in failed states, military instruments may be 
needed to restore order … Regional conflicts need political solutions 
                                                
66 The importance of civilian instruments in responding to the changing security environment after the 
end of Cold War was also emphasised by NATO in its strategic concepts of 1991 and 1999 (Koenig, 
2010: 7). 
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but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post 
conflict phases … the European Union is particularly well equipped to 
respond to such multifaceted situations. (ESS, 2003) 
Yet, the specific nature of defence policy and military operations also led to the 
creation of a separate infrastructure designed to enable the EU to benefit from, in the 
words of the Saint Malo Declaration, “the appropriate structures and a capacity for 
situation analysis, sources of intelligence and capability for relevant strategic 
planning” (Grevi, 2007). Initial steps towards the construction of this infrastructure 
were taken with the creation of the Political and Security Committee, the EU 
Military Staff and the EU Military Committee (Howorth, 2007). This was 
subsequently expanded to the civilian dimension with the creation of the Committee 
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) during the Feira European 
Council in 2000 (Cross, 2010). The CIVCOM was supplemented in 2006 with the 
establishment of a Civil-Military Cell within the EUMS and, a year later, by the 
creation of a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) located in the 
Council Secretariat. The concept of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) was 
reinforced by the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, with the aim to enhance coordination between civilian 
and military actors at all stages of crisis management, particularly at the strategic 
planning phase.67  
As an integral part of the CFSP, the institutional system of the CSDP overlaps to 
some extent with that of the CFSP. Member state sensitivity about the need to 
preserve autonomy when it comes to defence-related decisions has led to the 
emergence of a complex decision-making process that requires consensus between 
the member states. From the outset, the CSDP has been subject to inter-governmental 
decision-making, characterised by complex interactions between the Council 
Secretariat (headed by the Secretary General/ High Representative for CFSP), the 
Brussels-based PSC and decision-makers in the national capitals (Grevi, 2009). In 
                                                
67 The concept of CMCO can be seen as the key component of what is mostly called a European 
comprehensive approach to crisis management. As a new structure within the EEAS, the CMCO has 
been incorporated by the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). 
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many respects, the recent Treaty revision confirmed existing practices on 
CFSP/CSDP and affirmed the standing of existing institutions (see Articles 38 on the 
PSC and 42 on the European Defence Agency). Apart from the EEAS, its major 
institutional innovation is that of the position of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Sceptics argue that the real problem 
of the CSDP lay not with the Treaty provisions or the institutions but with Europe’s 
weak and underfunded militaries. Military spending in most EU states declined 
sharply after the Cold War, leaving the US to extent its lead in the application of new 
technologies and hardware (Howorth, 2000: 38).  
Since its first mission in the Balkans in 2003, the EU’s operations have varied widely 
in terms of its size, ranging from the modest (ten EU experts in rule-of-law missions 
in Georgia and 30 in Iraq) to Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina, which 
involved up to 7,000 soldiers. The EU has launched military missions both 
autonomously (Artemis in DRC, EUFOR Chad) and with the support of NATO 
under the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, governing operational collaboration 
between the two institutions (Concordia in FYROM, Althea). Missions have also 
varied widely in nature, ranging from the military to police missions in the Balkans, 
DRC, Palestine and Afghanistan to rule-of-law missions (Georgia, Iraq), monitoring 
missions (Aceh, Georgia), security sector reform missions (DRC, Guinea Bissau) and 
border missions (Georgia, Palestine, Ukraine-Moldova). 
Although the emphasis was on the military dimension when creating the CSDP, the 
first operation was a civilian one and since 2003 military missions have made up 
only a minority of deployments. While many CSDP missions, in fact, exhibit both 
military and civilian characteristics, what is significant is the increasing emphasis on 
the latter. In most cases, missions have occurred in places where a robust NATO 
presence (as in Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia) or a UN role (as in Congo and 
Kosovo) already paved the way for deployment. From the outset of the creation of 
common European security and defence policies in the aftermath of Kosovo, the 
expectations were stirred to develop the EU into a fully-fledged security actor 
including sufficient military capabilities. In practice, however, the EU’s civilian 
crisis management record outweighs its military engagement by far. When looking at 
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the development of the CSDP since 1999 until 2009, the ‘capability-expectations 
gap’ (Smith, 1993) seems to be a persistent feature of the EU’s foreign policy. To 
what extent there is also a gap between the EU’s understanding of its responsibility 
and its available crisis management resources and structures will be addressed in the 
following section. 
The EU’s responsibility (to protect) 
The EU’s understanding of its security role is inherently linked to its sense of 
responsibility. Panos Koutrakos (2013) has defined the EU’s sense of responsibility 
as “a soft, almost moral, understanding of responsibility and it emerges from, and is 
deeply embedded in the EU’s experience in legal and policy integration” (p. 89). The 
Laeken Declaration (2001), which kick-started the process of constitutional reform 
and led, ultimately, to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, states: “Now that the Cold 
War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, 
Europe need to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation.”  
The European Security Strategy points out further, that “Europe should be ready to 
share its responsibility for global security and in building a better world”. And, once 
it has set out the security challenges facing the EU and the added value of its 
contribution, it states that a “European Union which takes greater responsibility and 
which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight”. Five years 
later this sentence opens the 2008 Implementation Report: “[f]ive years on from [sic] 
adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater 
responsibilities than at any time in its history.” 
The EU’s understanding of its international responsibility has been informed further 
by the RtoP as an emerging international norm. The EU started to engage with the 
RtoP shortly after it had been designed by the ICISS in 2001. However, in official 
EU documents the RtoP began to appear only after its inclusion in the 2005 Outcome 
Document. In a statement by the EU Presidency in April 2005, it acknowledged that 
if a state is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens in a situation of genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross human rights violations, the 
international community has the responsibility to help protect these citizens. The EU 
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emphasised that only if diplomatic and humanitarian measures do not show any 
immediate effect, it lies within the authority of the UN Security to permit 
enforcement measures as a last resort. At the same time, it stressed the importance of 
the prevention component of the RtoP (Dembinski and Reinold, 2011). 
A reference to the RtoP appears also in the Consensus on Development from 
November 2005:  
The EU also strongly supports the responsibility to protect. We cannot 
stand by, as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or other gross 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights are 
committed. The EU will support a strengthened role for the regional 
and sub-regional organisations in the process of enhancing 
international peace and security, including their capacity to coordinate 
donor support in the area of conflict prevention. 
The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS made the EU’s support for the 
emerging norm even more explicit by stating that  
Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of 
their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. (p. 3) 
At the same time the Report emphasises that the EU “must be clear that respect for 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes are not negotiable” (p. 2) 
The picture that emerges from these rare statements shows, as Matthias Dembinski 
and Theresa Reinold (2011: 13) have argued, that the EU has developed a particular 
understanding of the RtoP norm that emphasizes the responsibility to prevent and 
evidently conveys the understanding that force should be used in rare and clearly 
defined circumstances only. Furthermore, EU documents clearly indicate that local 
actors bear the prime responsibility to protect. If states prove then unable or 
unwilling to protect their population, their responsibility would pass over either to 
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the UN or to the geographically responsible regional security organisation. Outside 
of Europe, the EU sees itself primarily in an auxiliary role. It will empower local 
actors or, if absolutely necessary, step in temporarily to fill the gap before local 
actors or the UN do (Gänzle and Grimm, 2010; Brosig, 2011).  
While scholars have long been criticising the EU’s ‘capability-expectations gap’ 
(Smith, 1993), the EU’s understanding of its responsibility (to protect) seems to fit its 
capabilities much better. As predominantly civilian or normative actor, the EU’s sees 
its responsibility mainly in the area of non-coercive crisis management. However, 
since the member states remain the key actors within the CSDP, their understanding 
of the responsibility (to protect) and of the EU’s role matters at least as much as the 
EU’s definition of responsibility (see chapter 3). 
The EU and the use of force 
Since the end of the Cold War, European governments have become more willing to 
deploy military capabilities for voluntary operations in the name of multilateral 
frameworks (Deighton, 2011: 315). EU governments claim that actions that involve 
the use of force “for voluntary operations are an essential and legitimate way of 
upholding international norms of behaviour for peaceful, just and well-functioning 
international systems” (idem). In developing its Common Security and Defence 
policy the EU has shifted its ground from civilian politics to becoming an actor with 
tools that extend to the military spectrum (idem: 317). 
At first, the use of force seems to openly contradict the EU’s aspiration to act as 
normative power and a force for good in its external action. Yet, intervention in 
support of shared norms could be regarded as a necessary requirement for the EU’s 
role as a security actor. The ESS does not make any explicit reference to the use of 
force but rather refers to “military activities” and “robust intervention”. The 
document confirms that the role of the EU as security actor will increase the greater 
the responsibilities it takes. At the same time, it emphasises the need of civilian 
instruments in the area of crisis management and post-crisis reconstruction: “In 
almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian 
chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in 
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crisis and post-crisis situations” (ESS, 2003: 12). The 2008 Implementation Report 
reminds further that the “threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve 
territorial issues – anywhere” (p. 2). 
The type of intervention the EU is ready to perform or at least to consider as 
acceptable is characterised by three constraints. First, military force is regarded as 
‘last resort’. Therefore, EU interventions have more frequently taken the form of 
economic and political reconstruction and peacekeeping through presence on the 
ground. Second, the area of intervention is limited to the EU’s neighbourhood as 
evidenced by both actual performance and the European Security Strategy. Third, 
intervention should only take place in a legal framework or more specifically if 
authorised by the UN Security Council. Taken these elements together convey the 
image of a reluctant security actor that is further restraint by limited European 
military capabilities and dependant on the peculiar institutional structure of EU 
foreign policy, dominated by intergovernmental decision-making.  
Jan Techau wrote in 2013, that “Europeans are not per se unwilling to use force to 
achieve political goals. They only seem to be unwilling to do so in the framework of 
the EU.” Reasons for member states’ reluctance towards joint military operations are 
seen in the absence of a common threat, in the different strategic cultures, the lack of 
military capabilities but also of trust and ambition as well as the economic pressures 
related to the Euro crisis since 2009 (Techau, 2013). However, the EU’s stated 
intention to increase its military capabilities since the 1990s sends the signal that 
military force is still seen as a useful foreign policy tool and that it might be used to 
further the EU’s interests (Smith, 2000: 28). 
2.4 From humanitarian intervention to the 
responsibility to protect – what to expect? 
The analysis of the French, German and British discourse on the Kosovo intervention 
has shown that there was agreement on the policy of military intervention within 
Europe. Even Germany who is traditionally averse to the use of force (see chapter 3) 
was in favour of the Kosovo intervention. France and Britain justified their 
participation in the bombing campaign over Kosovo on the basis of national security 
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interests. France, particularly, warned of the refugee’s flows that would reach Europe 
if the crisis could not be contained. At the same time, French President Chirac 
emphasised that the decision to intervene in Kosovo was grounded in moral reasons 
and not in economic or strategic interests. Germany on the other hand justified its 
participation in the military intervention by referring to its historic responsibility.  
Tony Blair’s presentation of the humanitarian intervention norm shows both the 
difference and similarities with the emerging norm of the RtoP. The first four out of 
these five criteria are reflected in the development of the RtoP, in the aftermath of 
the Kosovo intervention. The biggest difference becomes apparent in the fifth 
criteria. While humanitarian intervention seems to be contingent upon national 
interests and state security, the RtoP is designed to address the people’s needs and is 
based on human security. 
The EU’s role in the Kosovo crisis has been heavily criticised for lacking bolder 
action and an integrated strategy (Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis cited in 
Peterson, 2003: 89). Others argued that the EU acknowledged its responsibilities as 
foreign policy actor during and after the Kosovo crisis (idem). Then Belgian Prime 
Minister Guy Verhofstadt claimed that “one of the most serious dents to the EU’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens had derived from the EU having ‘to wait for 
the Americans’ to intervene in Kosovo” (quoted in Youngs, 2004: 418). 
The developments outlined in this chapter demonstrated that arguably reaching the 
climax of the humanitarian intervention dilemmas of the 1990s, the Kosovo crisis 
constitutes not least timely a juncture in the EU’s history. The violent dissolution of 
former Yugoslavia contributed to the transformation of the EU’s international role 
and its foreign policy ethos. Almost half a decade later, the EU has taken many steps 
in improving its security capabilities, particularly in conflict management. It now has 
a CSDP, political and military decision-making structures, battlegroups, military and 
civilian force catalogues, a security strategy, strategic headquarters, an operational 
planning cell, access to a gendarmerie force and a European Defence Agency. It has 
also undertaken a number of civil, military and civil-military crisis management 
operations.  
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Furthermore, the development of the RtoP in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis 
aimed at shifting the focus of intervention from national interests to human security 
as well as from military action to the prevention of mass atrocities. With the goal of 
protecting civilians, the emerging norm introduced a range of non-coercive 
instruments that should be exhausted before the use of military force is considered. 
However, due to the RtoP’s indeterminacy it remains unclear to what extent there is a 
collective understanding of what the emerging norm means and entails. Divergent 
interpretations might be reflected in an inconsistent application of the RtoP in 
practice.  
The question that arises from this chapter is whether the development of the CSDP 
and the RtoP actually make a difference in whether and how Europe responds to 
mass atrocities in its neighbourhood since the Kosovo crisis in 1999. While this 
chapter traced the emergence of the RtoP and creation of the CSDP from a historical 
perspective, the following chapter places the emphasis on the CSDP and RtoP in 
practice. Chapter 3 will therefore review four cases of RtoP implementation and non-
implementation in the period from 2005 until 2011, while scrutinizing the European 
interpretation of the emerging norm and the role of the EU as security actor. 
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Chapter 3: RtoP and CSDP in practice – 
implementing a collective understanding? 
Having looked at the historical development of the RtoP and institutional evolution 
of the CSDP in the previous chapter, the focus of the following sections will be on 
the RtoP and the CSDP in practice. By picking up the historical narrative from the 
previous chapter, the main aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, the chapter seeks to 
reveal the extent to which there is a collective European understanding of what the 
RtoP means and entails. Second, it scrutinises the extent to which the RtoP has had 
an influence on the EU as a security actor.  
Due to the RtoP’s indeterminacy it is assumed that there are diverging 
understandings of and different levels of commitment to the RtoP. Furthermore as an 
emerging international norm the RtoP has to work its way not only through the EU 
but also through national structures. While the EU’s understanding of the RtoP has 
been addressed in the previous chapter, this chapter starts by looking at the member 
state’s interpretations of the emerging norm.  
Being among the most important players in the area of European security and 
defence, the focus throughout this thesis will be on the ‘Big 3’68. The following 
section therefore briefly reviews the security strategies of France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom (UK) in order to establish the respective general understandings of 
the RtoP. The second and third part of this chapter will analyse the four most 
prominent ‘RtoP cases’ (see Bellamy, 2010) – two cases of RtoP implementation and 
two instances of non-implementation or misuse – with an emphasis on the European 
responses therein. Comparing the French, German, British and the EU discourse 
within and across the four ‘RtoP cases’, in the fourth part of this chapter, will reveal 
to what extent the RtoP has been applied consistently and whether there is a 
collective European understanding of when and how to apply the emerging norm.  
                                                
68 For a more detailed justification of the choice of units of analysis, see chapter 4. 
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3.1 Member states’ responsibility (to protect) 
While all member states subscribed to the protection of human rights as part of the 
EU’s aquis communautaire, they differ widely with regard to the means of 
protection. At one end of the spectrum there are countries whose colonial histories 
accustomed them to interventionist practices – namely France and the UK, who 
consistently supported both a militarily meaningful CSDP and an interventionist 
interpretation of the RtoP. At the other end of the spectrum there are member states 
with a neutral or non-interventionist tradition, like Germany, that emphasise the 
preventive and peace-building aspects of both the CSDP and the RtoP. 
France: sovereignty as responsibility 
France builds its international responsibility on its permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council since the UN’s creation in 1945. In addition to that it assumes an 
essential role in the maintenance of peace in Europe as a founding member of NATO 
and the EU. France has therefore always held a central position in defining the scope 
and the ambition of EU foreign policy. The underlying philosophy of French 
engagement in this area has been a belief in the primacy of national foreign policy as 
a core element of state sovereignty (Lehne, 2012). At the same time, France commits 
to “work for a more unified, stronger European Union, with a greater presence in the 
fields of security and defence” (French White Paper, 2008: 7569). 
The overall aim of France’s security policy is to defend the French population and 
territory:  
Protection and intervention are expected to enable the State first to 
ensure, primarily on the national soil, the security of its citizens, of 
society and the economic life of the country (idem: 61). 
                                                
69 The French government published a new version of the White Paper in 2013. As the empirical focus 
of this study is on European responses to mass atrocities in the Libyan and the Syrian crisis since 
2011, the focus is on the 2008 version of the White Paper. 
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Therefore, France will ensure that it “remains a major military and diplomatic power, 
ready to take on the challenges congruent with our international obligation” (idem: 
9). 
From the French perspective, intervention within the framework of humanitarian 
action can be intended to avert wider conflict and continues to be one of France’s 
“essential mode[s] of action” for its armed forces: “Our intervention capability 
should be such as to guarantee our strategic interests and enable us to shoulder our 
international responsibilities” (idem: 67). Most interventions take place within a 
multilateral framework – either the UN, the EU or NATO. According to the 
“principle of concentration on priority geographical axes” and due to its colonial ties, 
the external dimension of France’s security policy focuses particularly on countries 
in North Africa.  
The use of military force is only envisaged in the case of “a sufficiently grave and 
serious risk or threat” (idem: 68). But France may also take part in an intervention 
directed towards the preservation of peace and international security. The Guidelines 
for the commitment of French armed forces abroad state that prior to the use of 
armed force, other possible measures have to be considered “without prejudice to the 
urgency of legitimate defence of the responsibility to protect” (idem). Moreover the 
democratic legitimacy of a military intervention is crucial. According to the White 
Paper “legitimacy will be all the greater if, for each engagement, the objectives are 
transparent and if it has the explicit support of the national community, as notably 
expressed through its representatives in Parliament” (idem: 69). 
The French security strategy defines sovereignty as responsibility and affirms that 
fundamental principles such as non-interference in internal matters of a state cannot 
be superior to mass atrocities: 
…human rights are no more incompatible with State sovereignty than 
they are with the pursuit of our interests. The sovereignty of the State 
consists in the first place in protecting its population. Neither the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of a State, nor that of 
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the sovereignty can therefore be invoked to defend atrocities such as 
massacres and other massive violations of international humanitarian 
law (idem: 115). 
Germany: shared responsibility 
According to the 2006 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr, German foreign policy is based on a comprehensive concept of security 
and is inseparably linked to the political development of Europe. The White Paper 
states that “Germany stands by its international responsibility for freedom and peace 
and, in doing so, strives for the long-term protection and welfare of its citizens” 
(idem: 14). Moreover, German security policy “is guided by the values enshrined in 
the Basic Law and by the goal of safeguarding the interests of [the] country” (idem: 
20) 
The main aims of Germany’s security policy are in particular the protection of its 
own citizens, ensuring its sovereignty and territorial integrity but also to help 
upholding human rights and strengthen the international order on the basis of 
international law. The comprehensive approach to security includes the use of 
diplomatic, economic, development policies, policing measures and military means. 
However, the White Paper stresses that security cannot be guaranteed with armed 
forces only (idem: 19). Germany thus commits itself to multilateralism and 
international law but has in contrast to France and due to its history developed a 
distinct aversion to the use of military force. 
In accordance with the stated goals in the White Paper, the main tasks of the German 
Bundeswehr is to maintain national security and provide assistance in the defence of 
Germany’s allies (idem: 51). Germany’s commitment to its allies 
(Bündnisverpflichtung) forms an important part of its foreign policy strategy. The 
German armed forces can take part in international conflict prevention or crisis 
management mission only since 1994. The deployment of the Bundeswehr has 
subsequently been integrated into the constitutional structure of Germany’s basic law 
and has to be democratically legitimised by the German Bundestag accordingly.  
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Regarding the RtoP, Germany “accepts its share of the responsibility to protect to 
strive for world peace and international security within the framework of the United 
Nations” (idem: 44). At the same time the White Paper emphasises that Germany 
“remains prepared to accept greater responsibility, also by assuming a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council” (idem: 45). It also predicts that the RtoP will 
increasingly affect the mandating of international peace mission by the UNSC and 
will serve as legitimation under international law particularly when the use of force is 
implied (idem: 44). In comparison to France, Germany seems more reluctant in its 
commitment to the RtoP. This might be mainly related to its aversion of the use of 
military force and its interpretation of the RtoP, as being increasingly linked to the 
issue of military intervention. 
The United Kingdom: collective responsibility 
While Germany wants to be part of a European foreign policy and France aims to 
lead it, the UK’s most important foreign policy relationship remains with the US 
(Lehne, 2012: 16). The 2010 National Security Strategy states that “in order to 
protect our interests at home, we must project our influence abroad” via a network of 
alliances – “principally with the United States of America, but also as a member of 
the European Union and NATO” (p. 5). The main aim of Britain’s foreign policy is 
“to use all [its] national capabilities to build Britain’s prosperity, extend our nation’s 
influence in the world and strengthen our security” (idem: 9) by applying a “’whole 
of government’ approach”. Resembling the concept of comprehensive security, the 
British approach goes beyond the mere use of military means. It emphasises the 
importance of domestic resilience but also a stable global environment.  
In order to shape a stable world, the UK might address causes of instability overseas 
in order to prevent them from manifesting themselves in the UK (idem: 10). 
Furthermore, securing these “strategic interests and responsibilities overseas could in 
some circumstances justify the threat or use of military force”. In this context, there 
might be occasions when it is in the British national interest “to take part in 
humanitarian interventions” (idem: 23). Committing itself to multilateralism, the 
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document states further that British interests can be best pursued in a system of 
collective security. 
The RtoP is not explicitly mentioned in the 2010 British security strategy. However, 
Ambassador Michael Tatham stated at the UN General Assembly in September 2012 
that “the United Kingdom is fully committed to implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect” (Tatham, 5 September 2012). Moreover, the 2006 White Paper on The 
Future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, emphasises the UK’s identity as 
protector (Duncanson and Eschle, 2008: 554). In the White Paper’s foreword, Tony 
Blair states that “the primary responsibility of any government is to ensure the safety 
and security of its citizens” (White Paper, 2006: 5). In comparison to France and 
Germany, British foreign policy is directed exclusively to national interests and 
security. Reflecting the old norm of humanitarian intervention the overseas 
deployment of the British military would therefore only be considered if it also 
involved national security interests directly or indirectly by constituting a threat to 
international peace and security. 
A common European perspective? 
From the diversity of European security strategies, based on different national 
experiences and traditions, derives the difficulty to forge a common European 
security policy (Hyde-Price, 2004: 327). Accordingly, there is disagreement among 
member states about the means and ends of security policy (Baun, 2005). As nation 
states, all three – France, Germany and the UK – give priority to national security 
and state interests. France and the UK both seem willing (and able) to defend their 
national interests at home and abroad. However, while the UK makes its 
participation in a military intervention overseas contingent upon national security 
issues, France sees its sovereignty as responsibility and would thus also take part if 
security and safety of others were at stake.  
In fact, France is the only one among the three that prioritises human rights over the 
fundamental principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in case of grave 
violations. Germany, on the other hand, appears much more reluctant to the use of 
military force and is the only country where the deployment of the armed forces is 
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constrained by its constitution. It however accepts its shared responsibility and 
emphasises commitment to its alliances. 
In order to see how these different security strategies and understandings of the RtoP 
play out in practice, the following sections will review two cases before the Libyan 
and the Syrian crises in 2011, in which the RtoP has been applied – the Darfur crisis 
and the post-electoral violence in Kenya – and two cases in which it has arguably 
been misused – the French attempt to invoke RtoP after the cyclone Nargis in Burma 
and the Russian-Georgian war.70 The analysis of these four cases will focus 
particularly on the French, German and British discourse as well as the role of the 
EU. 
3.2 RtoP and CSDP in practice 
The Darfur crisis 
Before the Libyan crisis, two of the most prominent cases in which the UN has 
invoked the RtoP doctrine were the Darfur crisis and the post-electoral violence in 
Kenya. The crisis in Darfur was the first to be seen through an RtoP prism and 
became a “primary test case” (Bellamy, 2010: 153) for the nascent doctrine. The 
conflict that started in 2003, when two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked 
Sudanese government posts in response to decades of political and economic 
marginalisation and neglect. It has been labelled one of the world’s worst 
humanitarian crises.71 Until spring 2004, mass atrocities and crimes against humanity 
were widely known to be occurring in Darfur, and the number of ‘war affected’72 
came close to one million. Until June the next year, the number had reached 2.9 
million (Prunier, 2007: 148-152).  
                                                
70 The four cases are among those most cited for the application of the RtoP by media commentators, 
diplomats, policy makers and scholar (see Bellamy, 2010). 
71 According to the Darfur Consortium (2011), 300,000 civilians died in the course of the conflict and 
2,5 million Darfurians had to flee their homes. 
72 The UN’s term for those killed, raped, displaced, malnourished etc. 
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Before supporting an AU-led peace operation in Darfur, the UN regarded the 
possibility of a multilateral intervention in Darfur as unfeasible (Badescu and 
Bergholm, 2009: 295). The government in Khartoum rejected any UN presence in 
Darfur. In July 2004 the AU deployed sixty observes and 300 troops to Darfur as the 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and in August 2004 it started the Abuja 
negotiations for inter-Sudanese peace talks. In March 2005, the UNSC referred 
Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and established the UN Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS) with the task to reinforce AMIS and implement the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), intended to end the conflict in southern Sudan. 
In August 2006, the UNSC passed resolution 1706 recalling resolution 1674 and 
expanding the mandate of UNMIS authorising it to use “all necessary means … to 
prevent attacks and threats against civilians” (UNSC, 2006a). This was the first time 
that the UNSC invoked the RtoP to authorise the use of force. However, the 
resolution made deployment conditional on the consent of the Sudanese government. 
It assigned a 26,000-strong UN peacekeeping force to replace the AU mission. In 
July 2007, UNSC resolution 1769 established the African Union/UN Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID officially took over from AMIS in 
December 2007. In July 2008, the UNSC extended UNAMID’s mandate for another 
year, followed by another extension in August 2009 for one more year until July 
2010. 
On the European side, Germany formally proposed the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers to Darfur in May 2004. However, inside the UNSC, Pakistan, China 
and Russia believed that the scale of human suffering in Darfur was insufficient to 
provoke serious reflections on whether Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities to its 
citizens. Initially, France, Germany and the UK saw the responsibility primarily with 
the Sudanese government and emphasised that their crisis response would not go 
beyond the application of sanctions. On the adoption of Resolution 1556 the French 
Representative to the UN stated, “the primary responsibility of the government of 
Sudan is to protect its population” (Jean Marc de la Sablière, quoted in UNSC, 
2004). Germany stressed that “the government of Sudan must now act rapidly and 
decisively for the sake of its very own population – to which it has … a sacred 
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obligation to protect. Otherwise … further Council deliberations could lead to the 
imposition of sanctions” (Gunter Pleuger, 2004, quoted in idem). Similarly, the UK 
affirmed that “the best way to deliver security to the people of Darfur is to get those 
with primary responsibility for it to do it … the government of Sudan” (quoted in 
Bellamy, 2006: 45). 
When the UNSC met to pass Resolution 1706 in July 2006, Germany amongst others 
invoked the language of RtoP but without suggesting that the responsibility ought to 
pass from the Sudanese government to the UNSC. They referred to the AU as 
bearing the primary responsibility for action should Sudan fail in its responsibilities. 
The intervention debate crystallized around the question of who had the 
responsibility to protect the Darfurian population (Bellamy, 2006: 43). France 
expressed that there was a “collective responsibility” at least to implement the 
resolution (Jean-Pierre Lacroix, 2007, quoted in UNSC 2007b) but not to go any 
further. Merely the British Representative indicated a shift of the responsibility from 
the Sudanese government to the UN Security Council. At the same time the UK 
reminded to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan:  
The test before the Council today was whether it was prepared to act to 
mandate that United Nations mission and assume its responsibilities 
towards the people of Darfur. The adoption of the resolution show it is. 
The text also states clearly and categorically that the Council remains 
committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan, 
which will be unaffected by the transition to a United Nations 
Operations. (Karen Pierce quoted in UNSC, 2007b) 
Finally, by referring to the RtoP the UK highlighted that it was “very pleased that 
this is the first Security Council resolution mandating a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation to make an explicit reference to this responsibility” (UNSC, 2007b). 
The EU’s assessment of and its response to the crisis in Darfur were equally 
reluctant. After having completed a fact-finding mission in Darfur in August 2004, 
the advisor to the EU High Representative states that there was “no situation of 
genocide” (Carroll, 2004). However, the EU expressed considerable doubts as to the 
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willingness of the Sudanese government to assume its responsibility to protect its 
civilian population from attacks. Yet, by the end of the year, the European 
Parliament declared “that the actions of the Sudanese government in Darfur were 
‘tantamount to genocide’” (Bock and Miller, 2004). Furthermore, EU minister 
threatened sanctions “if no tangible progress was achieved” in meeting UN demands 
to halt the killing (idem). 
Despite an AMIS support operation, further direct intervention by the EU in Darfur 
proved to be difficult, due to both objections of the Sudanese government, which 
opposed any additional intervention, but also from a lack of willingness of the 
member states (Gya, 2010: 9). The EU also had to consider the risk of jeopardising 
the UN mission and the need to coordinate international efforts. Most of the EU 
member states were not keen on a long-term commitment in Darfur and therefore 
preferred a ‘bridging’ operation, which would see the mission pass to the UN 
eventually. 
Pushed by France, which underlined the connection between Sudan and Chad, the 
EU turned its attention in October 2007 to the collateral issue thrown up by the 
Darfur conflict, namely 170.000 internally displaced persons (IDP) in Chad, and 
230.000 refugees from Sudan. In 2007, it was again the European Parliament that 
made the strongest statement issuing a resolution, invoking the RtoP and calling for 
action in Darfur. Member states, however, merely signalled their “readiness to 
consider further measures” (Waging Peace, 2007). 
To deal with the IDPs on the border of Sudan and Chad, French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy and the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, met to discuss a possible 
EU mission to Chad. The President of Chad, Idriss Déby, would not accept a UN 
force but was persuaded to allow a EU mission (Natsios and Scott, 2012: 251). 
Despite little enthusiasm amongst EU member states for a mission, with resources 
stretched by several CSDP and other operations already, EUFOR Tchad was 
established in January 2008. In accordance with UNSC Resolution 1778 the mission 
was mandated to uphold security and protect aid corridors for the refugees and the 
UN.  
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EUFOR was criticised at the outset. It was described as yet “another French initiative 
to strengthen its influence in the region, and above all in Chad” (FRIDE, 2008). 
During the deployment, the mission was criticised further by its lack of potential to 
make a significant difference due to its size, equipment, capabilities and mandate 
(Gya, 2010). EUFOR’s negative assessment was coupled with deteriorating security 
situations in Chad and in Darfur (Seibert, 2008). 
Some argued that the case of Darfur constitutes a gradual step towards the 
consolidation of the RtoP as an international norm. According to Max Matthews 
(2008), the fact that the UNSC explicitly invoked the RtoP in its resolutions on 
Darfur, while deciding on implementing measures, added legal weight to the 
principle and foretold a trend towards the development of the RtoP into binding 
international law. By contrast, Alex Bellamy (2010) argued that both advocates and 
opponents of intervention used the RtoP language to legitimise their actions. RtoP 
allowed opponents of intervention to replace traditional arguments on the absolute 
validity of sovereignty against intervention in the case of humanitarian emergencies 
with arguments about who had the primary responsibility to protect civilians in 
Darfur.  
While Germany emphasised the responsibility of the Sudanese government, France 
eventually spoke of a collective security towards the people in Darfur. Only the UK 
admitted that the responsibility had shifted from the Sudanese government to the 
international community. The EU’s response remained very reluctant on a rhetorical 
as well as on a practical level. The RtoP was merely invoked by the European 
Parliament which was demanding a stronger EU response but does not have much of 
an influence in EU foreign policy-making. EUFOR Chad was eventually deployed to 
Sudan’s neighbouring country on a demand by France but achieved only limited 
success. On the EU level the RtoP had only limited influence in the case of the 
Darfur crisis, which revealed different interpretations among the member states. 
Accordingly, the RtoP failed to activate the EU’s responsibility to use the CSDP in 
its crisis response.   
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Post-election violence in Kenya 
The second case that was viewed through the RtoP prism was the reaction to post-
electoral violence in Kenya in 2007. Presidential elections were held on 27 
December 2007. The announcement of the victory of incumbent President Mwai 
Kibaki against opposition candidate Raila Odinga triggered allegations of electoral 
fraud leading to violent demonstrations, causing over 1,000 casualties and 300,000 
displaced persons (United Nations, 2008). Desmond Tutu and Francis Deng, the UN 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide were the first to make references to 
RtoP in relation to the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya (UN News, 2008). The 
UN Secretary-General reminded the Kenyans of their legal and moral responsibility 
to protect the lives of their citizens but did not repeat this reference to RtoP in 
subsequent statements (Strauss, 2009: 118). In early 2008, a UN-supported mediation 
effort by the AU Panel of Eminent Personalities, led by former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, conduced Kibaki and Odinga to agree on a power sharing 
agreement. This mediated solution is said to have prevented a campaign of mass 
atrocities (Bellamy, 2010: 154).  
In Europe, it was France that was at the forefront of calling for an international 
response on the basis of the RtoP. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated 
that “in the name of the responsibility to protect, it is urgent to help the people of 
Kenya. The United Nations Security Council must take this question and act” (Tutu, 
2008). However, when the UNSC took up the matter on 6 February 2008, the 
Presidential Statement took note of the violence and its impact on the region, but 
stopped short of referring to the RtoP (UNSC, 2008).  
France pointed towards the role of Europe in the response to the Kenyan crisis. On 7 
February 2008, State Secretary Jean-Pierre Jouyet affirmed further that he would 
prefer Europe to intervene in Kenya than the US as Europe still had to progress in 
terms of its international influence (Jouyet, 7 February 2008)73. At the same time, the 
                                                
73 « Je préfèrerais que ce soit l’Europe qui soit intervenue au Kenya plutôt que la secrétaire d’Etat 
américaine. Nous avons encore de progrès à faire en termes d’influence européenne au niveau 
international. » 
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French Foreign Minister noted that an outside military intervention was not a 
solution but that it was necessary to put on a certain pressure (Kouchner, 15 January 
2008)74. France expressed its trust in Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts and called on 
the UNSC – in the name of the RtoP – to open ways for delivery of humanitarian aid 
to the Kenyan population (idem)75. However, Kouchner also acknowledged that the 
crises in Darfur and Chad, as well as the one in Kenya have showed the limits of the 
RtoP (idem)76. 
Without making any reference to RtoP, Germany called for an immediate end to the 
violence and for a peaceful solution to the conflict between the government and the 
opposition in January 2008 (Steinmeier, 1 January 2008). German Foreign Minister 
Franz-Walter Steinmeier expressed concerns that the political crisis in Kenya was 
causing extensive human suffering and that it challenged the economic success and 
political success of Kenya over the past years (Steinmeier, 27 January 2008)77. Only 
when Annan’s mediation efforts started to gain ground at the beginning of February, 
the German government stressed that the protection of the civilian population was 
the highest priority (Steinmeier, 2 February 2008)78. Thus the focus of Germany’s 
crisis response seemed to be initially on Kenya as an economic and political actor. 
Germany’s approach became more people-centred only, once a solution to the crisis 
seemed to be in sight.  
While the RtoP was almost absent in the German response, the British discourse 
reflects the emerging norm to a greater extent but also with a stronger focus on the 
first pillar. The UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband stated on 10 January 2008 that 
“Kenya’s leaders must live up to their responsibilities, end this violence, and work 
for the security and safety of the people of Kenya”. When asked whether the UNSC 
                                                
74 « Bien sûr, nous n’interviendrons pas militairement mais il faudrait quand même avoir la possibilité 
de peser d’un certain poids. » 
75 « Au nom de la responsabilité de protéger, il est urgent de venir en aide aux population du Kenya. 
Le Conseil de sécurité des Nation unies doit se saisir de cette question et agir. » 
76 « …responsabilité de protéger. On en voit les limites, au Darfour comme au Tchad, et on les voit au 
Kenya… » 
77 „Die politische Krise in Kenia verursache großes menschliches Leid und stelle die Erfolge der 
wirtschaftlichen und politischen Entwicklung Kenias der letzten Jahre in Frage.“ 
78 „Oberste Priorität hat der Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung.“ 
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should get involved in the political crisis in Kenya, the Foreign Secretary reiterated 
that a role of the international community cannot be a substitute for the responsibility 
of the Kenyan leaders: 
I think we … need a strong international response but we shouldn’t let 
that become a substitute for the fact that this still remains an issue 
where Kenya’s own leaders need to show a lot more statesmanship than 
they’ve shown so far… (Miliband, 1 February 2008).  
At the invitation of the government of Kenya, the EU established a mission to 
observe the general elections there on 27 December 2007. On behalf of the EU the 
French Presidency condemned the violence in Kenya and urged the political leaders 
to refrain from any further violence (Council of the EU, 4 January 2008). 
Resembling the language of the RtoP, the EU stressed the responsibility of all parties 
to immediately end the violence and to find a political and democratic solution that 
benefits the Kenyan people (Council of the EU, 11 January 2008). Despite this 
rhetorical response the EU’s role in response to the Kenyan crisis remained fairly 
insignificant. Ultimately, it was Kofi Annan’s mediation that led to an end of the 
conflict. 
Due to the successful prevention of further atrocities and its non-coercive character, 
the Kenyan intervention has been praised as the most successful case of RtoP 
implementation and a “high watermark” (Evans, 2011a) for the use of the concept. 
Gareth Evans has argued that “Kenya in early 2008 is probably the best example we 
have so far of the responsibility to protect appearing to play an important energising 
role in stimulating an effective response…” (quoted in Preston-McPhie and Sharma, 
2012: 279). However, the Kenyan case also uncovered questions and limitations 
regarding the practical implementation of the RtoP. The international agreement was 
facilitated by host-country consent and the limitation of the intervention to 
diplomatic tools. It is far from clear how the international community would have 
reacted, had these tools failed. There is little evidence to suggest that the UNSC 
would have been prepared to adopt a more robust stance if it had been required 
(Bellamy, 2010: 154-55).  
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The two cases reveal a consensus that the international community has a legitimate 
role to play in the case of humanitarian emergencies. However, although the RtoP 
was utilized in both cases, in neither did the emerging norm provide a catalyst for 
decisive common action. The capacity or incapacity of RtoP to serve as catalyst for 
collective action can be further tested by reviewing cases of mass atrocities in which 
RtoP has been misused or not considered at all. Two prominent cases of non-
implementation and misuse are the cyclone Nargis in Burma and the Russian-
Georgian war. 
Cyclone Nargis in Burma 
When cyclone Nargis hit Burma’s Irrawaddy Delta in 2008, and the Burmese 
authorities at first denied access to foreign aid workers, French Foreign Minister 
Bernard Kouchner called on the UNSC to invoke the RtoP to grant humanitarian 
access without the consent of the Burmese generals. He stated that  
we are seeing at the United Nations if we can’t implement the 
‘responsibility to protect’ given that food, boats and relief teams are 
there, and obtain a UN resolution which authorises the delivery [of 
aid] and imposes  this on the Burmese government”(Mydans, 2008). 
The Foreign Minister warned that not helping the Burmese people could increase the 
risk of crimes against humanity and therefore called on the international community 
to assume their ‘responsibility to protect’ (Le Figaro, 17 May 2008).  
Akin, the German government considered the delivery of humanitarian aid even 
against the will of the Burmese government. The Minister of Development 
Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul affirmed that “the international community has the 
responsibility and the right to assist people in emergencies even if the government is 
resisting” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 May 2008)79. Germany supported 
Kouchner’s initiative to put pressure on the Burmese government. Furthermore, 
Germany together with France and the UK asked for a UNSC resolution that would 
                                                
79 „Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat die Verantwortung und das Recht, Menschen in Not zur Seite 
zu stehen, auch wenn die eigene Regierung sich dagegen sträubt...“ 
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force the military government in Burma to let in international aid workers (FAZ, 13 
May 2008). 
The UK saw the responsibility primarily with the Burmese government. British 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown described the crisis as one that was 
being made into a manmade catastrophe by the negligence, the neglect 
and the inhuman treatment of the Burmese people by a regime that is 
failing to act and to allow the international community what it wants to 
do. (McKinnon and Tran, 2008) 
However, Brown added that “the responsibility lies with the Burmese regime” 
(idem). 
The EU High Representative Javier Solana, again, took the view that the UN Charter 
opened ‘certain paths’ to bring help to a country affected by a natural disaster, even 
if the political leadership did not allow swift and effective support (FAZ, 13 May 
2008). The EU met to discuss its response to the cyclone and the French proposal to 
invoke the RtoP. Although, EU ministers failed to reach a consensus on the French 
proposal, Solana declared that the international community “should use all possible 
means to get aid through to the victims of Myanmar’s cyclone” (O’Neill, 2008).  
The special advisor on issues related to the RtoP, Edward Luck claimed that “linking 
the ‘responsibility to protect doctrine’ to the situation in Burma is a misapplication of 
the doctrine” (BBC News, 2008). Conversely, some argued that Burma could have 
been an RtoP case (see for example Cohen, 2009) because the natural disaster turned 
into a human-made disaster, as also argued by the UK. The refusal of the Burmese 
authorities to allow external support after the cyclone did not, in itself, trigger the 
application of the RtoP. If such actions had led to massive deaths and displacements, 
then RtoP would have been relevant. The French proposal was therefore finally 
rejected due to the limitation of the RtoP to genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing.  
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The Russian-Georgian War 
Another misuse of the RtoP doctrine was the invocation in the context of the 2008 
Russian-Georgian war. After a forceful intervention in the breakaway province of 
South Ossetia, President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
argued that the use of force was aimed at preventing genocide against the separatists. 
On 9 August, foreign minister Sergej Lavrov told the BBC “that the laws of the 
Russian Federation make it absolutely unavoidable to us to exercise the 
responsibility to protect” (quoted in Bellamy, 2010: 151). Western governments 
broadly rejected Moscow’s arguments on the grounds that the claim of genocide was 
exaggerated and the use of force disproportionate. Critiques also argued that there 
was no legal authority for unilateral RtoP intervention in Georgia since Russia lacked 
UNSC authorisation (Vlasic, 2012: 171). 
Moscow used the RtoP internationally to legitimise its intervention, but the public 
discourse less reflected humanitarian rhetoric than a forceful stance against the 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili (Badescu, 2011: 143). Further evidence of 
Russia’s false humanitarian claims emerged from a similar operation in Abkhazia. 
Russia argued that sending additional forces into another breakaway region was a 
preventive act to reassure the local population that the situation in South Ossetia 
would not be repeated (Kendall, 2008). Within days, Russian troops had expelled 
Georgian forces and controlled both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In August 2008, 
Russia officially recognised both provinces as independent states and implemented a 
ceasefire mediated by the French President at the time holding the presidency of the 
EU. This episode fuelled the criticism of RtoP as being used as a ‘Trojan horse’ for 
state interests.  
On 8 August 2008, France emphasised the respect for Georgia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity within the internationally recognised borders (Point de presse, 8 
August 2008)80. Moreover, the French Foreign Minister stressed the role of the EU in 
working towards ending “this vicious war, like all wars elsewhere, but this 
                                                
80 « La France réitère son attachement a la souveraineté et a l’intégrité de la Géorgie dans se frontières 
internationalement reconnues. » 
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particularly brutal one taking place on Europe’s doorstep” (Kouchner, 10 August 
2008). He added that he did not “understand why Europe did not get involved in 
trying to achieve an immediate cease-fire”81 (idem). 
Similarly to France, Germany called for respect of the territorial integrity of Georgia 
and highlighted that the principle of non-interference is at the core of Germany’s 
response to the conflict. At the same time, Steinmeier indicated that by attacking and 
invading Georgian territory, Russia had crossed a line (Steinmeier, 11 August 2008). 
However, Germany did not specify further whether Russia’s behaviour would have 
any further consequences and remained very reluctant in assigning blame, let alone 
responsibility to one party or another (Steinmeier, 27 August 2008). 
Speaking in the Georgian capital Tbilisi on 8 August 2008, the British Foreign 
Secretary warned Russia that it should expect a response for its actions and that the 
international community would not forget the invasion of Georgia (Blomfield, 2008). 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown confirmed that “there is no justification for continued 
Russian military action in Georgia, which threatens the stability of the entire region 
and risks a humanitarian catastrophe” (Brown quoted in BBC News, 2008b). He 
claimed that “there is a clear responsibility on the Russian government to bring this 
conflict quickly to an end” (idem). Furthermore, he emphasised that Russia had 
clearly breached international law by violating Georgia’s territorial integrity. In 
comparison to Germany, the UK directly accused Russia of a disproportionate use of 
force and of disregarding international law.  
Under the French EU Council Presidency the EU played a surprisingly high-profile 
role in the Russian-Georgian War (Halbach, 2009: 113).  For the first time it was the 
EU, not the US, that led the process of ending a conflict in the EU’s neighbourhood. 
The EU condemned the violence and the disproportionate use of force by the Russian 
government but did not directly blame Russia nor did it indicate any consequences 
                                                
81 « La mission de l’Union européenne, est d’essayer de mettre fin à cette guerre odieuse, comme 
toutes les guerres d’ailleurs, mais celle-là particulièrement brutale qui se déroule aux portes de 
l’Europe. On ne comprendrait pas que l’Europe ne s’implique pas à essayer d’obtenir un cessez-le-feu 
immédiat. » 
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for Russia’s behaviour. However, the EU committed itself “including through a 
presence on the ground, to support every effort to secure a peaceful and lasting 
solution to the conflict in Georgia” (European Council, 1 September 2008). The EU 
contributed to the OSCE observer mission in South Ossetia and decided to send a 
fact-finding mission with the “task helping to gather information and defining the 
modalities of increased EU commitment on the ground, under the ESDP” (idem). 
Following the ceasefire agreement initially negotiated by the Nicolas Sarkozy, in his 
function of Presidency of the EU, the EU deployed the monitoring mission EUMM 
Georgia with the objective to contribute to the post-war stabilisation process in 
Georgia and the surrounding region. 
While the unilateral misuse of the emerging norm can serve to test the limits of its 
applicability, the failure to invoke the doctrine when a trigger is actually present is 
the type of inconsistency that is arguably more detrimental to the credibility of the 
RtoP as a universal norm. There are several cases where one or more of the four 
RtoP crimes were committed but where the RtoP norm was not invoked. According 
to Bellamy (2010: 150) these cases include Afghanistan (2001-ongoing), Iraq (2003-
ongoing), Somalia (2006-ongoing), and Sudan (north-south, 2008-ongoing). 
Depending on whom you ask, more cases can be identified.82 
The selectivity and double standards in applying the RtoP were indeed one of the 
areas of concern during the 2009 UN General Assembly debate on the 
implementation of the RtoP. Some member states countered these concerns noting 
that “no principle had withstood perfect application and that it would be wrong to 
conclude that because the international community might not act everywhere, it 
should therefore act nowhere” (Global Centre for the RtoP, 2009: 2). However, the 
decision rules in the UNSC provide for very few countries to determine in which 
cases to act. 
                                                
82 An actualised list of eligible cases can be found on the website of the International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises. 
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3.3 RtoP as a European norm 
The first aim of this chapter was to answer whether there is a collective European 
understanding of what the RtoP means and implies. A comparison of the positions of 
France, Germany and the UK on the four above reviewed RtoP cases shows that 
there is agreement on the first pillar – the responsibility of each state to protect its 
own population. However, there seems to be much less agreement on when the 
responsibility moves from the state to the international community. Diverging views 
also surfaced regarding the question of whether the RtoP also applies to cases beyond 
the four crimes mentioned in the 2005 Outcome Document. And finally different 
understandings regarding the use of force under the RtoP could be detected. 
France made the strongest arguments for the application of the RtoP in the case of 
Burma after the cyclone Nargis in 2008, by proposing a military intervention with 
the aim of securing the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Burmese people. During 
the post-election violence in Kenya France emphasised that the crisis showed the 
limits of the RtoP while at the same time advising against any use of military means. 
In case of the Darfur crisis, France did not explicitly promote the application of the 
RtoP and therefore spoke rather of a collective responsibility. Against this 
background it seems as if the French interpretation of the RtoP is strongly linked to 
the use of force and the question of military intervention.  
By contrast, Germany rarely referred to the RtoP explicitly and was not in favour of 
considering the use of military means in any of the four cases. Germany seems to 
subscribe merely to the first pillar of the RtoP as in the case of the Darfur crisis as 
well as to the second pillar (the responsibility to assist) in the case of the Kenyan 
crisis. RtoP was absent in the German discourse on the Kenyan crisis and on the 
Russian-Georgian war. In case of the latter, Germany moreover took a more neutral 
position than France and the UK. 
The UK discourse reflected the RtoP more frequently. In case of the Darfur crisis the 
UK committed to both the first pillar and the third pillar (the responsibility of the 
international community) of the RtoP. At the same time the UK emphasised its 
respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore the UK 
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made clear that in some cases – as in the instance of Kenya – the responsibility of the 
state cannot be replaced by the responsibility of the international community. During 
the Russian-Georgian war, the UK openly accused Russia of breaching international 
law.  
The review of the four RtoP cases reveals a mixed picture regarding the collective 
understanding of the RtoP. Agreement among France, Germany and the UK does not 
seem to go beyond the first pillar of the emerging norm. Despite that, member states 
seem divided on the meaning of pillar two and three as well as on the actions these 
components entail.  
The second aim of this chapter was to assess to what extent the RtoP and the CSDP 
have an influence on the EU’s role as a security actor. The EU was able to show the 
strongest commitment in its response to the Russia-Georgia war by contribution to 
the ceasefire agreement (in form of the French EU Presidency), as well as by 
supporting the peace process with presence on the ground (EUMM Georgia). 
However, the RtoP is rarely reflected in the EU official discourse and does not seem 
to serve as a catalyst for a decisive EU response. Furthermore, the EU’s role in the 
ceasefire agreement has to be attributed mainly to the efforts of French EU 
Presidency under Nicolas Sarkozy. 
In case of the Darfur crisis, the EU expressed doubts on the willingness of the 
Sudanese government to assume its responsibility and the European Parliament 
invoked the RtoP. However, member states could not agree on a common response 
going beyond civilian means and support to AMIS. Similarly, EU member states 
were unable to reach an agreement on the French proposal to invoke the RtoP in the 
case of cyclone Nargis in Burma. Finally, in case of Kenya, the EU had established – 
on invitation of the Kenyan government – an election observation mission, the 
conflict between the government and the opposition was, however, mainly solved 
due to Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts. In combination with the RtoP, the CSDP 
seems therefore to have only a limited influence on the EU’s role as a security actor. 
However, this might also be related to the fact that three out four RtoP cases 
analysed above were geographically outside the EU’s neighbourhood. 
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RtoP France Germany The United Kingdom The EU 
In 
general 
Intervention as essential mode of 
action to guarantee strategic 
interests and shoulder international 
responsibilities 
Intervention as preservation of 
international peace and security 
Importance of democratic 
legitimacy 
Sovereignty as responsibility 
Aversion to the use of 
military force 
Protection of own citizens 
ensuring sovereignty and 
territorial integrity  
Comprehensive approach 
to security 
Share of the RtoP within 
the UN 
Protect own interests and 
people 
Build Britain’s prosperity, 
extend its influence in the 
world and strengthen 
security 
‘Whole of government’ 
approach 
Fully committed to 
implement the RtoP 
Comprehensive security 
Supporting the UNSC 
‘Robust intervention’ 
Shared RtoP regarding the four 
RtoP crimes 
Respect for fundamental 
principles of international law 
such as sovereignty, non-




2004: responsibility of the Sudanese 
government 
2007: collective responsibility 
Responsibility of the 
Sudanese government 
Sanctions 
2004: Responsibility of the 
Sudanese government 
2007: Responsibility of the 
international community, but 
emphasis on Sudanese 
sovereignty and territorial 
integrity 
Doubts about Sudanese 
government’s willingness to 
assume its responsibility 
European Parliament invoking 
RtoP 
Disagreement among member 
state 
Initiated by France, military 
CSDP mission in Chad 
(EUFOR Chad) 
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RtoP of the international 
community/ the UNSC 
European intervention rather than 
US to increase Europe’s influence 
Limits of the RtoP 
No military intervention but 
political solution 
Responsibility of the Kenyan 
leaders 
RtoP absent Responsibility of the Kenyan 
leaders 
Role of the international 
community cannot substitute 
a state’s responsibility 






RtoP due to risks of crimes against 
humanity 
Responsibility of the 
international community 
to assist Burmese people 
Call for UNSC resolution 
Responsibility of the 
Burmese government 
No agreement on French 




Respect of Georgia’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity 
Importance of the EU’s role in 




Responsibility of the 
Russian government 
Disproportionate use of force 
Breach of international law 
Disproportionate use of force 
Peace agreement negotiated by 
French EU Presidency 
Support to peace process with 
EUMM Georgia 
Table 6: Overview of European interpretations of the RtoP   
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3.4 Reassessing RtoP as (emerging) international 
norm 
Since the 2005 World Summit, the RtoP has slowly but steadily made its way into 
the international discourse. However, the inconsistent implementation of the RtoP 
has raised questions with regard to its development as emerging international norm. 
The case of Darfur showed that there is no consensus on the legal weight of the RtoP 
in relation to other norms such as non-interference and about what ought to be done. 
The implicit use of the RtoP in the case of Kenya was possible because engagement 
was limited to diplomacy and host-state consent. Finally, the broader use (or misuse) 
of the RtoP does not feature a collective understanding of what RtoP means and 
entails. The review of the four RtoP cases shows that there is no international 
consensus, not even among supporters of the RtoP, on how to operationalise it. 
Therefore, the implementation of the RtoP remains a work in progress. 
However, the choices that are being made both at the UN and by individual 
governments shape the development of the emerging norm. Normative development 
should not be seen as a precursor to implementation, but it continues throughout the 
process of application. When comparing the normative development of the RtoP 
since its creation in 2001 with its practical application until 2011, four conclusions 
can be drawn: 
1. RtoP is used by proponents and opponents of the norm. As suggested by the 
Darfur crisis it has been invoked to justify action as well as inaction. 
Moreover, the Russian invasion of Georgia confirms the concerns that the 
RtoP can also be abused to fit the interests of the powerful. 
2. The scope of the RtoP is limited to the four crimes as stated in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document (genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing). The rejection of France’s proposal to invoke 
RtoP in case of the natural disaster after the cyclone Nargis in Burma and of 
Russia’s claim of having prevented genocide in Georgia affirmed this 
limitation of the norm. 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Theoretical and analytical framework        106 
3. The ‘toolbox’ of instruments implied by the RtoP remains unclear. Reaction 
under the RtoP should not be tantamount to military intervention but should 
at first exhaust less coercive measures, such as political and diplomatic 
pressure as well as economic sanctions or referrals to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). 
4. The implementation of the RtoP and of the CSDP is challenged by the lack of 
political will from powerful states, especially those that have declared their 
support for the RtoP, to commit military forces in ways that would challenge 
the traditional meaning of sovereignty. 
This chapter has highlighted the importance of the RtoP’s practical application for its 
evolution starting from the millennium until 2011. Building on the historical 
narrative traced in chapter 2, this section has provided a broad overview of the most 
prominent cases of RtoP application, while emphasising the evolving role of the EU 
as a security actor. The historical background (chapter 2) and the practical 
application (chapter 3) of the RtoP and the CSDP have also informed the theoretical 
and analytical framework presented in chapter 1. The approach developed to assess 
the influence of the RtoP on European responses to mass atrocities will now be 
applied to two case studies ten years after the creation of the RtoP and the CSDP. 
The outbreak of the Arab Spring in late 2010 and the Libyan crisis in particular have 
essentially revived the debate on Europe’s responsibility to protect. The following 
two chapters provide an in-depth case study analysis of the Libyan crisis from 
February to October 2011 (chapter 4) and the Syrian crisis from March 2011 to 
September 2013 (chapter 5).  
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PART II 
Chapter 4: The Libyan crisis – protection vs. 
intervention? 
On 22 February 2011, only days after violence erupted in Libya, the members of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) called on the Libyan government to meet 
its responsibility to protect its population…” They underscored the need to hold 
those accountable for attacks, including by forces under their control on civilians 
(UNSC, 2011a). Faced with escalating violence and something increasingly 
resembling a civil war, the UNSC identified Libya as a “threat to international peace 
and security” and adopted a range of measures on the basis of the Responsibility to 
Protect (RtoP). Within weeks the UNSC imposed an arms embargo and sanctions, 
referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), established a no-fly 
zone and authorised the UN member states to “take all necessary measures…to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya” (UNSC, 2011b). This was the first time that the UNSC had taken 
such quick and decisive action, explicitly based on the RtoP and without government 
consent.  
Following the decision of the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over 
Libya in response to the escalating violence against civilians, proponents of the RtoP 
have elevated the concept from notable development to triumphant achievement 
(Bolopion, 2012; The Economist, 2011). UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 
(quoted in ICRtoP, 2011) declared that the decision to authorise a military 
intervention “affirm[ed], clearly and unequivocally, the international’s community’s 
determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated 
upon them by their government”. One of the main proponents of the RtoP norm, 
Gareth Evans, announced in an article entitled End of Argument (2011) that the 
world had reached an “overwhelming consensus, at least on basic principles” of the 
RtoP.  
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The European Union (EU) clearly supported the RtoP in its discourse. Accordingly, 
the protection of civilians had been declared as being the main aim in the EU’s 
response to the Libyan crisis (Gottwald, 2012a). However, the EU remained 
incapable of reacting with military means and of contributing to the military 
intervention due to disagreement among the member states and the lack of 
capabilities. While France together with the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States (US) took the lead in implementing the no-fly zone in Libya, Germany as 
another core member state abstained in the voting on Resolution 1973. Despite the 
UN and the EU acting as norm entrepreneurs, the Libyan crisis revealed different 
perspectives on how best to respond to the crisis. Furthermore, it has been claimed 
that the military operation went beyond the mandate by extending air strikes to non-
military areas in order to achieve a regime change. The presumed overstepping of the 
UNSC mandate raised questions about whether the decision to use force in Libya 
was a manifestation of the international community’s commitment to the emerging 
norm of the RtoP, or whether it was a military intervention based on a hidden 
agenda.  
This chapter focuses on the influence of the RtoP on European responses to the 
Libyan crisis from February 2011, marking the outbreak of the violent conflict, to 
October 2011, flagged by Muammar Gaddafi’s death and a de-escalation of the 
conflict. According to the previously developed research design, the analysis starts 
with the UN and the EU responses to the Libyan crisis and their potential roles as 
norm entrepreneurs for the RtoP. Furthermore, this chapter analyses the French, 
German and British official discourses in terms of their crisis perception, the 
discussed foreign policy options and the actual policies implemented. The final part 
of this chapter will draw some preliminary conclusions on the influence of the RtoP 
and on the role of the EU as a security actor.  
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Box 2: Map of the Libyan crisis 
Description: 
     Held by anti-Gaddafi factions by 1 March 2011. 
     Contested areas between March and August 2011. 
                Rebel western coastal offensive in August 2011. 
     Rebel gains by 1 October 2011. 
     Last loyalists pockets. 
 
     Major campaigns 
     Battles 
Source: Wikipedia (21 October 2011) 
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4.1 The role of norm entrepreneurs 
The UN response 
Based on the RtoP, the UNSC has taken quicker and more decisive action than in any 
previous situation of mass atrocities. One week after the outbreak of violence in 
Libya, the UNSC issued a press statement calling “on the government of Libya to 
meet its responsibility to protect its population” (UNSC, 2011a). On 26 February, the 
UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 condemning “the violence and use of 
force against civilians”, and recalling “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to 
protect its population”. Acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter, the resolution 
referred the situation to the ICC, and imposed an arms embargo and targeted 
sanctions. On 17 March, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 reiterating “the 
responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population”. It 
authorised the member states under chapter VII “to take all necessary measures … to 
protect civilians…while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any 
part of the Libyan territory” (UNSC, 2011b). Furthermore, Resolution 1973 
established a no-fly zone “in order to help protect civilians”. This was the first time 
that the UNSC authorised the use of military force for the protection of civilians 
against a functioning de jure government.  
Pillar three of the RtoP states that in situations where a state has manifestly failed to 
protect its population from the four crimes it is the international community’s 
responsibility to take action, first through peaceful means and if necessary through 
forceful means. A number of statements issued by Gaddafi demonstrated his 
intention to trigger large-scale and systematic massacres. He labelled the protesters 
“cockroaches”, stated his intention to “cleanse Libya house by house” and called on 
his supporters to attack protesters (quoted in ICRtoP, 2011). The evidences of an 
evolving case of crimes against humanity were also confirmed ex-post by the 27 June 
decision of the ICC to issue an arrest warrant for Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam, and 
Abdullah al-Senussi for crimes against humanity (murder and persecution).  
Almost from the outset of the crisis, senior UN officials warned of the imminent 
threat of mass atrocities and framed their responses in the RtoP language. On 22 
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February, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay (2011), 
emphasised the need to protect civilians and called on the authorities to stop using 
violence against demonstrators, which “may account to crimes against humanity”. 
On the following day, the Secretary General framed the ensuing debate as one about 
the prevention of mass atrocities and protection of vulnerable populations.  
On 26 February, the UNSC voted unanimously to pass Resolution 1970. Among 
other things, it condemned “the widespread and systematic attacks against civilians, 
which it suspected “may amount to crimes against humanity”. It welcomed the 
earlier criticisms of the Libyan government’s actions by the League of Arab States 
(LAS), the African Union (AU), and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
and underlined the Libyan government’s responsibility to protect its population.  
On 12 March, the LAS (2011) called on the UN Security Council  
to take the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly zone on 
Libyan military aviation and to establish safe areas in places exposed 
to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the 
Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya, while respecting 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring States. 
It moreover urged the international community to  
cooperate and communicate with the Transitional National Council 
(TNC) of Libya and to provide the Libyan people with urgent and 
continuing support as well as the necessary protection from the serious 
violations and grave crimes committed by the Libyan authorities, which 
have consequently lost their legitimacy. (LAS, 2011) 
It was in this context, that the Security Council members debated whether to 
authorise the use of force to establish a no-fly zone and to protect civilians. One of 
the central arguments made in the Council, and outside, was that the situation in 
Libya was both an ongoing threat to international peace and security and a 
humanitarian crisis that was likely to get significantly worse without urgent and 
decisive action. On 17 March Resolution 1973 passed with ten votes in favour 
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(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Portugal, Nigeria, 
South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States), zero votes against, and 
five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia). 
The resolution initially reiterated the Council’s concern that crimes against humanity 
may have been committed, deplored the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and took note 
of the criticisms of Gaddafi’s regime made by a variety of international 
organisations, particularly the LAS call for a no-fly zone and safe areas to protect 
civilians. Once again, it defined the situation in Libya as a threat to international 
peace and security and, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, demanded, 
among other things, an immediate cease-fire and intensified efforts to find a political 
solution to the crisis. In paragraph 4, the Council authorised the use of “all necessary 
measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack … 
while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of the Libyan 
territory.” In paragraph 6, it established a “ban on all flights in the airspace of the 
Libya Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians.” The only exceptions were 
those flights necessary to enforce the no-fly zone and those “whose sole purpose is 
humanitarian” (paragraph 7). It also refined the arms embargo and asset freezes 
detailed in Resolution 1970, in part by creating a panel of experts to assist in their 
implementation. 
UN Resolution 1973 stated explicitly that the primary goal of the intervention is the 
protection of civilians. There was however a discrepancy between the goals stated in 
the resolution and the political call for regime change issued by those implementing 
them. In May 2011, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 
(ICRtoP) warned “not to undermine RtoP by confusing civilian protection with other 
motives such as regime change or resource control” (ICRtoP, 2011). 
Although Resolution 1973 would not have been issued if it was not for the existence 
of several political factors that were unique to the situation in Libya, the analysis of 
the UN discourse shows that the RtoP was taken into consideration and thus guided 
political decision-making on the international level (Williams and Bellamy, 2012). 
Remarkably, Resolutions 1970 and 1973 referred merely to Libya’s responsibility to 
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protect and did not explicitly mention the responsibility of the international 
community to protect the Libyan population. The application of the RtoP by the UN 
in the case of the Libyan crisis therefore emphasised the most commonly accepted 
part of the emerging norm – the responsibility of each state to protect its own 
citizens. The other components of the RtoP norm – pillar 2 and 3 – were left open for 
interpretation. The analysis of the EU and its member states responses to the Libyan 
crisis throughout the next sections will show that pillar 2 and 3 of the RtoP are – as 
in previous instances – not interpreted consistently across different cases. While 
diverging interpretations of the RtoP do not necessarily impede its influence, they 
certainly impede the development of the RtoP into a collective international norm. 
The EU response 
Representing the common position of the EU member states, the High 
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), Catherine, 
Ashton, reacted to the unfolding events in Libya on 20 February 2011. A declaration 
was issued stating that the EU “condemns the repression against peaceful 
demonstrators and deplores the violence and death of civilians” (Ashton, 20 February 
2011). The EU moreover urged the Libyan “authorities…to immediately refrain from 
further use of violence” (idem). On 23 February, President of the European Council, 
Herman Van Rompuy, stated that the EU  
should not be patronizing, but should also not shy away from using its 
political and moral responsibility. While the decision on the future of 
Libya should be made by its citizens, the EU’s … responsibility is to 
help. 
A few weeks later, on 11 March, the extraordinarily convened European Council 
declared that  
the safety of the people must be ensured by all necessary means. The 
European Council expresses its deep concern about attacks against 
civilians, including from the air. In order to protect the civilian 
population, Member States will examine all necessary options, provided 
that there is a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from 
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the region. Those responsible will be held accountable and face grave 
consequences. 
The EU welcomed the adoption of Resolution 1973 and stressed that the main aim of 
the resolution was the protection of the Libyan civilians: “Resolution 1973 provides 
a clear legal basis for the members of the international community to provide 
protection to the civilian population” (Van Rompuy and Ashton, 17 March 2011). In 
line with other voices in the international community, the EU agreed that the Gaddafi 
regime had lost all its legitimacy and that he had to relinquish power. The EU 
described the situation as a “humanitarian emergency”, to which is was committed to 
respond (idem). Catherine Ashton emphasised that it “is key for the European Union 
that we look at what we can do to strengthen economic sanctions and to intensify our 
humanitarian support for the people of Libya” (Ashton, 18 March 2011). 
The Foreign Affairs Council confirmed a couple of days later that “while 
contributing in a differentiated way, the EU and its Member States are determined to 
act collectively and resolutely … to give full effect to these decisions [taken by the 
UNSC]” (FAC, 21 March 2011). It underlined that “the Council and the EU Member 
States will support actions provided for by UNSCR 1973 necessary to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” (idem). Finally, the 
Council declared that “the EU is ready to provide CSDP support to humanitarian 
assistance in response to a request from OCHA83 and under the coordinating role of 
the UN” (idem).  
Sven Biscop claimed in March 2011 that “… the EU, as a distinctive actor waging a 
value-based foreign policy, has a moral responsibility to protect civilians against 
violence” (Biscop, 2011a: 1). However, the Libyan crisis proved not to be the EU’s 
finest hour. While the EU officially supported the adoption of Resolution 1973 and 
the authorisation of the use of force, the actual action taken on the EU level was 
nevertheless limited to civilian means of crisis management (Gottwald, 2012a).  
                                                
83 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
The Libyan crisis        115 
The European Commission reacted by putting into effect two of its disposable crisis 
management instruments: the civil protection mechanism, by which approximately 
5,800 EU citizens have been brought back to their home countries, and humanitarian 
assistance, under which the Commission together with some member states had 
provided over €144.8 million for humanitarian aid and civil protection until 30 May 
(European Commission, 2011). Additionally, EU field experts in humanitarian aid 
and civil protection have been deployed inside Libya and on its borders with Tunisia, 
Egypt, Algeria and Chad (idem). Regarding the migrant influx from North Africa, 
the EU responded to Italy’s formal request for support and launched FRONTEX 
Joint Operation Hermes 2011, mandated to assist Italian authorities in coping with 
ongoing and prospective migratory flows (FRONTEX News, 2011). 
The EU implemented the sanctions authorised by the UN Security Council and went 
even further. Council decision 2011/137/CFSP aimed at implementing UNSC 
resolution 1970 requesting an arms embargo and targeted sanctions. Council decision 
2011/137/CFSP was amended according to UNSC resolution 1973 with the aim of 
implementing the no-fly zone and extending the asset freeze to additional persons as 
well as to the Libyan National Oil Cooperation and five of its subsidiaries. These 
restrictive measures had been extended further on 12 April and on 7 June 2011. 
On 1 April the European Council issued the decision to set up a military mission, 
called EUFOR Libya. Tied to a request made by the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), EUFOR Libya would be deployed with the aim of 
contributing to the safe movement and evacuation of displaced persons and of 
supporting the delivery of humanitarian aid (Official Journal of the EU, 2011). In 
April 2011 the EU decided to offer EUFOR Libya in support of the UN’s efforts in 
its humanitarian work. Although “human security has been the primary motive for 
setting up EUFOR Libya, it was legally created very quickly and thus not very 
concretely defined” (Interview with Finnish Civil Servant, 8 July 2011). In response 
to the offer made by the EU, UN humanitarian chief Valerie Amos expressed 
concerns about the “blurred lines” between military and humanitarian action and said 
that EUFOR Libya was considered a measure of last resort (EuBusiness, 2011). 
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A Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for EUFOR Libya was developed during an 
extraordinary meeting of the EU Military Committee on 11 April, but the Foreign 
Affairs Council on 12 April approved neither the CONOPS nor an Operation Plan for 
a potential EUFOR mission, since Sweden was opposed to making such a decision 
during the Council meeting. Significantly, Sweden was the framework nation of one 
of the two ‘battlegroups’ on stand-by, whose deployment was considered in the 
context of Libya (Bloching, 2011). As part of the Nordic battlegroup Finland also 
expressed concerns about the deployment of ground troops. Finnish Foreign Minister 
Alexander Stubb warned of getting into a “stalemate” leading to “more of a Kosovo 
situation …” (Marsden, 2011). The EU’s response in setting up EUFOR Libya was 
not supported by all member states, nor did it seem to fulfil the UN’s needs and thus 
appeared to be rather a symbolic gesture (Koenig, 2011). 
The fact that there was disagreement concerning the practical implementation of the 
RtoP with military means cannot only be seen in the diverging opinions about setting 
up EUFOR Libya but moreover in Germany’s abstention from the UNSC voting on 
Resolution 1973 and its reluctance to participate in the military intervention in Libya. 
Although the EU officially fully supported the RtoP approach taken by the UN and 
aimed explicitly at ensuring the protection of civilians throughout its crisis response, 
disagreement among the member states on the actual implementation of the RtoP 
revealed different interpretations of the emerging norm. Heads of state and 
governments eventually agreed on the need for Gaddafi to cede power but the EU 
member states remained at odds with each other on how best to respond to the crisis. 
Significantly, the three biggest EU member states – France, Britain and Germany – 
openly opposed each other in the UNSC voting on the no-fly zone over Libya. On 
the one hand, the differing European responses to the Libyan crisis revealed once 
more the difficulties the EU faces in having a common foreign and security policy. 
On the other hand, the apparent weakness in the EU’s crisis response has been linked 
to the lack of leadership, with the HR being pulled in different directions by national 
leaders, as well as with the still premature institutional set-up of the EEAS 
(Gottwald, 2012a). 
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Furthermore, Lady Ashton has emphasised that her vision for Europe’s role in the 
world is primarily civilian. On several occasions throughout the crisis she repeatedly 
insisted that the EU should confine itself to humanitarian issues (Brattberg, 2011: 3). 
The ambitions of the EU to become a fully-fledged power with military capabilities 
have thus experienced another setback in the Libyan crisis. During a speech in 
February, Ashton declared that the EU “is not a traditional military power … it 
cannot deploy gunboats or bombers” (quoted in Brattberg, 2011: 4). Similarly, Joe 
Coelmont (2011: 3) concluded that “Europe has now passed the Rubicon of engaging 
in a military intervention …”. 
Although the EU’s response was clearly influenced by the RtoP, when comparing the 
EU’s rhetoric to the practical implementation of its crisis response, a gap between 
discourse and action appears. The EU openly supported a people-centred approach in 
its crisis management and backed the UN’s application of the RtoP. However, it 
remained unable to translate this support into action due to disagreement among the 
member states and a lack of capabilities. The analysis of the EU’s actual crisis 
response reveals the imbalance between military and civilian crisis management and 
moreover the lack of an integrated civil-military approach. While the EU was 
successful in the area of civilian crisis management, a response using its military 
capabilities remained virtually non-existent.  
4.2 National perceptions of the Libyan crisis 
The way the Libyan crisis is perceived in the official discourses of France, Germany 
and the UK is assumed to lay the ground for later justifications of the actual policies 
proposed and adopted. The analysis of the member states’ discourse starts by looking 
at how the situation in Libya was depicted and whether and at what stage it was 
influenced by the RtoP. In general, the better the later proposed policy fits the type 
and amount of information at the beginning of the crisis the higher the legitimacy 
will be. This means, in this case specifically, that – according to the scale of 
measuring the RtoP’s influence in chapter 2 – the legitimacy of the RtoP increases if 
it is not only used to frame the crisis but also as basis for the later adopted policy. 
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France 
On 21 February 2011, the French government raised serious concerns about the 
development of the situation in Libya vis-à-vis the severe repression that had been 
taken place throughout the previous days (Point de presse, 21 February 2011). The 
French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, condemned the use of force of the Libyan 
government against its own people and called for an end of the violence through a 
political solution (Communiqué de la Presidence, 21 February 2011). At the same 
time, France seemed initially occupied primarily with the security and the 
repatriation of French citizens resident in Libya: “Our real preoccupation is to ensure 
the security of the French in Libya” (Wauquiez, 21 February 2011)84. 
The events in Libya were described as “massacres” for the first time in the French 
discourse on 22 February. However, when asked for more concrete information on 
the situation in Libya in general and the massacres specifically, the official answer 
remained vague (Point de presse, 22 February 2011). The spokesperson of the French 
Foreign Ministry referred to a press statement given by the French President in which 
he had condemned the disproportionate use of violence in Libya but remained unable 
to provide a precise number of (civilian) victims. The claim by the Italian Foreign 
Minister, Franco Frattini, that the repression in Libya had already caused 1000 
victims, was not confirmed by the French government. The French Foreign Minister 
explained that the situation in the country was too confusing to be able to provide a 
reliable number of victims (Point de presse, 24 February 2011). At the same time the 
French porte-de-parole emphasised that the repressions of the Libyan government 
against the protesters had caused “too many” victims.  
The description of the events in Libya changed from “massacres”, to “massive 
human rights violations” to “alleged crimes of humanity”. On 23 February, the 
French President called on the international community to not to merely stand aside 
and watch the massive human rights violations that were committed in Libya. One 
day later the French Foreign Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, claimed that the 
                                                
84 « Notre vraie préoccupation c’est d’assurer la sécurité des Français en Libye. » 
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violence in Libya “could constitute crimes against humanity” (Alliot-Marie, 24 
February 2011). Gerard Araud, the French Permanent Representative to the UN, 
accused the Libyan government further of a “systematic, planned and massive 
repression of their own population” (Araud, 25 February 2011)85. He stated further 
that the severity of the situation was further confirmed by “menacing declarations 
from the Libyan direction” (Araud, 26 February 2011)86.  
More precise information on the conflict in Libya was firstly presented to the 
Assemblée Nationale on 2 March. According to the Libyan Human Rights, almost 
6000 people had died until the beginning of March 2011 as “victims of the organised 
terror by the Libyan Dictator M. Gaddafi, who, after having organised assassinations 
in the world, is now killing his own people” (Ayrault, Assemblée Nationale, 2 March 
2011)87. On the same occasion, Sarkozy affirmed that the Libyan crisis was of 
exceptional seriousness and that the Colonel Gaddafi had lost all his legitimacy 
(Sarkozy, Assemblée Nationale, 2 March 2011).  
Recalling UNSC Resolution, France referred to the RtoP for the first time on 26 
February. The French Ambassador reminded that it is the Libyan authorities’ 
responsibility to protect all citizens on their territory. At the same time he 
emphasised that Resolution 1970 implied both “the responsibility of each state to 
protect its own citizens as well as the responsibility of the international community to 
intervene if a state fails to comply with the first responsibility” (Araud, 26 February 
2011)88. In a joint press conference with British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, 
French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé, reiterated that the international community 
had to step in and assume its responsibility since “all the mediation directed towards 
                                                
85 « Les autorités libyennes répriment de manière systématique, massive et planifiée leur propre 
population. » 
86 « Déclaration menaçantes de la direction libyenne. » 
87 « Nous venons effectivement d’apprendre de la ligue libyenne des droits de l’homme que déjà près 
de 6000 personnes son mortes, victime de la terreur organise par le dictateur libyen M. Kadhafi, qui, 
après avoir organise des attentats dans le monde, est en train d’assassiner son propre peuple. » 
88 « Ce texte…rappelle la responsabilité de chaque Etat à protéger sa population et de la communauté 
international à intervenir lorsque les Etats manquent a leur devoir. » 
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letting Gaddafi be succeeded was not welcome (Juppé, 3 March 2011)89. From the 
beginning, the responsibility to protect the Libyan people of the international 
community seemed therefore to be linked to the goal of regime change.  
On 10 March, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron agreed that  
the world is witnessing an unacceptable prosecution of violence and 
repression in Libya. Ignoring the exigencies of Resolution 1970 and the 
appeals of regional organisations and the whole international 
community, Gaddafi continues to attack its population with airplanes 
and helicopters” (Sarkozy and Cameron, 10 March 2011)90. 
On 15 March, Laurent Wauquiez, Secretary of State for European Affairs, described 
the situation in Libya as “extremely worrying”. Gaddafi’s forces were taking over 
more and more ground from the opposition forces and were moving towards 
Benghazi. Due to the increasing number of air raids the threats for the civilian 
population were perceived as ever more important (idem). In the French Parliament, 
the situation was described in similar terms: “Gaddafi’s forces were quickly taking 
over ground at the cost of massacres and attacks of the civilian population” 
(Assemblée Nationale, 15 March 2011)91. Finally, on the day of the adoption of 
UNSC Resolution 1973, Juppé depicted the conflict as “murderous offensive of 
Gaddafi against his civilian population” (Juppé, 17 March 2011)92. 
Although struggling to provide any detailed information and precise numbers on the 
crisis in Libya, France described the violence from the outset as disproportionate and 
                                                
89 « Les Nation unies, je vous rappelle, ont adopte il y a quelques années un nouveau concept qui est la 
responsabilité de protéger – ‘the responsibility to protect’ – les gouvernement doivent protéger les 
populations contre les crime de guerre et quand ils ne le font pas, la communauté internationale est 
fondée a se substituer à eux. On en est là aujourd’hui et donc toute médiation visant à permettre au 
colonel Kadhafi de se succéder a lui-même n’est évidemment pas la bienvenue. » 
90 « Le monde est témoin quotidiennement d’une poursuite inacceptable de la violence et de la 
répression en Libye. Ignorant l’exigences de la résolution 1970 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations 
unie, les appels des organisation régionales et de toute la communauté internationale, le régime de 
Kadhafi continue a attaque sa population, y compris avec des avions et de hélicoptères. »  
91 « Les forces du colonel Kadhafi regagnet rapidement du terrain, aux prix de massacres et de 
bombardements de la population civile. » 
92 « L’offensive meurtrière de Kadhafi contre ses populations civiles. » 
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unacceptable. In line with the worsening of the conflict and the increase in violence, 
the French discourse became stronger in its description of the crisis. Initially 
perceived as a brutal and bloody repression, then as massacres possibly constituting 
crimes against humanity and finally as murderous offensive of the Libyan 
government against its own population. Against this background the French 
government argued that the international community had the responsibility to step in. 
However, the RtoP appeared in the French discourse only after the UNSC had issued 
Resolution 1970. The reason given for the shift of responsibility from the Libyan 
government to the international community was that Gaddafi refused to step down. 
France, thus, framed the crisis in Libya as an RtoP case inspired by the UN but 
mixed the aim of protection with the objective of regime change.  
Germany 
The German Foreign Minister referred to the RtoP at an earlier point of time in the 
Libyan crisis than France but interpreted it differently. On 22 February 2011, Guido 
Westerwelle, called on the UNSC to assume its responsibility to protect the Libyan 
people and to react by authorising sanctions against the Gaddafi regime at the 
international level (Westerwelle, 22 February 2011). In contrast to France, Germany 
referred particularly to the responsibility of the UNSC and not of the international 
community as a whole. Furthermore, Germany indicated that the RtoP should be 
restricted to political and economic measures.  
Due to the limited amount of precise information on the situation inside Libya, 
Germany appeared more reluctant than France in describing the evolving conflict. 
On 24 February, State Minister Hoyer described the Libyan crisis as the “opposite of 
what we define human, ethical and responsible…” (Hoyer, 24 February 2011)93. 
Referring to a recent media address by Gaddafi, the Minister further expressed 
doubts about the Libyan leader’s sense of reality. He portrayed the situation in Libya 
as “dangerous” and “confusing” (idem). As in the case of France, Germany’s initial 
primary concern was the repatriation of German and other European citizens.  
                                                
93 „Wenn wir in diesen Tagen auf Libyen schauen, dann sehen wir dort genau das Gegenteil dessen, 
was wir als human, ethisch und verantwortbar bezeichnen ...“ 
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On 25 February, Guido Westerwelle described the situation in Libya as a “war of the 
regime against his own people”. He acknowledged that massive human rights 
violations and atrocities were taking place in Libya and emphasised at the same time 
the need of an emergency meeting of the UNSC in order to agree on a range of 
political and economic sanction, such as visa bans and asset freezes (Westerwelle, 25 
February 2011). Asked by a journalist whether the claim made by Jean Asselborn 
that a genocide was taking place in Libya would imply considering a military 
intervention in Libya, the Foreign Minister denied that claim. Faced with a civil war 
rather than genocide, Westerwelle argued, the international community should find a 
political solution to the crisis not a military one (idem). Instead of accepting that the 
Libyan government has failed in its responsibility to protect its own people, Germany 
emphasised that the perpetrators of the violence will be held accountable “if 
necessary … before the International Criminal Court” (Westerwelle, 28 February 
2011). 
Similarly to the French discourse, Germany reported the occurrence of gross human 
rights violations and atrocities in Libya without initially being able or willing to 
provide any precise numbers of victims. From the outset, Germany labelled the crisis 
in Libya as an RtoP case and emphasised the responsibility of the UNSC to respond 
with non-coercive means. Whereas France seemed to avoid the use of war attributes, 
Germany described the crisis in Libya as war and civil war. The appropriate answer 
to such a crisis was, according to Germany, to find a political solution and not to 
become a warring party itself by the use of military force. 
The United Kingdom 
Even before Germany and France, the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, 
expressed his concern about the “unacceptable violence used against protesters in 
Libya” on 19 February 2011. However, similarly lacking a concrete assessment of 
the situation on the ground Hague vaguely referred to alarming “reports of large 
numbers of people being killed or attacked by Libyan security forces” (Hague, 20 
February 2011). On 21 February 2011 the UK called on the Libyan government “to 
take responsibility for the safety of its people” (idem).  
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Differing from German and French descriptions of the situation in Libya, William 
Hague, portrayed the crisis as “a danger to the people” that “could have serious 
implications for the wider region” (Hague, 22 February 2011). Although initially 
prioritising the “safety of British nationals in Libya” the Foreign Secretary expressed 
concerns “about the loss of life in Libya and their government’s failure to protect its 
own people” from the beginning (Hague, 23 February 2011). 
The descriptions of the conflict and the hostilities were much more detailed in the 
official UK discourse than in the French or the German documentation. In a 
statement to the House of Commons on 7 March, William Hague described at full 
length, in which part of Libya what kind of atrocities were committed. The Foreign 
Secretary concluded that there was a clear risk of a protracted conflict and “an 
extremely dangerous and volatile situation in large parts of the country” (Hague, 
House of Commons, 7 March 2011). 
The Quadhafi regime is launching military counter-attacks against the 
opposition forces. There has been intense fighting in the East and 
centre of the country along the coastal strip between the opposition-
held Ras Lanuf and the Quadhafi stronghold of Sirte. There are 
credible reports of the use of helicopter gunships against civilians by 
government forces, and unconfirmed reports of a helicopter and jet shot 
down over Ras Lanuf…. In Tripoli there have been disturbing reports 
of hostage taking and large military deployments around the city 
designed to consolidate Quadhafi’s position and intimidate his 
opponents. His forces remain in control of Tripoli, Sebha and Sirte; but 
his authority is contested in large swathes of the country where local 
tribes have withdrawn their support (idem). 
On the adoption of Resolution 1973, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, UK Ambassador to the 
UN, explained that “the situation in Libya is clear. A violent, discredited regime 
which has lost all legitimacy is using weapons of war against civilians.” Besides 
having ignored UNSC Resolution 1970,  
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it is now preparing for a violent assault on a city of one million people 
that has a history dating back 2500 years. It has begun airstrikes in 
anticipation of what we expect to be a brutal attack using air, land and 
sea forces. Gaddafi has publicly promised no mercy and no pity (Grant, 
17 March 2011). 
The UK labelled the crisis in Libya as an RtoP case and in contrast to France and 
Germany acknowledged that the Libyan government was failing in its responsibility 
to protect. However, initially it did not indicate who was supposed to assume the 
responsibility if not the Libyan government. Moreover, the UK was the first to point 
out the potential consequences of the Libyan crisis to the wider region. France 
Germany and the UK seemed to agree that the RtoP applied to the Libyan crisis. 
However, the emphasis ranged from the RtoP of the international community 
(France), to the RtoP of the UNSC (Germany) to the failure of the Libyan 
government to assume its RtoP (UK). The ambivalences within Europe on the exact 
meaning of the RtoP in practice were exposed even more in the decision-making 
processes on the actual policy response and leading up to the military intervention. 
National perspectives on the role of the EU 
The role of the EU as a security actor depends not only on the availability of crisis 
management capabilities but also on what kind of role the member states envisage 
for the EU to play in the crisis response. According to Nicolas Sarkozy, the response 
of the European Council was strongly determined, particularly in comparison to 
previous crises such as in Bosnia that had revealed the complete lack of a European 
response. Laurent Wauquiez emphasised in a similar comparison that Europe has 
come along way: “Considering its inability to respond to Srebrenica the EU has 
proven its ability to respond to events in Libya” (Wauquiez, 12 May 2011)94. At the 
same time the French President noted that a strong European response does not imply 
that there are no differences in the member states’ approaches to the crisis (Sarkozy, 
                                                
94 « Toutefois, il convient, là encore, de mesurer le chemin parcouru entre une Europe qui avait révélé 
son impuissance à Srebrenica et, à l’inverse, une Europe qui s’est montrée malgré tout capable de 
réagir face aux événements survenus en Libye. » 
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11 March 2011). Alain Juppé emphasised further that convening an extraordinary 
meeting of the European Council to talk about Libya already constituted a very 
important step for the role of the EU as a security actor (Juppé, 17 March 2011).  
Since the European Council acknowledged that Resolution 1973 “contributed 
significantly to protect the Libyan people and the civilian areas threatened by attacks 
and helped save lives of civilians”95 in the aftermath of the UNSC voting, the 
decision to implement the Resolution was taken unanimously by the European 
countries. According to France, this agreement has significantly strengthened Europe 
(Juppé, 24 March 2011). Furthermore, the European Council defined the conditions 
that were set out in Resolution 1973 to end the military intervention as proposed by 
France (idem). When civilians are safe and the objectives of Resolution 1973 are 
met, the military operation will be completed. 
Finally, the French Foreign Minister affirmed that the role of the EU in finding a 
solution to the crisis in Libya mainly relates to the use of peaceful measures (Juppé, 
Assemblée Nationale, 30 March 2011). First, the EU should continue to increase 
pressure on Gaddafi’s departure through sanctions, followed by its readiness to 
support the Libyan people in their transition to democracy. Furthermore, it should 
continue to support humanitarian and civil protection also by maritime means. 
Finally, with regard to the EU’s security and defence policy, Le Monde reported on 
22 March 2011 Juppé passing a shattering assessment: “The common security and 
defence policy of Europe? It is dead.”96 (Stroobants, 2011) 
Responding to the criticism that the EU’s High Representative Catherine Ashton had 
been completely absent in the Libyan conflict, Juppé countered that Lady Ashton had 
been very active in the preparation of the “day after” (Juppé, 29 August 2011). She 
was responsible of the EU’s involvement in humanitarian action and will take care of 
building the rule of law and of monitoring new elections. Juppé clarified further that 
it was ‘normal’ that during the period of military intervention, the focus has been put 
                                                
95 « …contribué à protéger les populations et les zones civiles menacées d’attaques et ont contribué à 
sauver la vie de civils. » 
96 « La politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'Europe ? Elle est morte. » 
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on NATO rather than the EU.97 At the same time, the Foreign Minister noted that in 
case a ‘peace building’ mission was to be deployed to Libya in the aftermath of the 
military intervention, this task should be shouldered by the UN rather than the EU. 
In August 2011, the French President concluded that there are lessons to be learned 
particularly for Europe: 
In this crisis, through the initiative of the United Kingdom…the 
Europeans have demonstrated for the first time that they were able to 
intervene decisively in a conflict on Europe’s doorstep – because Libya 
is in the Mediterranean, and the Mediterranean is primarily the 
business of Europe rather than an America affair…Again this is a 
remarkable improvement since the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, where 
Europe was going to beg for help from the Americans to do a job 
Europe did not have the courage to do at its doorsteps. (Sarkozy, 31 
August 2011)98 
At the beginning of February, just before the violent outbreak of the Libyan crisis, 
the German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, set out his perspective of the EU’s 
CSDP and its role as a security actor: 
An essential element in the global role of the European Union is a 
powerful security and defence policy. As the largest economic area and 
trade power, as a community of values and merger of liberal 
democracies, the European Union has an interest in stable and 
peaceful conditions in the world. The necessary engagement for that 
                                                
97 « Elle n’a pas été tout à fait absente. À chaque réunion du Conseil Affaires étrangères, sous sa 
présidence, nous avons discuté de la Libye. Elle est très active sur la préparation du «jour d’après», 
l’implication de l’Union européenne dans l’action humanitaire, dans la construction d’un État de droit, 
et dans la surveillance des élections : l’Union européenne sera très présente. Il était normal que dans la 
période militaire, le projecteur ait été mis sur l’Otan, plus que sur l’Union européenne. » 
98 « Dans cette crise, à travers l’initiative du Royaume- Uni…eh bien les Européens ont démontré 
pour la première fois qu’ils étaient capables d’intervenir de façon décisive dans un conflit ouvert à 
leurs portes, parce que la Libye, c’est la Méditerranée, et la Méditerranée, c’est d’abord l’affaire des 
Européens avant d’être l’affaire des Américains…Encore une fois, c’est un progrès remarquable par 
rapport aux guerres de Bosnie et du Kosovo où l’Europe allait quémander l’aide des Américains pour 
faire un travail qu’elle n’avait pas le courage de faire à sa porte. » 
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cannot be left to the U.S. and other countries. The development of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy – to protect against terrorism, to 
secure trade and shipping routes or to manage crises – will essentially 
decide to what extent Europe will participate shaping world affairs. 
(Westerwelle, 4 February 2011) 
However, with regard to the EU’s role in the Libyan crisis Westerwelle continuously 
emphasised that the EU should respond with economic sanctions, asset freezes and 
humanitarian aid. At the same time the German Foreign Minister noted that the EU 
needed to revise its neighbourhood policy in order to be able to address problems 
such as in Libya. Also advising against a military role of the EU, David Cameron 
stated at the beginning of March 2011 that “in terms of the European Council, of 
course, the EU is not a military alliance. And there is always a hesitation discussing 
military options” (Cameron, 14 March 2011). Still, he advocated for a strong 
response in the international community – “Europe included” (idem). 
After the establishment of the no-fly zone over Libya, William Hague, pointed 
towards the role of the EU as a normative power in its response to the Libyan crisis: 
It is very important that not only in Libya, but in north Africa as a 
whole, the UK and the European Union … act as a magnet for positive 
change – for civil society, open political systems, the building up of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, and all the other building blocks 
of democracy – but we cannot guarantee the outcome, of course. That is 
why we must make sure Europe provides a very big and effective 
magnet for those changes. (Hague, House of Commons, 30 March 
2011) 
Neither France, Germany nor the UK saw a substantial role of the EU going beyond 
the application of civilian means. Although France defended the contribution of 
Europe in general and the HR specifically, it was made clear that the EU’s task was 
“to clean up the dishes” in the sense that it was responsible to support the 
reconstruction of and democratic transition in Libya. Juppé even stated that the 
CSDP could be buried after Libya. While Germany was against the use of military 
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force altogether, the UK naturally preferred to rely on NATO as military alliance and 
not the EU. It was acknowledged that the EU’s role as a security actor has increased 
substantially since the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and that Europe was able to respond 
decisively to the Libyan crisis. However large parts of the European response took 
place outside the EU institutional framework and would not have been possible 
without US support. The EU’s role as a security actor in case of the Libyan crisis was 
therefore if anything, a reluctant one. 
4.3 National responses to the Libyan crisis 
While all three member states included in this analysis framed the Libyan crisis as a 
RtoP case, the following sections will focus on whether the RtoP was used further in 
the decision-making process and in the implementation of actual policies in response 
to the Libyan crisis. According to the scale developed in chapter 2 of this study, the 
influence of the RtoP will be the highest if it is present in the discourse on the 
proposed policy, if it is used as basis for the choice of the actual policy and if this 
policy is then implemented accordingly. The previous section has shown that the 
main aim of European and international responses to the Libyan crisis was the 
protection of Libyan civilians, as also stated in UNSC Resolution 1973. At the same 
time, there was agreement that Gaddafi had lost all its legitimacy and was therefore 
urged to step down. However, the objective of regime change was neither compatible 
with Resolution 1973 nor with the RtoP and was therefore potentially undermining 
the influence of the latter. 
France 
On the outbreak of the Libyan crisis, France emphasised that its foreign policy was 
based on two principles: “non-interference into a state’s internal affairs and respect 
of universal values, human rights, freedom and democracy” (Point de presse, 17 
February 2011)99. Yet, only a few days later, the French Foreign Minister mentioned 
for the first time the option of a military operation in Libya (Alliot-Marie, 25 
                                                
99 « La politique de la France demeure fondée sur deuz principes : la non-ingérence dans les affaires 
intérieures des Etats et l’attachement a des valeurs universelle, le respect des droits de l’Homme, la 
liberté et la démocraties. » 
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February 2011). In this context, François Fillon, affirmed that the establishment of a 
military no-fly zone would be considered as an option only under two conditions: 
First, there would have to be a decision by the UN Security Council (which seemed 
unlikely at the end of February, according to the First Minister). Second, a military 
intervention could only take place in cooperation with “other big countries” because 
no European state had the means to realise such an operation on its own (Fillon, 28 
February 2011). 
Laurent Wauquiez expressed further concerns about how a military operation 
implemented by NATO would be perceived by neighbouring countries in Libya and 
whether such a venture was feasible at all. The Secretary of State supposed that a 
NATO operation would stir criticism, that the West is intervening because of Libya’s 
crude oil resources and would thus send the wrong political signal. Moreover he 
doubted whether France had the capabilities to establish a no-fly zone over a country 
four times larger than France itself. France, although strongly in favour of 
intervention, was thus initially reluctant to give NATO a major role. 
At the beginning of March, Nicolas Sarkozy stated that the international community 
had developed a strategy to put pressure on the Gaddafi regime in the “spirit “of the 
RtoP (Sarkozy, 2 March 2011). He emphasised that on a Franco-British initiative and 
based on the RtoP, the UNSC had adopted Resolution 1970 imposing not only 
sanctions but also including a referral to the ICC (idem). Sarkozy argued that a 
military option did not (yet) fit the context but affirmed that France would pay close 
attention to further decisions that might be taken in the UNSC (idem). 
Moving forward quickly, only a day later, the French and the British Foreign 
Minister announced that they agreed to start working on the planning of a no-fly 
zone which would be implemented if the use of force by the Libyan regime against 
the civilian population became “more concrete” (Juppé, 3 March 2011). Juppé 
explained further that the conditions for the implementation of the Franco-British 
plan would be a “clearer situation” on the ground as well as the support of other 
countries in the region (idem). He emphasised that it should not be an intervention of 
Western countries only.  
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Accordingly, the demand of the League of Arab States (LAS) for a no-fly zone over 
Libya from 4 March 2011 changed the dynamic in the international community’s 
response to the crisis (Araud, 4 March 2011). The French Ambassador to the UN, 
Gerard Araud, underlined that the logic of the UN was based on the principle of non-
interference mainly “because the Western countries are always suspected of wanting 
to intervene” (idem). Although the Libyan crisis was clearly an internal affair, he 
argued, Arabic and African countries were the ones asking for an intervention by UN 
Security Council. Therefore this was not a case of Western countries trying to 
impose “a certain number of values” but it was the Arabic and the African countries 
that “conducted this assault” (idem). 
Ahead of the Extraordinary European Council on 11 March, Sarkozy and Cameron 
agreed that there were three conditions for the implementation of a military operation 
in Libya: (1) A demonstrable need (which was already given since the Libyan 
population was being attacked from the air); (2) a clear legal basis (in the form a 
UNSC Resolution); and (3) regional support (by the LAS and the African Union). 
Sarkozy reminded further that the situation in Libya could not be compared to the 
events in Tunisia and Egypt due to the different levels of repression and brutality: 
Acts of war crime are taking place in Libya. I believe that war crimes 
were also committed in Egypt and in Tunisia. A political revolution is 
carried out with violence, naturally, but in Libya we are confronted 
with bombed villages, bombed oil platforms, this is not comparable. 
(Sarkozy, 11 March 2011)100 
At the same time, Sarkozy stressed that considering the option of a military 
intervention in the case of Libya did not constitute a change in France’s diplomacy or 
even a new doctrine and affirmed that he was among the first to express reservations 
about the use of force. However, the French President saw a difference between 
                                                
100 « Il y a des actes de guerre en Libye. Je ne pense qu’il y ait eu des actes de guerre en Égypte ou des 
actes de guerre en Tunisie. Il y a eu une révolution politique avec de violences, naturellement, mais là 
on est dans des villes bombardées, des terminaux pétroliers bombardées, cela n’a rien à voir. » 
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“refusing a military intervention and letting people be massacred by fighter jets while 
they were demonstrating”101 (idem).  
Trying to persuade the other members of the UNSC to follow France’s lead, Sarkozy 
wrote a letter requesting the heads of state and government to assume their 
responsibility and to support the proposed initiative on the day before the historical 
voting on Resolution 1973. On 17 March, Alain Juppé also called on to the 
international community to stop the incitement of war by supporting the civilian 
population and not letting international legality and moral be jeopardised (Juppé, 17 
March 2011). When asked whether the intervention was to be a war against Colonel 
Gaddafi, the Foreign Minister replied that it was not a war but an operation designed 
for the protection of the civilian population. Gerard Araud described Resolution 1973 
as a historical moment, in which “the UN got involved into a state’s internal affairs 
on behalf of the RtoP, on behalf of our duty to help people in danger”102 (Araud, 23 
March 2011). 
However, doubts about the legitimacy as well as the aim of the military intervention 
were raised not only by French journalists but also within the French Parliament. On 
the question of how France was able to reconcile its policy of non-interference with a 
military intervention aimed at removing Gaddafi from power, the answer was merely 
that “it should not be forgotten that Gaddafi soldiers were massacring the Libyan 
people”103 (Point de presse, 18 March 2011). Furthermore, the question posed in 
Assemblée National on whether the military intervention in Libya was established to 
protect the Libyan people or the Libyan oil, remained unanswered (Assemblée 
Nationale, 8 March 2011). 
After the implementation of Resolution 1973, Sarkozy argued that the international 
community was able to prevent a “massacre” from occurring in Libya. He 
highlighted the events in Srebrenica 1995 where “… 8000 people were killed … 
                                                
101 « Mais, entre refuser une intervention militaire et laisser des gens massacrés par des avions de 
chasse alors qu’ils manifestent, il y a peut-être à réfléchir sur ce que l’on fait… » 
102 « L’ONU s’implique dans les affaires intérieures d’un État au nom de la responsabilité de protéger, 
au nom de notre devoir d’assistance à peuple en danger. 
103 « Il ne faut pas s’oublier que les Libyen se font massacrer par la soldatesque de Kadhafi. » 
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because the international community did not adopt the measures to prevent the 
massacre … Imagine if the coalition had not acted, what would have happened in 
Benghazi”104 (Sarkozy, 24 March 2011). 
In line with its perception of the Libyan crisis as massacres possibly constituting 
crimes against humanity, France was among the first countries calling for a military 
intervention. Although also emphasising the principle of non-interference, France 
took the view that a military intervention would still be legitimate if based on (1) a 
clear legal basis, (2) a demonstrable need and (3) regional support. Acting as norm 
entrepreneur, France actively persuaded the other members of the UNSC to assume 
their responsibility to protect the Libyan civilians. While simultaneously calling on 
Gaddafi to step down, France confirmed after the adoption of Resolution 1973, that 
the UNSC decision provided the right measures to protect the people in Libya. At the 
same it was argued that a military intervention was better than doing nothing also 
with regard to the credibility of the UN and the validity of international law. 
Germany 
The decision by the UN Security Council from 26 February to issue Resolution 1970, 
based on the RtoP, was welcomed by the German government. The imposition of 
sanctions, an arms embargo, an asset freeze and the referral of Gaddafi to the ICC for 
alleged crimes against humanity, were clearly in line with Germany’s approach to the 
conflict. In the face of ongoing and increased violence in Libya and in line with its 
major Western partners, the German government was in favour of regime change in 
Libya and of protecting the Libyan people, but preferred addressing both aims with 
the use of peaceful means.  
Accordingly, Germany remained openly sceptic of the creation of a no-fly zone over 
Libya, both regarding its operationalisation and its consequences. On 9 March, 
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle argued that it should be avoided so as not to be 
drawn into a civil war in Libya. He raised further concerns that a military 
                                                
104 «…à Srebrenica en 1993, 8000 personnes on été assassinée… parce que la communauté 
internationale n’avait pas pris à l’époque les mesures pour empêcher ce massacre…Imaginez, si la 
coalition n’avait pas agi, ce qui se serait passe á Benghazi. » 
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intervention in Libya would provide ‘fuel’ for those arguing that the revolts in Libya 
were controlled by the West (Westerwelle, 9 March 2011). Westerwelle reiterated 
that is was crucial to have a mandate of the UNSC as well as the support of the LAS 
for the establishment of a no-fly zone (idem). 
A no-fly zone is an option, but the German government remains 
reluctant because one has to consider the outcome of such decisions. 
We do not want to become delinquent in the sense that Germany 
becomes a permanent warring party. We should have learned from the 
experiences in Iraq. Everything that goes beyond targeted sanction 
requires a UN mandate. And it is compelling that neighbouring 
countries and the Arab League support or even participate in such 
measures. (Westerwelle, 12 March 2011)105 
On 16 March, the German Foreign Minister raised further concerns about whether a 
military intervention in a country like Libya, whose territory is four times bigger than 
Germany, would be the appropriate response. Westerwelle stated that “a no-fly zone 
is nothing like a traffic regulation…”. He argued further that a military intervention 
could lead to more violence instead of freedom and peace. In terms of the 
consequences of such an operation Westerwelle asked: “And what happens if the 
attacks continue on the ground? Would we then have to continue fighting Gaddafi’s 
tanks from the air? Or would we have to send ground troops?”106 (Westerwelle, 16 
March 2011). At the same time he acknowledged that 
the decision on the right approach towards the inhuman violence in 
Libya is not easy. As a member of the Security Council, Germany is 
particularly responsible in this difficult situation. We respect and 
                                                
105 „Eine Flugverbotszone ist eine Option, aber die Bundesregierung ist hier zurückhaltend, denn man 
muss bei solchen Entscheidungen auch das Ende bedenken. Wir wolle nicht auf eine schiefe Ebene 
gerate, an deren Ende Deutschland dauerhafte Kriegspartei ist. Wir sollten aus den Erfahrungen 
insbesondere Irak gelernt haben. Alles, was über gezielte Sanktionen hinausgeht, braucht ein Mandat 
der Vereinten Nationen. Und: Es ist zwingend notwendig, dass die Nachbarländer und die Arabische 
Liga das nicht nur unterstützen, sondern sich gegebenenfalls an solchen Maßnahmen auch beteiligen.“ 
106 „Aber was geschieht, wenn die Angriffe am Boden weitergehen? Müssen wir Gaddafis Panzer 
dann aus der Luft bekämpfen? Und wenn das nicht reicht, müssen wir dann Bodentruppen schicken?“ 
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welcome the resolution of the Arab League last week. However, we see 
the responsibility for further action on the side of the international 
community first of all with the countries in the region. (Westerwelle, 16 
March 2011)107 
In the UNSC vote on Resolution 1973, mandating amongst other measures the 
establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya, Germany abstained. Germany, 
nevertheless, supported the reinforcement of the restrictive measures imposed by 
Resolution 1973 and underlined the importance of Gaddafi’s referral to the ICC 
(Westerwelle, 17 March 2011). After the voting, Westerwelle explained that 
Germany did not want to “wage a war that would take place in Libya, even with 
international involvement. Therefore German soldiers will not participate in a war in 
Libya”108 (idem). He argued further, that history has proven that war is not a 
solution.  
On Germany’s abstention in the UNSC, Ambassador Peter Wittig elaborated further 
that 
if the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of 
being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the 
wider region. We should not enter a military confrontation on the 
optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be 
achieved (Wittig, 17 March 2011). 
In the aftermath of the implementation of Resolution 1973, Germany officially 
recognised the legitimacy and the validity of the UNSC decision. However, the 
German Foreign Minister expressed concerns that the intervention in Libya could 
serve as a precedent for solving conflicts namely through the use of military force. 
                                                
107 „Die Entscheidung über den richtigen Weg im Angesicht menschenverachtender Gewalt ist alles 
andere als einfach. Als Mitglied des Sicherheitsrates trägt Deutschland in dieser schwierigen Lage 
eine besondere Verantwortung für die internationale Sicherheit. Wir respektieren und begrüßen den 
Beschluss der Arabischen Liga vom vergangenen Wochenende. Aber wir sehen die Verantwortung für 
das weitere Handeln der international Staatengemeinschaft zuerst bei den Staaten in der Region.“ 
108 „Die Frage ist aber, ob wir Deutschland in einen Krieg führen, der dann in Libyen stattfinden 
würde, auch mit internationaler Beteiligung, und dagegen habe ich mich gewendet. Ich möchte nicht, 
dass deutschen Soldaten in Libyen ein Krieg geführt wird.“ 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
The Libyan crisis        135 
“The injustices in North Africa cannot be solved by means of military intervention 
wherever a conflict arises”, he argued. Furthermore Westerwelle claimed that 
“Germany could not intervene anywhere in the world, where injustice happens, with 
military means”109 (Westerwelle, 18 March 2011). At the same time, Germany’s 
abstention was further justified with the fact that Germany “assumes worldwide a lot 
of responsibilities”. While being militarily engaged in other arenas, such as 
Afghanistan, Germany did not see it as its responsibility to participate in a military 
intervention in Libya. 
In a statement in front of the German Bundestag, Westerwelle emphasised that 
Germany 
is on the side of all the people anywhere in the world that defend their 
freedom. We are on the side of all those that are repressed, tortured 
and murdered because they defend their freedom. We as a democracy 
are a community of values and therefore we argue worldwide for 
liberal and democratic values. (Westerwelle, 18 March 2011)110 
The Foreign Minister argued that when deciding whether to participate in a military 
intervention there are humanitarian aspects and the risk of civilian casualties that 
have to be considered (idem). Therefore the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan 
should not be forgotten. Westerwelle reiterated his understanding for the “honourable 
motives” of those that voted in favour of international military engagement in Libya 
(idem). He assured, that his decision to abstain Germany had received respect and 
understanding among its partners. 
As elaborated in the previous section, Germany has described the crisis in Libya as a 
civil war from the beginning. Accordingly its main argument against a response to 
the crisis with military means was to not to become a warring party in a protracted 
                                                
109 „Ich bitte auch ... immer zu bedenken, dass wir Deutsche nicht mit deutschen Soldaten überall in 
Ländern der Welt eingreifen können, wo Unrecht geschieht.“ 
110 „Wir stehen an der Seite von Menschen, die für ihre Freiheit wo immer auf der Welt eintreten. Wir 
stehen an der Seite derjenigen, die wegen ihres Eintretens für demokratische Prinzipien unterdrückt, 
gequält, gefoltert, gemordet werden. Wir sind als Demokratie eine Wertegemeinschaft, und deswegen 
treten wir auch weltweit für freiheitliche und demokratische Werte ein.“ 
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conflict. Germany’s position on the Libya intervention reflected its general aversion 
against the use of force. Therefore its crisis response focused on non-coercive 
measures. Germany agreed that the Libyan people needed to be protected but saw the 
responsibility to protect primarily with the countries in the region. In contrast to 
France and in line with the UK, Germany emphasised the potential risks of a military 
intervention for the wider region. Finally, Germany expressed concerns that the 
international action in Libya might serve as a precedent for further military 
interventions. 
The United Kingdom 
On 28 February 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron stated that 
for the future of Libya and its people, Colonel Gaddafi’s regime must 
end and he must leave. To that end we are taking every step possible to 
isolate the Gaddafi regime, deprive it of money, shrink its power and 
ensure that anyone in Libya will be held account. … And we do not rule 
out the use of military assets. (Cameron, 28 February 2011) 
From the outset, the British response to the Libyan crisis seemed to be directed 
towards the removal of Gaddafi rather than the protection of the Libyan population. 
At the same time William Hague acknowledged in front of the British Parliament 
that the UN had a responsibility to protect, which had to be balanced against the 
principle of non-interference (Hague, House of Commons, 7 March 2011). 
Therefore, the UK affirmed that the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya would 
need international support, a clear trigger and a legal basis (Hague, 10 March 2011).  
When updating the Parliament on the special European Council from 11 March 2011, 
Prime Minister Cameron emphasised that British national interests were at stake in 
the Libyan crisis: 
Do we want a situation where a failed pariah state festers on Europe’s 
southern border, potentially threatening our security, pushing people 
across the Mediterranean and creating a more dangerous and 
uncertain world for Britain and for all our allies as well as for the 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
The Libyan crisis        137 
people of Libya? My answer is clear: this is not in Britain’s interest. 
And that is why Britain will remain at the forefront of Europe in 
leading the response to the crisis. (Cameron, 14 March 2011) 
The Foreign Secretary argued along the same lines that a failed Libyan state could 
provide “a potential source for terrorism in the future, that would be a danger to the 
national security interest of this country” (Hague, 15 March 2011). In the run up to 
the voting on Resolution 1973, the UK justified the proposal of a military 
intervention in Libya mainly with national security reasons. At the same time, 
Cameron emphasised the urgency of the situation in Libya: “The clock is now 
ticking, and we now need a sense of urgency, because we do not want to see a 
bloodbath in Benghazi, and further repression and taking of innocent civilian life in 
Libya” (Cameron, House of Commons, 18 March 2011). He added that “the stronger 
argument is that it is better to act than to stand back and do nothing and witness the 
slaughter of civilians, when that is so clearly not in our national interest” (idem.) 
In the UK’s explanation on its vote in favour of Resolution, UK Permanent 
Representative, Sir Grant, affirmed that the UK was willing to assume its 
responsibility. However, the aim of protecting the Libyan civilians seemed to be 
deeply linked to the objective of regime change in the British discourse: 
We, along with partners in the Arab world and in NATO, are now ready 
to shoulder our responsibilities in implementing Resolution 1973. … 
The central purpose of this resolution is clear: to end the violence, to 
protect civilians, and to allow the people of Libya to determine their 
own future, free from the tyranny of the Qadhafi regime. (Grant, 17 
March 2011) 
When asked whether the Prime Minister could assure that the military intervention 
made a “real difference” to the people in Libya (Miliband, House of Commons, 18 
March 2011), Cameron’s answer remained vague. He underlined that the objective of 
Resolution 1973 was to save lives and to protect people and not to choose the 
government of Libya (Cameron, idem). At the same time, Cameron admitted that the 
international community had agreed that Gaddafi needed to go and that it was almost 
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impossible to envisage a future that included him. Nevertheless, he stressed, that the 
aims were those stated in Resolution 1973 (idem). 
A further justification for Britain’s participation in the military intervention in Libya 
was its role as an international actor: 
We are one of the worlds leading military powers, and we also have a 
huge strength in diplomacy, soft power and development. We should not 
play a disproportionate part, but I think that we should play a 
proportionate part alongside allies such as France, America and the 
Arab World. To say that we should pass such a resolution but then just 
stand back and hope that someone, somewhere in the Arab world will 
bring it about is profoundly wrong. (Cameron, idem) 
The previous section revealed that the UK described in detail the use of military 
force by the Libyan government against its civilians and stressed the government’s 
failure to protect. Britain’s participation in the military intervention was justified 
with the argument that a failed Libyan state would be against the UK’s national 
interest. Alongside a demonstrable need, regional support and a clear legal basis, the 
presence of national security interests seems to constitute a fourth condition for 
British involvement in the Libyan intervention. In the UK discourse the aim of 
protection seemed therefore not only blurred with the objective of regime change but 
also raised questions regarding the compatibility of national interests and a people-
centred approach to intervention. To what extent the RtoP was actually reflected in 
the actual implementation of Resolution 1973 or whether it was rather seen as a 
‘classical’ humanitarian intervention will be the focus of the next section. 
Assessing the application – protection vs. intervention? 
Five days after the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya, France justified its 
participation by claiming that the international coalition “has saved Benghazi”, it has 
stopped Gaddafi’s offensive and has re-established the equilibrium between the 
opposition and the Gaddafi regime. On the question of whether the objective of the 
military operations in Libya was the removal of Colonel Gaddafi, the French Foreign 
Minister confirmed that the aim of regime change was not included in Resolution 
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1973. Yet, Juppé expressed doubts whether “after what has happened and what is 
happening in the Arab world that such a regime governed by such a person could 
persist” (Juppé, 24 March 2011). The objective of protecting the Libyan civilians 
seemed, therefore, from the French perspective, only possible in combination with 
Gaddafi resignation of power. At the same time, France stressed that it was up to the 
Libyan people to decide how Libya would be governed in the future (idem). 
At the Assemblée Nationale, it was emphasised that France is not a “liberator” since 
it did “not have the mandate to intervene on the ground” (Ayrault, Assemblée 
Nationale, 22 March 2011). Furthermore it was claimed that a no-fly zone can “never 
win a war or get rid of a dictator. The Libyans themselves have to design their 
liberation and victory” (idem). 
At the end of March 2011 Sarkozy and Cameron confirmed in a joint statement: 
… we do not envisage any form military occupation of Libya, which 
would violate the requirements of the resolution. We strongly reaffirm 
our engagement to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity 
and national unity of Libya. Military action is not an objective in itself. 
There is no other sustainable solution than a political one, and the 
latter belongs to the Libyan people. (Sarkozy and Cameron, 28 March 
2011).111 
In terms of the execution of the military operation, Alain Juppé assured that France 
that it had “formally requested that there would be no collateral damage on the 
civilian population, which made the intervention obviously more difficult because 
                                                
111 « Nous soulignons le fait que nous n’envisageons aucune occupation militaire de la Libye, ce qui 
enfreindrait les conditions prévues par la résolution. Nous réaffirmons notre engagement le plus ferme 
en faveur de la souveraineté, de l’indépendance, de l’intégrité territoriale et de l’unité nationale de la 
Libye. L’action militaire n’est pas un objectif en soi. Il n’y a de solution durable que politique, et cette 
dernière appartient au peuple libyen. » 
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Gaddafi’s troops … tend to approach the civilian population” (Juppé, 6 April 
2011)112. 
In mid-April, the French Foreign Minister reaffirmed that France’s policy was not 
directed towards achieving a regime change:  
We do not intend to decide on the nature and distribution of internal 
competences of independent countries. We express ourselves, we 
condemn, we intervene solely on the basis of international law and, in 
particular, the implementation of the new principle, adopted in 2005 by 
the UN and registered for the first time in a resolution of Security 
Council, I mean the principle of responsibility to protect… (Juppé 16 
April 2011)113 
However, presumably acting within the strict framework set out in the respective 
UNSC resolution, did not prevent France from demanding the departure of Gaddafi 
whose regime, as argued by France, appears no longer consistent with the protection 
of the Libyan citizens (idem). Furthermore Juppé asserted that “the fate of Benghazi” 
would have been ten times worse than in Srebrenica. The French Ambassador to the 
UN, Gerard Araud, affirmed that “when serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights, war crimes, crimes against humanity are 
committed, it is indeed the duty of the Security Council to intervene to prevent them. 
This is what we did in Libya” (Araud, 10 May 2011). 
In June 2011 Nicolas Sarkozy reminded again of the lessons learned from history: 
I would like to recall that in Srebrenica 8,000 people, who should be 
protected by democracies but that were not, were murdered, 8000. Is 
                                                
112 « …nous avons demandé formellement qu’il n’y ait pas de dommages collatéraux sur les 
populations civiles; cela rend les interventions évidemment plus difficiles parce que les troupes de 
Kadhafi…ont tendance à se rapprocher des populations civiles. » 
113 « Nous n’avons pas l’intention de décider de la nature et de la répartition des compétences internes 
de pays qui sont indépendants. Nous nous exprimons, nous condamnons, nous intervenons sur le seul 
fondement du droit international et, en particulier, de la mise en œuvre du principe nouveau, adopté en 
2005 par l’organisation des Nations unies et inscrit pour la première fois dans une résolution du 
Conseil de sécurité, je veux parler du principe de responsabilité de protéger… » 
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there anyone who thinks that in Benghazi, a million inhabitants, 
Gaddafi would have killed merely 8000? So the operation in Libya has 
saved lives and will continue until the Libyans can build their 
democracy. (Sarkozy, 24 June 2011) 
Furthermore, the French Foreign Minister stressed that oil was not the reason for 
France’s intervention in Libya (Juppé, 26 June 2011). 
A day after Gaddafi’s death on 20 October 2011, France announced that the end of 
the Libyan conflict “… was an illustration of the strength of the principle of 
responsibility to protect, endorsed by the UN, and which formed the basis of 
Resolution 1973”114 (Point de presse, 21 October). Gaddafi’s defeat was described as 
a success for the international community and the values enshrined in the UN 
Charter, on the basis of which the UN were able to protect the Libyan population and 
prevent the bloodbath announced by Gaddafi himself (idem.) 
Since its abstention in the voting on Resolution 1973 in the UN Security Council, 
Germany’s position has been widely criticised not only but especially from parts of 
the opposition. Former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer referred to the abstention as 
“scandalous mistake”. The core allegations of the criticism were that Germany had 
isolated itself politically and had breached the solidarity to his allies 
(Bündnissolidarität) (Westerwelle, 24 March 2011). 
In order to compensate for the abstention, Germany offered on 23 March to send 
further AWACS to Afghanistan “to relieve those NATO members that were …  
participating in the implementation of the no-fly zone” (Westerwelle, 23 March 
2011). Despite that, Germany assured that its different opinion on the Libyan crisis 
did not harm the franco-german relationship nor did it question its solidarity towards 
its allies (idem). Furthermore, Westerwelle expressed concerns about how quickly 
the call for a military intervention came up in the German public debate. He warned 
                                                
114 « La fin du conflit en Libye, dont nous attendons la proclamation…est une illustration de la force 
du principe de la responsabilité de protéger, consacré par les Nations unies, qui a été le fondement de 
la résolution 1973… » 
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to be careful not to lower the threshold for military interventions and the use of force 
can only be a last resort (Westerwelle, 30 April 2011). 
Finally, the German Foreign Minister concluded: 
We have made our contribution to change with political means. The 
sanctions and the international isolation were of great importance… 
We have set up a comprehensive sanctions policy that has isolated the 
dictator. Ultimately, the decisive factor was the will of freedom of the 
Libyan people.115 (Westwerwelle, 24 August 2011) 
Though Germany has been criticised for its abstention on Resolution 1973, this 
criticism was not directed at Germany’s compliance with the RtoP as applied by the 
UN. It was rather a question of solidarity with its European and transatlantic allies. 
Germany was thus excluded from further consultations on Libya and exposed on the 
international scene. Among domestic critiques it was also not the principle of RtoP 
but Germany’s well-established foreign policy doctrine of ‘never alone’ that was at 
the centre of the debate. Germany’s abstention has shown that diverging 
understandings of the RtoP can lead to different positions on its implementation.116 
After the adoption of Resolution 1973, the UK assured that “all missions are 
meticulously planned to ensure every care is taken to avoid casualties” (Foreign 
Office press statement, 20 March 2011). Furthermore, William Hague affirmed at the 
House of Commons that “operations have been directed against [Gaddafi’s] military 
forces and control of those forces” and that “the greatest care” would be taken “to 
avoid civilian casualties (Hague, House of Commons, 24 March 2011). He 
emphasised that the “action is saving lives and is protecting hundreds of thousands of 
civilians in Benghazi and Misrata from the fate that otherwise awaited them” (idem). 
                                                
115 „Wir haben unseren Beitrag zum Umbruch mit politischen Mitteln geleistet. Die Sanktionen und 
die internationale Isolierung waren von großer Bedeutung. Dadurch ist Gaddafis Regime von 
Nachschubquellen. Wir haben auf eine umfassende Sanktionspolitik gesetzt, die den Diktator isoliert 
hat. Entscheidend war am Ende der Freiheitswille des libyschen Volkes.“ 
116 At the same time it has also been suggested that Germany abstained because of the critical local 
elections taking place at the end of March 2011 and unpopularity of military action in Libya in the 
German public.  
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At the end of March, the Foreign Secretary stated that “so far, the action we have 
taken has been successful in protecting countless civilians from Qadhafi’s forces …” 
(Hague, 29 March 2011). He further underlined the speed with which “NATO has 
moved to put in place the planning and launch of the … demanding operations, more 
quickly than was the case for Bosnia or Kosovo” (Hague, 30 March 2011). 
The NATO Foreign Ministers agreed in April that the NATO mission in Libya has 
three military objectives: (1) the end to all attacks and threat of attacks against 
civilians; (2) the withdrawal of all regime forces to bases; and (3) immediate 
humanitarian access. They emphasised that “NATO is absolutely determined to 
continue its operation for as long as there is a threat against Libyan civilians and it is 
impossible to imagine that the threat will disappear with Qadhafi still in power” 
(Press release on NATO’s Foreign Minister meeting, 19 April 2011). 
After the Libyan opposition forces managed to take over Tripoli at the beginning of 
September, David Cameron stated at the House of Commons:  
It is the Libyan people who have liberated their country; there was no 
occupying army. This has been a Libyan-led process, assisted by the 
international community… It was a unique set of circumstances and not 
something that we can or would wish to repeat all over the world, but I 
have never accepted the argument that because you can’t do 
everything, you shouldn’t do anything. Removing Gaddafi from power 
was a major achievement. (Cameron, House of Commons, 5 September 
2011) 
On the death of Gaddafi, David Cameron remarked: “I’m proud of the role that 
Britain has played in helping them to bring that about and I pay tribute to the bravery 
of the Libyans who have helped to liberate their country” (Cameron, 21 October 
2011). 
In comparison with previous cases of mass atrocities the Prime Minister concluded 
that “on this occasion a coalition of nations across the Western and Arab World had 
the will to act. In so doing, they stopped Benghazi from joining Srebrenica and 
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Rwanda in history’s painful roll call of massacres the world failed to prevent” 
(Cameron, 22 September 2011). 
Making its participation contingent on the presence of national interests, the UK 
government followed very much the old norm of humanitarian intervention as laid 
out by Tony Blair during the Kosovo war in 1999. At the beginning of September 
2011, Cameron confirmed that “this was a practical, liberal, Conservative 
intervention” (Cameron, House of Commons, 5 September 2011). At the same time 
the Prime Minister underlined that Britain “had a moral obligation to try to deal with 
[the Libya crisis] because [it] could prevent a massacre”, however, there was not 
only “an‘ought’, there was also ‘a could’” (idem). 
While the initial strikes were implemented by the US, NATO took over military 
operations from the US-led coalition ten days after. The majority of the missions 
were then carried out by France and Britain, with the support of a few smaller allies, 
including Belgium, Denmark and Norway (Chivvis, 2012). Subsequently, US 
military and political power would play a major role behind the scenes, but the US 
would not play a larger role in the succeeding air strikes. According to US President 
Barack Obama it was Europe’s role to assume the major part in Libyan crisis 
response: “the Mediterranean is your inner sea, not ours – we will help you with the 
things you can’t do but we won’t do the things that you can do for yourselves” 
(quoted in Brown, 2011). 
However, in April, the US agreed to reintroduce Predator drones to strike (they had 
been removed when the US retrieved its strike aircraft at the end of Odyssey Dawn) 
(Chivvis, 2012: 8). In June, France and the UK introduced attack helicopters. 
Although both these military instruments increased the risk of Allied and civilian 
casualties, they offered the possibility for even more precise strikes. In seven months 
of military operations, NATO achieved all of its stated strategic objectives: it upheld 
an arms embargo, provided for humanitarian relief, established a no-fly zone and 
helped to protect the Libyan civilian population from further destruction by Gaddafi 
and his forces (idem: 10). 
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On the other hand, Varun Vira and Anthony Cordesman (2011) argued that 
protecting civilians according to Resolution 1973 has proven to be difficult in its 
implementation. Moreover, what began as an operation that was initially closely 
aligned with the RtoP, expanded considerably into something resembling an air war 
aimed at forcing regime change. By mid-June, NATO forces expanded the scope of 
the air strikes, which reinforced the suspicion that they may be seeking a forceful 
regime change by deliberately targeting Gaddafi and his allies. However, France and 
the UK have continuously denied that military operations are targeting Gaddafi 
personally and maintained that NATO attacks aim at degrading Gaddafi’s military 
forces, destroying their ability to maintain communications or logistical and supply 
chains, as well as at increasing the pressure within Gaddafi’s inner circle (idem).  
Similarly, Geir Ulfstein and Hege Føsund Christiansen (2013) put forward the 
argument that NATO actions to protect Libyan civilians were clearly within the 
mandate of Resolution 1973. However military strikes intending to overthrow 
Gaddafi, including support to the rebels’ advancement, violated the mandate given 
by the UN Security Council and constituted an illegal use of force (idem). In this 
context, Ulfstein and Christiansen (2013: 162) argue further that the overstepping of 
the mandate may have undermined the credibility of the RtoP for future crises 
involving the commitment of mass atrocities.  
The explanation given by those conducting the military operation in Libya was 
ambiguous. In a joint statement together with Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and 
David Cameron argued on the one hand that Resolution 1973 did not mandate the 
removal of Gaddafi. On the other hand, they stated that NATO was to maintain its 
operations and increase pressure on the regime as long as Gaddafi is in power. By 
providing close air support for the rebels’ advances into cities held by Gaddafi’s 
forces, NATO helped to destroy Libyan military forces loyal to Gaddafi. Moreover, 
NATO air strikes arguably assisted the rebels also in conquering new areas and in 
finally bringing down the Gaddafi regime. The implementation of the military 
operation raises question of whether the aerial support for rebel manoeuvres on the 
ground in Libya was legally in line with Resolution 1973 or whether the coalition 
was overstepping the mandate (Ulfstein and Føsund, 2013: 168-169). 
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Resolution 1973 did not cover regime change or general human rights protection in 
Libya. The UNSC mandate explicitly only authorised a coalition of the willing to 
protect ‘civilians and civilian populated areas’ under ‘threat of attack’. Clearly, the 
areas held by Gaddafi were not under threat of attack by him. By contrast, when the 
opposition forces advanced on cities held by Gaddafi’s troops it was the rebels 
themselves who posed a threat to civilians and civilian populated areas (Akande, 
2013). 
The basis for NATO air strikes on areas held by Gaddafi was arguably the consent by 
the rebels rather than Resolution 1973. But neither the UN mandate nor consent 
would provide a legal basis for NATO’s use of force to support the rebels in their 
offensive against Gaddafi (Ulfstein and Føsund, 2013: 169). While there were 
arguably military and political reasons for NATO wanting to put an end to the 
conflict between Gaddafi and the rebels, the air support for the Libyan opposition 
forces to advance on Gaddafi-held territories went beyond the mandate of Resolution 
1973 and thus violated the prohibition against the use of force as stated in Article 
2(4) in the UN Charter. As in the case of the Kosovo intervention in 1999, the 
implementation of the military intervention in Libya raises important questions on its 
legitimacy and legality despite the existence of a UN mandate. These issues will also 
be crucial for the further normative development of the RtoP. 
4.4 Preliminary conclusion 
The analysis of the Libyan crisis has shown that the RtoP did have an influence on 
European responses to the crisis in the sense that it was used to legitimise their 
positions. Yet, France, Germany and the UK referred to the RtoP in different ways 
and justified partly different approaches towards the Libyan crisis on the basis of the 
emerging norm. Therefore, the ‘Big 3’ disagreed on whose responsibility it was to 
respond to the crisis and with what means. While France and the UK shared the 
understanding that a military intervention on the basis of the RtoP was legitimate, 
Germany was opposed to the use of means other than political and economic 
pressure.  
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At the same time, Europe seemed to agree that Gaddafi had lost all his legitimacy as 
leader of Libya and that he had to step down. Although France and Britain strongly 
emphasised in their discourses that the sole objective of the military intervention was 
the protection of the Libyan civilians, achieving this aim seemed to be possible only 
if linked to Gaddafi’s removal. The lines between the goal of protection and regime 
change, which was not authorised by Resolution 1973, became therefore unclear. 
Furthermore, the UK legitimized its participation in the military operation in front of 
the national audience mainly on the basis of national security interests.  
Thus, the application of the RtoP in the case of the Libyan crisis appeared to a certain 
extent more like a ‘classical’ intervention. While in previous RtoP cases the 
emphasis was on non-coercive means, the Libyan crisis stressed the use of force 
component of the emerging norm. During the Libyan intervention, concerns were 
expressed, such as in Germany, about the Libyan case serving as a precedent for the 
use of force against the will of a de facto government. The international community 
in general and Europe specifically might thus be twice as shy after Libya to respond 
to further cases of mass atrocities. 
For the EU, although it supported the application of the RtoP in its discourse, the 
protection of the Libyan civilians seemed possible only with civilian means. In its 
actual crisis response, the EU has certainly been successful not only in protecting EU 
citizens but also in the delivery of humanitarian aid and the implementation of 
restrictive measures against the Libyan regime. In some respects the Libyan crisis 
was tailor-made for the EU’s CSDP but a lack of capabilities, internal discord and 
personalities undercut the EU’s chances of playing any significant role in military 
operations (Chivvis, 2012). 
Although the EU has constantly tried to increase its military power by merging 
military and civilian means into a Common Security Defence Policy, it has mostly 
failed to implement military methods and concentrated more on humanitarian crises 
and natural disasters. The Libyan crisis has shown once more that the EU’s response 
has mainly focused on ‘soft’ security actions, such as civil protection and 
humanitarian assistance. At the same the EU has emphasised in its discourse that it is 
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primarily its responsibility to help and to assist. While there might still be a gap 
between expectations and capabilities in the area of the CSDP the EU’s 
understanding of responsibility as well as its security role envisaged by France, 
Germany and the UK seem to actually match with its available capabilities.  
Some have argued that the Libyan crisis and the UN’s reaction to it constituted a 
“breakthrough” for the RtoP as an emerging international norm (Cotler and Genser, 
2011; Evans, 2011b; Ischinger, 2011) and another step towards its recognition. In 
comparison to previous RtoP cases, the reaction to the Libyan crisis was marked by 
forceful political commitment to the emerging norm. The UNSC was quick to 
condemn the violence and call on the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect. 
The clarity of the language of the UNSC was unprecedented: UNSC Resolution 1970 
and 1973 clearly stated that their primary goal was the protection of civilians. It was 
the first time that the UNSC evoked the RtoP doctrine to authorise the use of force 
without host government consent. Finally, the decisions at the level of the UNSC 
entailed speedy and decisive implementation. The fact that the crisis has been linked 
to the RtoP from the beginning and that there was broad consensus on the UNSC’s 
application of the emerging norm is of important symbolic value (Geiß and Kashgar, 
2011: 101). Furthermore, it strengthened the role of the UNSC as the legal and 
legitimate authoriser of the use of force under the RtoP (Van Landingham, 2012). 
The Libyan case study shows that the RtoP has clearly influenced the decision-
making process on the European crisis response but that the RtoP’s legitimacy was 
undermined by the actual military operations going beyond the mandate given in 
Resolution 1973. According to the scale developed in chapter 4, the influence of the 
RtoP remains moderate. The fact that the RtoP was not implemented accordingly 
point towards the fact that the crisis response was motivated by other reasons and 
that the RtoP has merely been used superficially. Furthermore, the fact that there are 
(still) different understandings of the RtoP at work and the fact that RtoP in the case 
of Libya was linked to the use of military force, might create new barriers for the 
development and the application of the emerging norm. The Western-led intervention 
has arguably increased the scepticism vis-à-vis the RtoP by some countries, namely 
Russia, China and India. When looking at international and European responses to 
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the Syrian crisis, it could be argued that the way the RtoP was implemented in Libya 
constituted – despite all the praise – a setback for the emerging norm itself.  
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Chapter 5: The Syrian crisis – responsibility to 
protect or to punish? 
“Syria is not Kosovo” titled the New York Times on 4 September 2013 and wrote 
further: 
The United States and Europe are at odds with Moscow, the Security 
Council is deadlocked, NATO has stayed on the sidelines, and the Arab 
League has been ineffectual. There is no strategy to achieve a stable 
endgame in which peacekeepers would be deployed and rebels would 
be disarmed, and the promised Geneva peace conference has been 
delayed indefinitely. As a matter of international law, Kosovo is no 
precedent either. (Rubin, 2013) 
This devastating assessment summed up two and half years of the international 
community’s effort in conciliating the Syrian crisis.117 While the option of a military 
intervention was initially very quickly put off the table, it became a matter of the 
international debate only after the alleged attacks on the Syrian civilian population 
by the Assad government using chemical weapons of mass destruction in August 
2013. Arguments brought forward in favour of a military intervention seemed to be 
based on the need to punish the Assad government rather than to protect the Syrian 
population. Furthermore, the Libyan intervention was used to delineate the two crises 
from each other and to argue against a military intervention. An international military 
intervention with or without UNSC mandate was ultimately averted due to an 
agreement between the US, Russia and the de facto Syrian government on the 
destruction of its chemical weapons arsenal and its admission of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). However, the fighting between opposition and 
government forces and the suffering of the civilian population continues at the time 
of writing.  
Significantly, the RtoP was considered as a legitimate basis to act upon only once the 
option of a military intervention was put back on the table by the US. Arguments in 
                                                
117 By the time of writing the crisis in Syria was still ongoing. 
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favour of a military intervention were based on the need to punish the Syrian 
government for the use of chemical weapons, which have been prohibited by 
international law since 1997, rather than the need to protect the Syrian civilian 
population. The following analyses examines the influence of the RtoP on European 
responses to the Syrian crisis under the question of whether the RtoP is applied to 
protect the Syrian people or whether it is misused to punish the regime of Bashar al-
Assad. 
This chapter analyses the influence of the RtoP on international and European 
responses to the Syrian crisis from March 2011 to September 2013. The next section 
starts by giving a brief overview of the development of the Syrian crisis during the 
chosen time frame. The following section focuses on the role of norm entrepreneurs 
and the UN and EU responses to the Syrian crisis. Member states responses will be 
investigated in sections three and four before drawing some preliminary conclusions 
on the RtoP influence in the case of the Syrian crisis since 2011 and its status as an 
emerging international norm. 
Summary of the Syrian crisis 
The Arab Spring hit Syria on 15 March 2011 with popular demonstrations that grew 
nationwide by April. Similar to other Arab countries, the crisis initially started off as 
civil uprising from initially minor protests in January 2011, as a response to the 
regional Arab Spring, government corruption and human rights abuses. Large-scale 
unrest began on 15 March in the southern city of Daraa, where about fifteen children 
had been arrested and reportedly tortured for writing on a wall, the well-known 
slogan of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt: “The people want the downfall of the 
regime” (International Crisis Group, 2013). Citizens carried out a peaceful protest, 
demanding the release of the children. The protesters also called for democracy and 
freedom. The government responded to the protests with large-scale arrests, torture 
of prisoners, police brutality and censorship of events. As in Libya, the protesters in 
Syria have demanded their leader to step down. In response, Syrian president Bashar 
al-Assad has not only stated he has no intentions of stepping down, but he has also 
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rejected allegations that Syrian security forces have committed crimes against 
humanity (Buckley, 2012). 
Following military crackdowns in June 2011 many soldiers defected to protect 
protestors. At the same time many protestors began to take up arms (International 
Crisis Group, 2013). On 29 July, a group of defected officers announced the 
formation of the Free Syrian Army opposition (FSA), an umbrella group, which 
would later represent the main opposition army. The establishment of the FSA 
formally marked the beginning of armed resistance to the Assad government (Boxx, 
2013). The FAS gained in size but remained without centralised leadership until 
December 2011. In early November 2011, clashes between the FSA and government 
security forces in Homs escalated. November and December saw increasing rebel 
attacks, as opposition forces grew in number. In January 2012, Assad began using 
large-scale artillery operations against the insurgency leading to the destruction of 
many civilian homes due to indiscriminate shelling. By this time, daily protests had 
almost disappeared and were eclipsed by the spread of the armed conflict 
(MacFarquhar, 2012). 
The situation in Syria deteriorated rapidly since February 2012, with one UN report 
indicating “the death toll often exceeds 100 civilians a day, including many women 
and children” (BBC News, 2013). In the same month, the UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon appointed Kofi Annan as the UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative 
for Syria. Annan’s peace-plan provided for a ceasefire, but even as the negotiations 
for it were conducted, Syrian armed forces attacked a number of towns and villages 
and summarily executed scores of people. Incommunicado detention, including 
children continued (Amnesty International, 2012). In March 2012, the UN reported 
that over eight thousand people had died as a result of the conflict in Syria (Buckley, 
2012). 
Assad responded to Annan, sounding like Gaddafi, that a political dialogue could not 
succeed while “armed terrorist groups” were in operation in his country (idem). In 
April 2012, Assad began deploying attack helicopters against the rebel forces (idem). 
On 12 April both sides, the Syrian government and rebels of the FSA, entered a 
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ceasefire period mediated by Kofi Annan. Unfortunately, the agreement failed with 
infractions of the ceasefire by both sides resulting in several dozen casualties. 
Acknowledging its failure, Annan subsequently called for Iran to “be part of the 
solution”, though the country had initially been excluded from the Friends of Syria 
initiative118 (Al Arabiya, 2012). Annan’s peace plan practically collapsed by early 
June and the UN mission was withdrawn from Syria (The Times of India, 2012). The 
Special Representative officially resigned on 2 August 2012. A few weeks after, 
Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed the new UN-Arab League peace envoy for Syria. 
Following consultations with the Syrian President Assad, as well as with Russian and 
Chinese officials, a second cease-fire attempt was announced towards late October 
2012. As both rebels and the Syrian Army resumed large-scale operations, the cease-
fire quickly collapsed. (Matthew, 2012) 
In November 2012, opposition forces came together to create a new coalition to be 
more inclusive and representative of the Syrian opposition (Al Arabiya, 2012). The 
new body was named the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Force, and has steadily gathered international recognition as the 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people. The Coalition was first recognised by 
the Arab League on 12 November 2012, then joined by France on 13 November, the 
EU on November 19, the UK on 20 November, the US on December 12, and then 
others such as Germany. However, the fighting continued and increased for almost 
another year culminating in summer 2013. On 21 August 2013, a chemical attack 
took place in the Ghouta region, Damascus countryside, leading to thousands of 
casualties and several hundred in the opposition forces (Dagher and Fassihi, 2013). 
The attack was followed by a military offensive by government forces into areas, 
which have been strongholds of the opposition since the beginning of the uprising. 
                                                
118 The Group of Friends of the Syrian People or simply Friends of Syria is an international group of 
countries meeting periodically to discuss the events in Syria outside the UN Security Council. The 
collective was created in response to the second Russian and Chinese veto on a Security Council 
resolution condemning Syria in February 2012. The group was initiated by then-French president 
Nicolas Sarkozy, and its first meeting took place on 24 February 2012 in Tunisia. 
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On 31 August, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, announced that he 
“decided that the United States should take military action against Syrian regime 
targets” for its use of chemical weapons but that he would ask Congress to vote to 
authorise military action (Obama, 2013). He further affirmed that “the attack [on 21 
August] is an assault on human dignity” and that “it also presents a serious danger to 
our national security” (idem). President Obama explained further that “we should not 
put boots on the ground … but I’m confident we can hold the Assad regime 
accountable for their use of chemical weapons, deter this kind of behaviour, and 
degrade their capacity to carry it out” (idem).  
Obama’s appeal triggered a wide-reaching debate particularly among European states 
on whether or not to intervene militarily in Syria. While France and the UK promptly 
signalled their willingness to support the US, the latter had to withdraw from the 
proposal after David Cameron lost a vote on British participation in the House of 
Commons. As usual, Germany remained sceptical on the usefulness of a military 
intervention. Since a UNSC mandate was unlikely to be issued, national and 
international debates crystallised around questions of legitimacy and legality of a 
possible intervention. Furthermore, questions about the purpose of a military 
intervention came up: Was the proposed action a military strike to punish the Syrian 
government or a necessary intervention to protect the Syrian civilian population from 
further atrocities? Assad eventually agreed to give up its chemical weapons and to 
sign the CWC. A military intervention was therefore averted. Yet, analysing 
international and European responses and the role of the RtoP therein can provide 
valuable insights on the motivations behind the crisis response in general and for the 
proposal to make use of force particularly. 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
The Syrian crisis        155 
Box 3: Map of the Syrian crisis 
5.1 The role of norm entrepreneurs 
The UN response 
As the protests in Syria gradually turned into an armed conflict between the 
government forces and the protesters, the UN became the focus of international 
reactions and interactions. Although the UN Security Council was not able to take 
immediate steps to halt the conflict in Syria, it has debated the crisis on a number of 
occasions (Eminue and Dickson, 2012; see table 7). On 27 April 2011, the UNSC 
held a public debate on Syria. On 9 May 2011, the Secretary-General called for an 
end to the violence and mass arrests, for an independent inquiry into the killings and 
for a UN team to enter Syria to assess the humanitarian situation. Then, in August 
2011, the UNSC issued a presidential statement expressing “its grave concern at the 
deteriorating situation in Syria, and … profound regret at the death of many hundreds 
of peopled” (UNSC, Media Release, 3 August 2011). It further condemned “the 
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widespread violations of human rights and the use of force against civilians by the 
Syrian authorities” and called “for an immediate end to all violence and urged all 
sides to act with utmost restraint, and to refrain from reprisal, including attacks 
against state institutions” (idem). 
The Security Council reminded “the Syrian authorities to fully respect human rights 
and to comply with their obligations under applicable international law. Those 
responsible for the violence should be held accountable” and reiterated “its strong 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria” 
(idem). Finally, the UNSC stressed that the only solution to the crisis in Syria is 
through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, with the aim of effectively 
addressing aspirations and concerns of the population, which will allow the full 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms for its entire population, including that of 
expression and peaceful assembly (idem). 
On 4 October 2011, France, the UK, Germany and Portugal tabled a draft resolution 
(UN Doc. S/2011/612, hereinafter, Draft Resolution) for consideration by the UNSC. 
The European Draft Resolution repeated many points from the August Presidential 
statement, though in stronger terms, condemning the “continued grave and 
systematic human rights violations and the use of forces against civilians by the 
Syrian authorities”. The Draft Resolution had initially imposed sanctions, but was 
watered down during the negotiations preceding the vote. It ultimately only warned 
of the Security Council’s “intention … to consider its options”, including measures 
under Article 41 of the UN Charter, thus only hinting at the prospect of mandating 
sanctions in the future (Mohamed, 2012). Despite these revisions, there were nine 
votes in favour (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, Nigeria, 
Portugal, the UK and the US), two votes against (Russia and China) and four 
abstentions (Brazil, India, Lebanon and South Africa). The European sponsored 
Draft Resolution thus failed to pass.119 
                                                
119 In a related development on 27 October 2011, Russia and China proposed a draft resolution, 
according to them, designed to encourage a peaceful process to help the Syrian government deal with 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
The Syrian crisis        157 
In a bid to further discuss and find a lasting solution to the Syrian crisis, the UN 
began a meeting on 31 January 2012, which continued until 4 February, when finally 
another draft resolution, this time sponsored by a large number of Arab States and 
Western countries, was put to vote. However, once again the draft resolution was 
vetoed by Russia and China with all other members voting in favour. As part of his 
efforts to find a solution to the Syrian crisis, Special Envoy Kofi Annan presented his 
six-point peace plan to the UN in mid-March 2012. Anna’s plan called on everyone 
involved in the conflict to  
address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, 
stop fighting, pull back military concentrations from towns while 
simultaneously the Envoy would seek similar commitments from the 
Syrian opposition and other ‘elements’. (Annan, 2012) 
The Syrian government accepted Annan’s peace plan (see box 1) on 25 March and 
on 2 April Annan reported to the UNSC that the Syrian regime had agreed to a 
ceasefire to come into effect on 12 April. Two days later, the UNSC adopted 
Resolution 2042, which condemned the “widespread violations of human rights by 
the Syrian authorities”, as well as “any human rights abuses by armed groups”. The 
resolution authorised the initial deployment of 300 unarmed military observes as part 
of the Annan peace plan. Before being adopted, the draft had been amended in order 
to avoid further Russian and Chinese vetoes. Russia’s representative stated at the 
UNSC that “the initial draft underwent substantial changes to make it more balanced, 
appropriately reflect realities and take into account the prerogatives of the Syrian 
government in receiving the Observer Mission on its territory” (Churkin, UNSC, 14 
April 2012). 
On 21 April, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2043, which mandated the deployment 
of a further 270 unarmed military observers to Syria. The resolution formally created 
the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), whose official mandate was to 
                                                                                                                                     
both its desired reforms and with the extremist violence against the Syrian government that was 
making such reforms difficult (Mohamed, 2012). However, the Russian and Chinese proposal was not 
even put to a vote at the Security Council. 
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“monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor 
and support the full implementation of the Envoy’s [Kofi Annan] six-point proposal” 
(see box 1; UNSC, 2012a). However, violence again increased and the UN reported 
that both sides had violated the ceasefire agreement.  
The peace plan calls on the Syrian authorities to: 
1. Commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to 
address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, 
commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;  
2. Commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations-
supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect 
civilians and stabilise the country. To this end, the Syrian government should 
immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, 
population centres and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around 
population centres. As these actions were being taken on the ground, the Syrian 
government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of 
armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations 
supervision mechanism. Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from 
the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to 
bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its form by all parties with 
an effective United Nations supervision mechanism; 
3. Ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the 
fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two-
hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily 
pause through an effective mechanism, including at local level;  
4. Intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including 
especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful 
political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all 
places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing 
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access to such locations and through appropriate channels, respond promptly to all 
written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;  
5. Ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-
discriminatory visa policy for them;  
6. Respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally 
guaranteed (Hamilton, 2012). 
(As annexed to Security Council resolution 2042 (2012) of 14 April) 
Box 4: Text of Kofi Annan’s six-point peace plan for Syria  
On 27 May 2012, the UNSC affirmed that “such outrageous use of force against the 
civilian population constitutes a violation of applicable international law and of the 
commitments of the Syrian government under UNSC resolutions 2042 (2012) and 
2043 (2012)” (UNSC, 2012a; 2012b). The Council called on the Syrian government 
“to cease all violence in all it forms, including the cessation of use of heavy weapons 
in populations centres…and reiterated that all violence…by all parties must cease” 
(idem). On 20 July the UNSC adopted Resolution 2059, renewing the mandate of the 
UNSMIS for 30 days. In October, the Council pointed out “the grave impact the 
crisis in Syria has on the security of its neighbours and on regional peace and 
stability” and “called on the Syrian government to fully respect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of its neighbours” (UNSC, 2012c).  
After the severe attacks in Aleppo on 5 October 2012, the Security Council 
expressed its “determination to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its 
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations” (UNSC, 2012c). In response 
to the attacks in Damascus in March 2013, the UNSC reaffirmed its commitment to 
counter terrorism as it “constitutes one of the most serious threats to international 
peace and security” (UNSC, 2013a). The Council stated further that “any acts of 
terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, wherever, 
whenever and by whomsoever committed” (idem). This was the first time that the 
Security Council linked unfolding events in Syria to terrorism as a security threat. 
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In March 2013, Valerie Amos, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian 
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator reported that there were as many as 4 
million in need within Syria, including 2 million internally displaced persons and 
650.000 Syrian refugees negatively influencing the economic and political situations 
in host countries. She also highlighted the indiscriminate nature of the violence, 
distressing reports of sexual violence and the need for unhindered humanitarian 
access. Navanethem “Navi” Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
referred to findings of an independent study commissioned by her office that more 
than 60.000 people had died in the Syrian Conflict. (UN News, 2013) 
In May 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution strongly condemning 
the Syrian government’s use of indiscriminate violence against the Syrian civilian 
population and welcoming the establishment of the National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as interlocutors for the political transition. The 
resolution was adopted with 107 votes in favour, 12 votes against, and 59 
abstentions. (UNSC, 2013b) A further GA resolution from June demanded that 
The Syrian authorities immediately end all violations of international 
human rights law and meet their responsibility to protect the population 
and comply fully with their obligations under applicable international 
law, including international law applicable to the rights and protection 
of women and girls, and the Conventions on the Right of the Child. 
(General Assembly, 2013) 
This was the first time in two years since the Syrian crisis had started, that an official 
UN body referred explicitly to the RtoP. Similar to the GA, the UNSC called in June 
2013 “upon all parties in Syria to do their utmost to protect civilians and avoid 
civilian casualties, recalling the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in 
this regard”. The emphasis within the UN was thus merely on pillar 1 of the RtoP. 
In July, António Guterres (2013), UN High Commissioner for Refugees, stated that 
there were nearly 1.8 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries with two-
thirds of them having fled since the beginning of 2013 – a rate not seen since the 
Rwandan genocide. Ivan Šimonović (2013), UN Assistant Secretary-General for 
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Human Rights, confirmed that serious human rights violations, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity were now the rule in Syria as stated in several reports on 
massacres by the government and affiliated militias. Nevertheless, a decisive and 
collective response to the Syrian crisis by the international community seemed 
impossible until the US pushed for a military intervention after the chemical weapon 
attacks in August 2013. The peaceful agreement, under which Assad would give up 
its chemical weapons and sign the CWC, was made outside the UN framework. Still, 
the agreement between the US and Russia was later confirmed and put under the 
UNSC auspice in Resolution 2118 on the Syrian civil war and the Framework for 
Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons (UNSC, 2013c). 
Type of document Date Document No. Main points 
UNSC 
Resolutions 
14/04/2012 S/RES/2042 Authorising the deployment of 
30 military observers. 
21/04/2012 S/RES/2043 Establishing UNSMIS. 
20/07/2012 S/RES/2059 Extending UNSMIS for a final 
period of 30 days 
27/09/2013 S/RES/2118 Requiring the verification and 
destruction of Syria’s 
chemical weapons stockpiles, 
calling for the convening of 
the Geneva II peace talks and 
endorses the establishment of 
a transitional governing body 
in Syria with full executive 
powers. 
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Type of document Date Document No. Main points 
UNGA  
Resolutions 
16/02/2012 A/RES/66/253 Condemning the violence in 
Syria, endorsing the Arab 
League’s 22 January initiative 
on a Syrian political transition 
and requesting the Secretary-
General to appoint a special 
envoy for Syria. 
03/08/2012 A/RES/66/253 
B 
Deploring the UNSC’s failure 
to act on Syria and calling for 
a political transition. 
15/05/2013 A/RES/67/262 Strongly condemning the 
Syrian government’s 
indiscriminate violence against 
civilian populations and 
welcoming the establishment 
of the National Coalition for 
Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces as 
interlocutors needed for a 
political transition. 
Table 7: UN documents on Syrian crisis 
The EU response 
Referring for the first time to the unfolding events in Syria, the High Representative 
for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy stated on 18 March 2011 that she was 
“deeply concerned by the events in Damascus … whereby peaceful demonstrators 
demanding the release of prisoners of conscience were violently dispersed by police 
and many of them arrested”. Ashton called on “the Syrian authorities to ensure the 
protection of peaceful demonstrators and to uphold the right to freedom of 
expression and assembly” (Ashton, 18 March 2011). Concerns about the degree of 
violence in Libya were first expressed in June when the HR referred to “reports of 
torture and other violence being used against family members, including children, as 
a means to silence activists” (Ashton, 6 June 2011). In July, Lady Ashton 
“condemned the continual breakdown against peaceful protesters, including by 
means of large-scale deployments of the Syrian military” (Ashton, 8 July 2011). She 
affirmed that “this path of repression and violence discredits the promises by the 
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Syrian leadership and its legitimacy and commitment to reform” (idem). At the end 
of the month the HR cited reports from Syria, according to which “large numbers of 
civilians have been killed in a totally unjustified assault by Syrian security forces on 
the town of Hama, using tanks and other heavy weapons against citizens exercising 
their right to peaceful protest.” (Ashton, 31 July 2011)  
It was not until 2012 that the EU institutions referred to specific numbers of victims 
caused by the Syrian conflict. The most detailed account was brought forward by the 
European Parliament stating in February that 
The UN estimates that the death toll in Syria has exceeded 5400 in the 
course of the 11 month-long uprising, although up-to-date figures are 
very difficult to obtain because some areas … are completely sealed 
off; whereas thousands have been injured, at least 69.000 have been 
detained, of whom about 32.000 have subsequently been released, and 
about 12.400 have fled to neighbouring countries … the UN Children’s 
Fund reports that hundreds of children have been killed and hundreds 
more arbitrarily arrested and tortured and sexually abused whilst in 
detention.” (European Parliament, 16 February 2012) 
The Foreign Affairs Council in March 2012 therefore condemned the  
continued brutal attacks and systematic human rights violations by the 
Syrian regime, including the use of heavy weaponry in civilian areas, 
which risk exacerbating further the spiral of violence, sectarian clashes 
and militarisation, and endanger the stability of the region” (FAC, 22-
23 March 2012).  
The latter concern was reiterated in October 2012, when the Foreign Affairs Council 
stated that the EU “remains deeply concerned by the spill-over effects of the Syrian 
crisis in neighbouring countries in terms of security and stability”. 
In its discourse the EU described the different dimensions of the Syrian crisis in 
detail: the large-scale human rights violations, the level of violence also against 
children as well as the risks for stability and security in the region. At the same time 
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the EU fell short of proposing a decisive response to the crisis. The EU initially saw 
the responsibility mainly with the Syrian government and the UN Security Council. 
On 6 June 2011, Ashton urged the “Syrian leadership to fulfil its commitments and 
responsibilities to halt violence and intimidation against the Syrian people. In the 
same month the Foreign Affairs Council affirmed its commitment “to ensure that the 
UN Security Council assumes its responsibility in relation to the situation in Syria 
and its regional implications”. In August, the EU however noted that the Syrian 
President Assad had lost “legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people” and should 
therefore step down (Ashton, 19 August 2011). 
The EU’s responsibility vis-à-vis the ongoing crisis in Syria was again pointed out 
merely by the European Parliament. In September, President Jerzy Buzek stated: 
We cannot allow the Syrian regime to continue killing the Syrian 
people. Authorities in Damascus have lost all remaining legitimacy and 
must step aside immediately … We Europeans must assume our 
responsibility to protect civilians and our responsibility to protect 
democracy. (European Parliament, 15 September 2011) 
The EP’s discourse and calls for action grew stronger towards the end of 2012. In a 
resolution from 15 December the EU emphasised that the crisis in Syria constituted 
“a threat to the stability and security of the entire Middle East region”. It stressed that 
“the Syrian government has failed to meet its responsibility to protect its population, 
to immediately put an end to all human rights violations and to stop any attacks 
against civilians” (EP, 15 December 2012). The EP advised that “in light of this 
failure, the international community needs to take urgent and appropriate measures” 
(idem). 
The Foreign Affairs Council however adhered to its approach of referring the main 
responsibility “to end the violence against the Syrian population” to the members of 
the UN Security Council while recalling the main findings of the report of the 
Independent Commission of Inquiry which stated that “crimes against humanity may 
have been committed in the country” (FAC, 14 May, 2012). The recognition of one 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
The Syrian crisis        165 
of the RtoP crimes in the case of Syria did, however, not serve as a catalyst for more 
decisive EU action. Instead, the EU tried to appeal to the responsibility of the 
international community. In this context, Herman van Rompuy stated: 
A swift reaction by the UN Security Council is urgently needed. I urge 
all members of the UN Security to assume their responsibilities in 
relation to the situation in Syria, and adopt steps long overdue in order 
to bring an end to the repression in Syria. (Van Rompuy, 30 January 
2012) 
The EU emphasised further the need of accountability. In June 2012 Ashton called 
“for a full investigation of the horrendous crimes … Those guilty of these atrocities 
must be brought rapidly to justice” (Ashton, 7 June 2012). 
Although the EU in mid-2012 acknowledged the failure of the Syrian government to 
protect its citizens, it held on to the position that the main responsibility for the crisis 
lies with the Syrian authorities (Ashton, 18 June 2012; FAC, 23 July 2012). At the 
same time, the EU stressed that it “remains committed to the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Syria (FAC, 19 November 2012). 
In terms of the EU’s policy response to the Syrian crisis, the application of sanctions 
was discussed for the first time in April 2011 by the Foreign Minister of Hungary, 
then holding the EU Presidency. While proposing restrictive measures, Zsolt Németh 
affirmed at the same time that “the military intervention applied in Libya … should 
serve as a warning” to Syria. He argued further that the intervention in Libya is not 
“analogous to Iraq, but rather to Rwanda or Kosovo, where the international 
community had to intervene, in an effort to protect the civilians” (Németh, 6 April 
2011). At the same time, the warning was articulated at the European Parliament that 
Europe could be accused of “applying double standards with regards to military 
intervention in Libya and the very different response to Syria” (Charles Tannock, EP, 
30 May 2011). 
Within the EEAS, the question whether a foreign intervention as in Libya would be 
considered in case of the Syria crisis was discussed in September 2011. In a press 
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statement it was emphasised that no one was in favour of military intervention and 
that the Syrian people should “own” the developments and the future transition in 
Syria: 
Unlike in the Libya case, neither the Syrian people, nor the countries in 
the region have been requesting outside military assistance for their 
protection. Therefore, an intervention would be illegitimate, harmful 
and counter-productive. It would neither help the situation within Syria 
nor the relations and stability in the regional framework. In addition, 
as it was the case for Libya, a military intervention would require a 
mandate of the UN Security Council, which is neither on the table nor 
foreseen. (EEAS, 13 September 2011) 
The EU Civil Protection Mechanism was activated twice, once in April 2012 to help 
Turkey cope with the influx of refugees and once in September 2012 to assist Jordan. 
In March 2013, the HR recognised the inability of the international community to 
find “a coherent, united way to respond to the horror that is being perpetrated and to 
act collectively to protect the people” (Ashton, 13 March 2013). She reiterated that 
without authorisation by the UNSC, as well as a clearer situation on the ground in 
Syria, military action would not be considered. Ashton recalled Commissioner 
Kristalina Georgieva120, in arguing that “from a humanitarian perspective there are 
no military fixes either. Humanitarian corridors, buffer zones and other ideas of the 
same kind are not viable solutions” (idem). By contrast, the European Commission 
and the HR advocated a comprehensive approach for the EU’s response to the 
conflict and its consequences both in Syria and its neighbouring countries. Therein 
the EU’s role is mainly  
to support a political process that brings a sustainable solution to the 
crisis, prevent regional destabilisation from the spill-over of the conflict 
in neighbouring countries, address the dramatic humanitarian situation 
                                                
120 European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response. 
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and assist affected populations, address the consequences of the 
conflict on and in the EU. (EU Joint Communication, 24 June 2013) 
According to the EU Factsheet on the Syrian crisis, the EU “has responded 
decisively to the violent repression and anti-government protests in Syria, which 
began in March 2011” (EU Factsheet, 1 March 2012). However, the previous 
analysis of the EU’s discourse on the crisis suggests that EU has been rather reluctant 
in assuming responsibility in its crisis response to Syria. In terms of concrete action 
the EU has supported the resolutions adopted by the UN, implemented sanctions and 
restrictive measures and has provided humanitarian assistance. 
The EU froze the draft Association Agreement that had been negotiated with Syria 
and suspended bilateral cooperation between the EU and the Syrian government 
under the MEDA121, a European Neighbourhood Policy instrument. The European 
Investment Bank suspended all its loan operations and technical assistance to Syria. 
At the regional level, the EU coordinated actions with the League of Arab States in 
its political response to the crisis by: supporting the LAS observer mission since 
December 2011; commending imposition of LAS sanctions; supporting the Arab 
Plan of Action and welcoming LAS demands to Assad to end the violence and step 
aside (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012).  
The EU has been at the forefront in providing humanitarian assistance for Syrian 
civilians. It has continuously called for unhindered access for humanitarian 
organisations to assess the need of the civilian population and to provide 
humanitarian and medical aid where needed. It has provided humanitarian support 
for refugees and internally displaced persons in its response to the Syrian crisis. The 
bulk of EU aid was used to respond to the immediate needs of the hundreds of 
thousand of people affected by the Syrian crisis (Syrians, but also Palestinian and 
Iraqi refugees) through the provision of food, water, shelter and medical assistance 
                                                
121 The MEDA programme serves “to implement the cooperation measures designed to help 
Mediterranean non-member countries reform their economic and social structures and mitigate the 
social and environmental consequences of economic development” 
(http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterrane
an_partner_countries/r15006_en.htm, 18 December 2012) 
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(Fargues and Fandrich, 2012). Furthermore the EU has allocated over €1.5 billion in 
humanitarian aid122.  
The EU has also called for a process of transitional justice. It has commended the 
work of the International Commission of Inquiry on Syria and its investigations into 
alleged violations of international human rights law with a view to holding 
accountable, those responsible for such violation, including those that may amount to 
crimes against humanity (Blockmans, 2012). Despite diplomacy and humanitarian 
assistance the EU has implemented 17 rounds of tightening sanctions (see box 3). 
The restrictive measures adopted by the EU included an arms embargo, economic 
sanction as well as freezing assets held within the EU and of persons associated with 
the Syrian regime.  
• Embargo on exporting arms and equipment for internal repression to Syria 
• Ban on exports of key equipment and technology to the Syrian and gas sectors 
• Ban on participation in the construction of new power plants in Syria 
• Ban on exports of equipment and software intended for use in the monitoring 
of internet and telephone communications by the Syrian regime. 
• Ban on providing grants, loans, export credit insurance, technical assistance, 
insurance and reinsurance for exports of arms and of equipment for internal 
repression for Syria. 
• Ban on trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds with Syrian public bodies 
and the central bank. 
• Freeze on 52 entities’ assets held within the EU, including the Syrian central 
bank, while ensuring that legitimate trade can continue under strict conditions 
• Asset freeze and visa ban on 155 persons associated with the regime and/ or 
responsible for violent repression or human rights abuses 
                                                
122 €515 million from the EU humanitarian aid budget and over €1 billion from member states plus 
€428 million from other EU funding instruments such as for education and support to host 
communities and local societies. The biggest bilateral donors were the UK, Germany and Denmark 
(ECHO Factsheet, 7 November 2013). 
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• Prohibition on access to EU airports for cargo flights operated by Syrian 
carriers, with the exception of mixed passenger and cargo flights.  
(Adapted from Blockmans, 2012: 2) 
Box 5: EU sanctions on Syria 
5.2 National perceptions of the Syrian crisis 
France 
At the beginning of 2012, France started to depict the crisis in Syria as involving the 
commitment of mass atrocities. In January 2012, France emphasised that the 
“international community cannot turn a blind eye to the atrocities in Syria”123 (Joint 
declaration of France, Australia, the UK, South Korea and Luxembourg, 18 January 
2012). In June, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, described the situation in 
Syria as a “terrifying spiral of violence” becoming “a threat to the regional stability 
and security” (Fabius, 1 June 2012). The French Foreign Minister confirmed that the 
conflict in Syria clearly constituted a civil war (Fabius, 14 June 2012). It was stated 
further that while the Syrian regime was “sinking into horror, it continues to 
perpetrate massacre over massacre and now it is the children that are at the front line; 
they are used as human shields”124 (Spokesperson of the French Foreign Ministry, 14 
June 2012). In its official discourse France thus described the Syrian crisis as a war 
since early 2012. 
Gerard Araud highlighted that “the longer the international community waits, the 
more there will be violations of human rights, the greater the risk will be of chaos, 
civil war, or even an explosion of Syria with all the consequences this may have on 
the region”125 (Araud, 1 August 2012). Further depicting the situation in Syria as 
“appalling”, Araud argued that the members opposing action of the Security Council 
were equally responsible for the “humanitarian disaster” in Syria (Araud, 27 
                                                
123 « …La communauté internationale ne peut fermer les yeux sur les atrocités commises en Syrie. » 
124 « Ce régime s’enfonce dans l’horreur, continue de perpétrer massacres sur massacres et 
maintenant, ce sont les enfants qui son en première ligne ; ils sont utilises comme bouclier humain. » 
125 « Plus nous attendons, plus il y aura des violations des droits de l’Homme plus il y aura des risques 
de chaos, de guerre civile, voire d’explosion de la Syrie avec toutes les conséquences que cela risque 
d’avoir sur la région. » 
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February 2013). The French government thus took note of the ongoing human rights 
violations and their consequences for the Syrian population. 
In July the French Representative to the UNSC described in detail the large-scale 
atrocities committed in Syria, affirming that they constituted war crimes and crimes 
against humanity – both crimes included in the RtoP: 
Daily, the regime, its militia and their allies are guilty of gross and 
systematic violations of human rights … These are war crimes and 
crimes against humanity: forced disappearances, torture, sexual 
violence, summary executions, deliberate attacks against schools and 
hospitals, repression by medical personnel. The government’s use of 
ballistic missiles, cluster bombs and incendiary bombs against civilians 
intensifies. More than 100.000 people have died in the conflict, among 
them many children, and the pace is accelerating.126 (Araud, 29 July 
2013) 
Regarding who was carrying the responsibility in the Syrian crisis, France stated 
during the UNSC meeting on 31 January 2012 that the Syrian regime was not only 
not protecting its civilian population but was “shamefully” massacring its population 
“without restraint”. Despite the atrocities committed by the Syrian government, 
France claimed that the regional consequences (flows of refugees and rising inter-
community tensions) provided enough reason to establish the UNSC’s responsibility 
“even without referring to the responsibility to protect” (Araud, 31 January 2012). 
François Hollande stressed at the same time that France “must also assume [its] 
responsibility” (Hollande, 14 March 2012). The French President claimed that “we 
cannot allow people to be massacred … by a regime that … does not want a 
discussion and a political transition” (idem). While referring the main responsibility 
                                                
126 « Quotidiennement, le régime, ses milices et leurs allies se rendent coupables de violations massive 
et systématiques des droits de l’Homme dans tout le pays. Celles-ci constituent des crime de guerre et 
des crime contre l’Humanité : disparitions forcées, torture, violences sexuelles, exécution sommaires, 
attaques délibérées contre des école et des hôpitaux, répression du personnel médical. L’utilisation par 
le gouvernement de missiles balistiques, de bombe a fragmentation et de bombes incendiaires contre 
les civiles s’intensifie. Plus de 100.000 personne on déjà trouve la mort dans ce conflit, parmi elles de 
nombreux enfants, et le rythme s’accélère. » 
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of responding to the Syrian crisis primarily to the UNSC, France also showed 
awareness of its share of responsibility. 
During the following meeting of the UNSC in March 2012 the French representative 
referred more explicitly to the RtoP as the basis for the international community’s 
response to the Syrian crisis: 
In 2005, the evolution of our work led us to recognise that the 
[Security] Council had the obligation to act when the responsibility to 
protect was not assured and when gross violations of human rights took 
place before our eyes, and that governments were accountable for acts 
of commission and omission alike. That is the context in which we hold 
today’s meeting… 
On the adoption of a resolution in the UN Human Rights Council confirming that 
crimes against humanity had been committed in Syria, Laurent Fabius declared that 
“this resolution … makes clear that the Syrian authorities have failed in their primary 
responsibility to protect the Syrian people”127 (Fabius, 1 June 2012). Finally, the 
French Foreign Minister advocated for an alteration of the voting rules in the UN 
Security Council: 
After all, this might mean that the rules of the Security Council should 
evolve because if two large countries, Russia and China say ‘no’, and 
consequently, the killing continues, then the public consciousness, you, 
me everyone reacts by saying that ‘no’ does not make sense.128 (Fabius, 
24 September 2012) 
Since the beginning of 2012, France clearly described the conflict in Syria as a 
commitment of mass atrocities, human rights violations and as a civil war that was 
                                                
127 « Cette résolution…établit clairement que les autorité syriennes on failli a leur responsabilité 
première de protéger le peuple syrien. » 
128 « Tout d’abord, cela signifie peut-être que les règles du Conseil de sécurité doive évoluer parce 
que, si deux pays, la Russie et la Chine disent « non », et par voie de conséquence, la tuerie se 
poursuit, alors la conscience publique, vous, moi, tout le monde, réagit en disant que ce « non » n’a 
aucun sens. » 
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endangering the Syrian population as well as regional security. Although referring 
the responsibility to act to the UNSC, France also acknowledged its own 
responsibility to respond to the Syrian crisis. France openly claimed that the Syrian 
government was failing in its responsibility to protect its own population as stated by 
the RtoP. 
Germany 
In a joint statement Germany, France and the UK from January 2012, agreed that 
Assad “who is resorting to brutal military force against his own people and who is 
responsible for the situation, has lost all legitimacy” and asked him to step down. 
This was one of the very few accounts of the German government on how it 
perceived the Syrian crisis. In comparison to the official discourse on the Libyan 
crisis, the Syrian crisis in terms of the dimension of the violence and the atrocities 
being committed, the German discourse remained predominantly silent. 
Significantly, the German discourse on the Syrian crisis did engage neither with the 
question of responsibility nor the RtoP. 
The United Kingdom 
The British account of the crisis in Syria, was in comparison to the German 
discourse, much more detailed. Foreign Secretary William Hague expressed in July 
2011 that he was “appalled by the continuing heavy violence in Syria and the murder 
of peaceful protesters”. Hague stated further that “the regime has killed over 1500 
civilians and has blood on its hands. In November Alistair Burt, Minister for the 
Middle East welcomed the publication of the Commission of Inquiry’s report on 
human rights violations in Syria. He emphasised that the reports of the “abhorrent 
treatment of children, including sexual torture” were particularly disturbing and that 
the “widespread and systematic attacks against civilians may amount to crimes 
against humanity” (Burt, 28 November 2011). Up to the end of 2011, the UK did not 
explicitly refer to the commitment of mass atrocities, but acknowledged the killing 
and murdering of thousands of Syrian civilians. 
In February 2012, Hague pointed out that “over the last 11 months, 6.000 people 
have been killed” in the Syrian conflict. He explained that “the Syrian regime has 
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deployed snipers, tanks, artillery and mortars against civilian protestors and 
population centres, particularly in the cities of Homs, Idlib, Hama and Daraa” 
(Hague, 12 February 2012). On the other hand, the UK also drew attention to the 
fact, that “abuses are also committed by members of anti-government groups in 
Syria. Although it is clear that these are on a far smaller scale than…the violations 
perpetrated by the Syrian authorities” the UK called on all parties in Syria to refrain 
from violence (Brown, 27 February 2012). In contrast to France and Germany, the 
British government took note of the crimes committed by anti-government forces 
instead of merely highlighting violations perpetrated by the Assad government. 
In March 2012, the Foreign Secretary referred to 10.0000 victims of the Syrian crisis 
allegedly killed by the Syrian regime as “part of the regime’s campaign of terror” 
(Hague, 31 March 2012). The UK described Syria as being “on the edge of a collapse 
or of a sectarian civil war” (Hague, 11 June 2012) which “could lead to thousands 
more casualties, a humanitarian disaster and human rights violations on an even 
greater scale, and instability in the neighbouring countries” (Hague, 12 June 2012). 
Finally in May 2013, Hague declared that “with every week that passes we are 
coming closer to the collapse of Syria and a regional catastrophe, with the lives of 
thousands more Syrians at stake” (Hague, 20 May 2013). Although still refraining 
from calling the crisis in Syria an actual civil war, the UK frequently highlighted the 
number of victims. 
In September 2011, the UK expressed the opinion that Assad had “lost all 
legitimacy” and could “no longer claim to lead Syria” (Cameron, House of 
Commons, 5 September 2011). With Assad ignoring the calls of the international 
community to stop the violence, William Hague affirms in January 2012 that there 
was a “growing consensus that the world must speak up for the people of Syria”. He 
called on the members of the UNSC to act collectively to put an end to the killing in 
Syria (Hague, 28 January 2012). He emphasised further “to fail to do so would be to 
undermine the credibility of this institution, … and fail in this Council’s 
responsibilities” (Hague, 30 January 2012). The UK thus implicitly confirmed that 
the Syrian government was not holding up its responsibility to protect and called on 
the UNSC to step in. 
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Furthermore, the UK Representative to the UN claimed that Russia and China, in 
supporting the Assad regime had failed in their responsibility as permanent members 
of the UN Security Council (Grant, UNSC, 4 February 2011). In a similar context, 
the British Foreign Secretary argued in July 2012 that “the Security Council has not 
shouldered its responsibilities and so it is not going to try to bring a solution to this 
…” (Hague, 20 July 2012). Speaking to the Syria Action Group Hague argued that 
“we face a heavy responsibility today. The world is looking for leadership to end the 
bloodshed and horror in Syria” (Hague, 30 June 2012). Therefore the “Security 
Council’s responsibility to act is now even greater than before … if it is not, the 
scene is set for months of greater bloodshed, greater suffering, and greater danger to 
international peace and security” (Hague, 29 August 2012). 
Although describing the violence and crimes committed in Syria in great detail, the 
UK appeared hesitant to explicitly make use of the terms mass atrocities, human 
rights violations and war up until August 2012. It claimed that the Assad government 
had lost its legitimacy and called on the UNSC to act. Although highlighting 
Russia’s and China’s responsibility as UNSC members, the British government did 
not explain or refer to its own responsibility in responding to the Syrian crisis before 
September 2012. 
National perspectives on the role of the EU 
In case of the Syrian crisis, none of the three chosen member states seemed to have 
envisaged a particular role for the EU in the crisis response. In the official French, 
German and British discourses the EU was thus mainly absent. As one of few 
exceptions, the French Defence Minister stated in June 2012 that “for European 
defence, it is time to recover”. He continued to elaborate that “Europe has to become 
a producer of security, in the sense that it assumes its own security”. Although this 
ambition had not progressed in the previous years, according to Le Drian, there was a 
shared conviction emerging from the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago on “the 
importance of a stronger and more capable European defence” (Le Drian, 7 June 
2012). Yet, neither France, Germany or the UK mentioned the EU’s role in 
managing the Syrian crisis in their official discourse. 
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5.3 National responses to the Syrian crisis 
France 
Since mid-2012, France seemed inclined to respond to the Syrian crisis with more 
coercive means. Signalling its willingness to participate in a military response to the 
Syrian crisis, the French Defence Minister, Jean Yves Le Drian, stated in June 2012 
that “if there is a military intervention, France will take its place”129 (Le Drian, 7 
June 2012). Yet, in July, Gerard Araud affirmed that France’s crisis response will be 
primarily political and emphasised that “there will be no military intervention, we 
will not help to add war to war”130 (Araud, 29 July 2012). 
In August 2013, after the chemical weapon attacks, France confirmed that its foreign 
policy was based on the respect of international law. The latter was, however, 
according to Laurent Fabius evolving over time. He argued that international law 
should not be an excuse to let mass murders be committed and affirmed that “this is 
why I recognise the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians” (Fabius, 27 
August 2013). Significantly, the French President François Hollande declared three 
days later that  
the chemical massacre in Damascus cannot and must not go 
unpunished. Otherwise this would mean running the risk of an 
escalation that would trivialise the use of these weapons and threaten 
other countries (Hollande, 31 August 2013). 
At the same time, Hollande underlined that he was not in favour of an international 
intervention aiming to overthrow the Syrian “dictator” but that the Syrian regime 
must be stopped from bringing “irreparable damage” over its population. The 
President concluded that he “would not call it war but the sanction of a monstrous 
violation of the rights of the human being”131 (Hollande, 31 August 2013). Revealing 
                                                
129 « S’il y a une intervention militaire, la France tiendra sa place. » 
130 « Il n’y aura pas d’intervention militaire, nous n’allons pas ajouter la guerre à la guerre ». 
131 «Je ne suis pas favorable à une intervention internationale qui viserait…à renverser le dictateur, 
mais j’estime qu’un coup d’arrêt doit être porte a un régime qui commet l’irréparable sur la 
population… Je ne parle pas d’une guerre, mais de la sanction d’une violation monstrueuse des droits 
de la personne humaine » 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
The Syrian crisis        176 
a certain indecisiveness, France switched its position from signalling its readiness to 
participate in a military intervention and from calling the Syrian crisis a civil war in 
June 2012 to acting on the basis of the RtoP and sanctioning the Assad regime 
instead of making war in August 2013. 
The calls for the necessity of punishment were repeated by French Prime Minister 
Jean-Marc Ayrault, who affirmed that “there has been a violation of a key 
international protocol established for 90 years, which prohibits the use of chemical 
weapons”132 (Ayrault, Assemblée Nationale, 4 September 2013). Ayrault argued that 
the “crime of gasing a population” could not go unpunished if not there was the risk 
of an extension of the security threat not only to the whole region but in fact to the 
whole world133 (idem). Laurent Fabius reiterated that the solution to the Syrian crisis 
will be political and not military but warned at the same time that “if we do not put a 
stop to such acts of the regime, there will be no political solution”134 (Fabius, 4 
September 2013). At the same time a military intervention was dependent on the 
decision of the US. The Foreign Minister stressed that France would not intervene 
alone (Fabius, 8 September 2013). The use of military force thus aimed ostensibly at 
punishing the Assad regime and not at protecting the Syrian civilian population. 
During the session of the Assemblée Nationale on 4 September 2011, members of 
parliament debated extensively and lively whether France should participate in a 
military intervention in Syria led by the US. Those arguing against the French 
contribution claimed that there was no conclusive evidence on who had committed 
the chemical weapons attack as well as no authorisation in form of a UNSC 
resolution. Furthermore it was argued that it is France’s “responsibility to protect 
French interests and French security”135 (Jean-Louis Borloo, Assemblée Nationale, 4 
September 2013). Those in favour of a military intervention on the other hand were 
                                                
132 « …il y eu une violation d’un protocole internationale essentiel celui qui, établi il y a 90 ans, 
interdit l’usage des armes chimiques…. » 
133 « …gazer une population, ce crime-là ne peut donc rester impuni sinon c’est le risque de la 
récidive, la menace de l’extension et c’est la sécurité – pas simplement des Syrien, pas simplement de 
la région – la sécurité du monde qui est en cause. » 
134 « …si nous ne mettons pas un coup d’arrêt à de tels agissements du régime, il n’y aura pas de 
solution politique. » 
135 « …notre responsabilité est de protéger les Français et les intérêts français. » 
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of the opinion that the paralysis of the UN Security Council should not prevent 
France from taking action when universally accepted international law is violated 
(Élisabeth Guigou, idem). Prime Minister Ayrault argued further that it is France’s 
responsibility to put a stop to the use of weapons of mass destruction and chemical 
weapons and warned that if not Iran might be the next in line to use them (Ayrault, 
idem). Although explicitly referring to France’s responsibility to protect, the notion 
was linked primarily to French security interests and the necessity to discipline the 
Assad regime. 
At the same time Gerard Araud emphasised that the RtoP entails the prevention of 
the four RtoP crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. He affirmed that France accepts this responsibility and will act in accordance 
to it (Araud, 11 September 2013). Although underlining the importance of the first 
pillar of the RtoP, Araud explained further that prevention goes beyond the first RtoP 
pillar and can include further measures such as referrals to the ICC and the use of 
force if necessary (idem). The French Ambassador cited amongst others, the cases of 
Libya and Kenya as examples for the international community taking responsibility 
and being able to effectively prevent atrocities. Therefore Araud stated that  
faced with such a massacre and at the risk of its repetition, we have a 
choice: a choice between resignation and action. No reaction would 
mean leaving the Syrian people to barbarism and the entire region to 
fall into chaos. It would protect a murderous regime using weapons of 
mass destruction. Action is needed to prevent further attacks and to 
trigger a political solution, if not the fine words – ‘never again’ – 
remain powerless to generate.136 (Araud, 11 September 2013) 
Explicitly referring to the RtoP and signalling its willingness to assume its share of 
responsibility also with military force, France was in favour of a strong response to 
                                                
136 « Face à un tel massacre et au risque de sa répétition, nous avons le choix : le choix entre la 
complicité résignée et l’action. Ne pas réagir, ce serait abandonner le peuple syrien a la barbarie et la 
région entière au chaos. Ce serait protéger un régime meurtrier ayant recours à des armes de 
destruction massive. L’action s’impose pour éviter une nouvelle attaque et pour provoquer une 
solution politique, que les belles formules – « Plus jamais ça » - resteront impuissantes à générer. » 
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the Syrian crisis since mid-2012. Arguably acting on the basis of the RtoP and with 
aim of protecting the Syrian population and preventing the further use of chemical 
weapons, France called for a military intervention in Syria. At the same time, France 
demanded on several occasions that military force was necessary to punish the Assad 
government and sanction the use of weapons of mass atrocities. It therefore became 
unclear whether the primary objective was actual protection of the civilian 
population requiring a response going beyond military strikes or whether the aim was 
rather ‘to teach Assad a lesson’. 
Germany 
Unsurprisingly, Germany advised caution in response to the Syrian crisis, 
particularly with regard to the use of force. German State Minister Werner Hoyer 
warned in August 2011 to consider the question of a military intervention in Syria 
carefully. He reminded that despite legal arguments, there was also no regional 
support for coercive measures (Hoyer, 2 August 2011). Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle argued that the international community “can break the spiral of 
violence and avert the logic of war only if the Security Council acts united and 
agrees on a resolution … that constraints Assad with strong non-military 
sanctions”137 (Westerwelle, 17 July 2012). In January 2013 Westerwelle argued 
further that “Germany does not get engaged in speculations or in preparations of any 
intervention in Syria”138 (idem, 14 January 2013). Germany was also essentially 
opposed to providing the Syrian opposition forces with arms. Westerwelle declared 
that “it is important to weigh all decisions not just by what seems appropriate in a 
short-term but by what ultimately helps the people of Syria and brings peace and 
stability to the whole region”139 (Westerwelle, 28 August 2013). Despite its 
                                                
137 „Wir können die Spirale der Gewalt nur durchbrechen und eine Logik des Krieges abwenden, 
wenn der Sicherheitsrat Geschlossenheit zeigt und sich auf eine Resolution einigt ..., die das Assad-
Regime mit harten, nicht-militärischen Sanktionen belegt ...“ 
138 „Deutschland beteiligt sich weder an Spekulationen noch an Vorbereitungen für irgendwelche 
Interventionen in  Syrien.“ 
139 „Umso wichtiger ist es, alle Entscheidungen genau abzuwägen, nicht nur danach, was gerade 
kurzfristig geboten erscheint, sondern danach, was am Ende auch den Menschen in Syrien , dem 
Frieden und der Stabilität in der gesamten Region wirklich dient.“ 
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reluctance, Germany seems to have adopted a people-centred perspective toward the 
Syrian crisis. 
After the chemical weapons attack in Syria in August 2013 and Obama’s 
announcement on a military intervention in Syria, Germany affirmed that its military 
participation was neither requested nor considered (idem, 1 September 2013). 
Westerwelle argued that the international community should not interfere in Syria’s 
civil war with the goal of ‘regime change’ or to force a military decision in favour of 
the rebels. The Foreign Minister, however, urged the international community to find 
the right response to the first use of chemical weapons of mass destruction in the 21st 
century. He claimed that 
if the international community were to return to business as usual … 
this would mean a heavy burden for our future. Anyone who considers 
the use of such weapons must know that they will face the consequences 
of the international community140 (idem). 
At the same time Westerwelle emphasised that it was important to await the report of 
the UN Chemical Weapons Inspectors before taking any further measures. The 
Foreign Minister justified Germany’s position on the basis that the culture of military 
restraint had been a constant in his foreign policy approach since 2009. Seemingly 
well aware of the criticism Germany had received for this position, Westerwelle 
underlined that Germany’s reluctance towards a military intervention in Syria was 
not affected by the then upcoming federal elections on 22 September 2013. 
Confirmed in its approach to the Syrian crisis with exclusively non-coercive means, 
Westerwelle welcomed the agreement of the US, Russia and Syria on the destruction 
of the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal. He stated: 
                                                
140 „Würde die international Gemeinschaft zur Tagesordnung übergehen, wenn der Einsatz chemischer 
Massenvernichtungswaffen bewiesen ist, wäre dies eine schwer Bürde für unsere Zukunft. Jeder, der 
den Einsatz solcher Waffen in Erwägung zieht, muss wissen, dass er mit Konsequenzen der 
Weltgemeinschaft rechnen muss.“ 
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If the words are put into action now, the chances for a political solution 
increase considerably. There will be no lasting peace with military 
means but only through a political solution. (Westerwelle, 14 
September quoted in RP Online, 2013) 
In line with its general aversion to deploy its military abroad, Germany was clearly 
against any kind of military intervention in Syria. The German discourse on how to 
respond to the crisis did not mention the RtoP or the more general term 
responsibility. Yet, even if unwilling to participate in any kind of military action 
against Assad government, Germany still advocated the punishment of the regime for 
the use or chemical weapons against its own population.  
The United Kingdom 
After the UNSC’s failure to agree on a resolution on Syria in February 2012, the UK 
laid out a further plan for the British crisis response containing seven steps of action. 
First, the UK confirmed to continue to support the League of Arab States. Second, it 
aimed at widening the international coalition of nations seeking a peaceful resolution 
in Syria. Third, the British government planned to intensify its contacts with 
members of the Syrian opposition. Fourth, the UK committed to continue to raise the 
situation in front of the UNSC. Fifth, British officials agreed to increase pressure 
through the EU. Six, the UK committed itself to work with others to ensure that those 
responsible for crimes in Syria were held to account. And seventh, the UK would try 
to make clear to the Syrian regime that its use of violence is unacceptable to the 
civilised world (Hague, 12 February 2012). In early 2012, the UK did thus not 
consider or discuss a military solution to the Syrian crisis, but relied exclusively on 
political and legal measures. 
William Hague reiterated on 11 June 2012 that the UK was “working intensively to 
find a peaceful means of resolving the crisis … in close cooperation with our 
European partners”. The British course of action was first to push for implementation 
of Annan’s peace plan; second, to increase pressure and isolate the regime 
internationally; and third, to provide justice accountability and humanitarian 
assistance (Hague, 11 June 2012). However, Hague also declared that the UK would 
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“not rule out any other option which could at any stage to stop the bloodshed” 
(idem). The British government thus slowly moved from focusing on non-coercive 
means to also considering measures ‘other’ than peaceful ones. 
Pushing for further action, the UK agreed with the US as early as June 2011 that 
there was sufficient evidence that chemical weapons, including the toxic gas sarin, 
had been used in Syria by the Assad regime (Hague, 14 June 2011). Therefore Hague 
called on the international community “to be prepared to do more to save lives… and 
to stop the regime using chemical weapons against its people” (idem). After a third 
veto in the UNSC on a resolution on Syria, the Foreign Secretary declared that the 
UK will be “doing more outside the Security Council” and will therefore intensify its 
“work to support the Syrian opposition and to give humanitarian aid” (Hague, 20 
July 2012). 
In March 2013, the British government for the first time linked the Syrian crisis to its 
own security interests. Hague emphasised that the situation in Syria was vital to 
British national interest for three reasons. The first was the growth of extremism in 
Syria. The Foreign Secretary claimed that “we cannot allow Syria to become another 
breeding ground for terrorists who pose a threat to our national security” (Hague, 6 
March 2013). The second ground was that the Syrian crisis was undermining the 
peace of the region and related to that the British government’s concern about the 
Syrian regime’s willingness to use chemical weapons. Hague also warned that Iran 
might be providing considerable military support to the Syrian regime. And the third 
reason was that British foreign policy is inseparably linked to upholding human 
rights, protecting lives and supporting international law. Therefore, Hague argued, 
the UK “must assist the genuine moderate and democratic forces in Syria who are in 
dire need of help and who feel abandoned by the international community” (idem). 
Almost as to prepare the British public but without specifying the kind of instrument 
the UK was intending to use in response to the Syrian crisis, the British government 
closely tied the fate of Syria to its own national interests. 
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Yet, not later than after the alleged chemical weapons attacks by the Syrian regime in 
August 2013, it was clear that something needed to be done. William Hague 
declared:  
This is the first chemical warfare in the 21st century. It has to be 
unacceptable, we have to confront something that is a war crime, 
something that is a crime against humanity. If we don’t do so, then we 
will have to confront even bigger war crimes in the future. (Hague, 28 
August 2013) 
The subsequent debates on a British participation in a military intervention in Syria 
on 29 August 2013 in the House of Commons crystallised around the issues of 
legality, legitimacy and feasibility of a military intervention. David Cameron referred 
to Tony Blair’s doctrine of humanitarian intervention according to which the 
international community could circumvent international law in the case of genocide. 
Furthermore, the RtoP was, for the first time, cited as a legitimate basis for action 
and an argument in favour of military intervention: 
… did not the world leaders and the UN sign up unanimously in 2005 
to the doctrine of the responsibility to protect,…? Syria has defaulted 
on its responsibility to protect its own citizens, so surely now the 
international community and ourselves have a responsibility to 
undertake what we agreed to do as recently as 2005. (Sir Tony Baldry, 
House of Commons, 29 August 2013) 
Furthermore, those in favour of military intervention also argued that British national 
interests were at stake not only in terms of a stable Middle East in general but also in 
relation to the use of chemical weapons specifically (Cameron, idem). Finally, it was 
claimed that inaction would “make a complete mockery of the international norm of 
the responsibility to protect.” (Lord Hannay of Chisnick, idem). While the norm had 
already been damaged a lot in Syria, the military intervention was seen as “a chance 
to honour it in the face of a massive breach of international humanitarian law” 
(idem). 
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Opponents on the other hand contended that there was a widespread scepticism 
among the British public about any further military involvement overseas (Liam Fox, 
idem). Furthermore, concerns were expressed about the outcome of a military 
intervention and to what extent it could be engineered. There was criticism regarding 
the lack of a legal basis which was also needed in case of the application of the RtoP: 
The effort to achieve a resolution under Chapter VII is a vital 
component of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, because if no 
such resolution is achieved … we turn to what was once called 
humanitarian intervention and now is called responsibility to protect. 
(Sir Menzies Campbell, idem). 
In line with the RtoP, sceptics emphasised that it was fundamental to exhaust all 
political and diplomatic means before considering more coercive measures (idem). 
Furthermore, it was argued that the RtoP “could have been invoked 100.000 lives 
ago. Therefore the idea that it becomes relevant because chemical weapons have 
been used is a non-starter” (John Baron, idem). In addition, it was underlined that 
there is a difference between humanitarian intervention and RtoP. While 
humanitarian intervention “is specifically about boots on the ground”, the RtoP is 
about protection and not about punishment (Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, idem). “It is 
about imposing ceasefires, separating warring parties and brining in aid. It is about a 
process of enforced pacification. It has nothing to do with punishment.” (Idem) 
Finally, opponents brought forward arguments on the feasibility of a military 
intervention in terms of Syria’s military and political alliance with Iran and the 
Lebanese Hezbollah as well as its political cover from Russia. In this context 
concerns were expressed that a military intervention could lead to a widening of the 
war particularly into Lebanon (Lord Williams of Baglan, idem). In the end, British 
MPs rejected the government motion on a possible UK military action against Syria 
by 285 votes to 272.  
Significantly, the RtoP appeared in the official British discourse on the Syrian crisis 
only after the chemical weapons attack in August 2013 and in order to legitimise a 
military strike against the Assad regime. Although both proponents and opponents of 
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a military intervention in Syria referred to the RtoP, the emerging norm seemed to be 
linked very closely to the calls for a need to sanction the Assad government and to 
legitimise the use of force. The late prominence of the RtoP in case of the Syrian 
crisis and the connection to the aim of punishment via coercive means leave great 
doubts as to its actual influence. 
Assessing the application – protection vs. punishment? 
As in the Libyan crisis, international and European responses to the Syrian crisis 
revealed different interpretations of whether the RtoP applied and what it meant. 
While the RtoP was absent in the German discourse, France and the UK seemed to 
agree, after the use of chemical weapons of mass destruction in Syria, that it was 
their responsibility to punish the Syrian government for such a crime. The RtoP was 
well reflected in the French and the British discourse, but seemed to be ultimately 
linked to the need to sanction the Syrian government rather than to protect the Syrian 
civilian population responsibly.  
France described the events in Syria as atrocities and massacres and emphasised that 
the crisis was becoming a threat to regional stability and security. In July, France 
referred to the Syrian crisis as humanitarian disaster. It was also confirmed that the 
large-scale atrocities constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity – two of 
the four RtoP crimes. In light of the increasing violence France signalled to be 
willing to assume its responsibility and stressed at the same time that the regional 
consequences of the crisis provided enough reasons to establish the UNSC’s 
responsibility even without the RtoP. France also argued that the Syrian authorities 
had failed in their primary responsibility to protect the Syrian people. In light of 
Russia’s and Chinas continuous use of their vetoes, the French government 
suggested an alteration of the voting rules in the UNSC. In terms of the actual crisis 
response, France seemed willing to participate in a military action since mid-2012. It 
also stated that international law should not stand in the way of protecting people 
from mass murder and confirmed its commitment to the RtoP. Moreover, the French 
government did not refer to the term war but advocated the sanctions of the gross 
human rights violations. It was reiterated more explicitly that the crime of using 
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chemical weapons should not remain unpunished. In the debate on a French 
participation in a military intervention in Syria at the French Parliament, the RtoP 
was used for arguments in favour as well as against military action. 
In the case of Germany, the Syrian crisis was almost absent in the official discourse. 
It was merely stated that the Assad regime was responsible for the crisis situation and 
that he had lost all legitimacy. As to the proposed military intervention, Germany 
showed itself even more reluctant than in case of the Libyan crisis. It was 
emphasised that there was no regional support and no legal basis for coercive 
measures. At the same time Germany stressed the need to sanction the use of 
chemical weapons. Although Germany did not refer to the RtoP explicitly, the 
recommended focus of the crisis response, at least after the 2013 chemical weapon 
attacks, was not only on sanctioning the Syrian regime, but also on the protection of 
the Syrian civilians, adopting a people-centred approach to the crisis response. 
In contrast to Germany’s reluctance, the UK spoke in November 2011 about the 
widespread and brutal attacks against civilians in Syria. Moreover, the UK gave a 
detailed account on the number of victims and the alleged crimes committed. In 
March 2012 it was claimed that Syria was on the edge of a civil war. The UK 
government argued that inaction in the UNSC undermined the credibility of the body 
and constituted a failure in the institution’s responsibility. After Russia and China’s 
third veto in the UNSC on a Syrian Resolution, the UK declared that it would do 
more outside the UNSC framework. Furthermore, the UK legitimised its crisis 
response by arguing that the Syrian crisis was vital to national security interests in 
terms of terrorism, in terms of the use of chemical weapons and in terms of Britain’s 
foreign policy principles such as protecting lives.  
After the US call for support of a military intervention at the beginning of 
September, the UK claimed that the Syrian government had failed in its 
responsibility to protect and that therefore, the international community and Britain 
itself had to take over, as agreed in 2005 in the RtoP. The parliamentary debate on 
Britain’s participation in a military campaign over Syria crystallised around 
questions of legality and the lack of popular support. Furthermore, it was argued that 
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the RtoP could not be used to punish the Syrian government for the use of chemical 
weapons. It was emphasised that there was a difference between humanitarian 
intervention, meaning boots on the ground, and the RtoP aiming at protection and not 
punishment. Similar to France, the RtoP was used both by proponents and opponents 
of British military action in Syria. 
Although member states agreed on the importance of a stronger European defence, 
this aspiration was not put into practice, at least not in the case of the Syrian crisis. 
While the EU was very active in implementing sanctions against the Syrian regime, 
as well as in providing humanitarian aid, a more decisive and robust action was not 
implemented. With the UNSC blocked by Russia’s and China’s veto and the EU’s 
commitment to international law, the EU’s options were limited. Until the chemical 
weapons attacks in August 2013 and the US demand for military action it seemed as 
if the whole world was unsure about how and with what means to react to the Syrian 
crisis.141 Although the EU’s profile as a security actor remained even lower than in 
the Libyan crisis, it should be noted that all other international players were equally 
unable to act as effective security actors in response to the Syrian crisis. 
While the use of chemical weapons of mass destruction and the sanctioning of such 
an action are not included in the RtoP, the RtoP’s application in case of the Syrian 
points toward a misuse of the norm. Possibly influenced by the US, the dominant 
European discourse was on punishment and not on protection. RtoP was further used 
to emphasise the evolving character of international law and that a vetoed UNSC and 
thus the lack of international legality would not necessarily impede the legitimacy of 
a military intervention. 
                                                
141 The paralysis of the international community in its response to the Syrian crisis cannot only be 
explained by a blocked UN Security Council but further with a lack of information on what was 
happening on the Syrian ground. While in the case of Libya, the opposition movement seemed fairly 
united in their revolt against the Gaddafi regime, this is not the case in Syria. By contrast the Syrian 
opposition is deeply divided due to Syria’s complex demographics and tensions between the sectarian 
divisions (74 per cent of the population is Sunni; significant minorities such as Christians, Alawites 
and non-Sunni Muslims each make up about 10 per cent) (Buckley, 2012). 
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5.4 Preliminary conclusion 
The analysis of the Syrian crisis has shown that the RtoP did play a role in European 
responses but much less than it did in European responses to the Libyan crisis. 
France and the UK both reaffirmed their commitment to the emerging norm and 
declared their willingness to assume their responsibility as members of the 
international community. While Germany’s crisis response was explicitly limited to 
non-coercive measures, the Franco-British approach did not exclude the possibility 
of using military force. They even agreed on the trigger to implement coercive 
measures – the use of chemical weapons of mass atrocities and justified their 
positions on the basis of the RtoP. In this context, there seemed to be a collective 
understanding – at least between France and Britain – on what the RtoP meant and 
entailed. The discourse, however, focused on the aim of punishing the Syrian 
government for the alleged use of chemical weapons rather than on protecting the 
civilian population. This justification for applying the RtoP seemed to be going 
beyond the original scope of RtoP referring to the four crimes – war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing.  
As in the case of the Libyan crisis, the influence of the RtoP as an emerging 
international norm therefore remained moderate. Although it was used in the 
decision-making process on how to best respond to the crisis the proposed action did 
not match the prescriptions of the RtoP. Furthermore, the RtoP was seen as a 
legitimate basis to act upon only after the option of a military was openly considered. 
The Syrian case therefore confirms the assumption that the RtoP is increasingly 
linked to the use of force. This might explain why France and the UK, who were 
eager on participating in a military operation in Syria, openly supported and 
promoted the emerging norm. At the same time the RtoP’s increasingly coercive 
interpretation might be the reason why compliance with the RtoP was decreasing in 
Germany and the EU.  
The EU in its role as security actor in the neighbourhood was able to deploy 
sanctions and deliver humanitarian aid. The 2012 Chicago summit aspiration of a 
greater role for the EU in defence, however, did not materialise in the case of the 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
The Syrian crisis        188 
Syrian crisis. In the case of the Syrian crisis the EU did not act as norm entrepreneur 
for the RtoP either. Although acknowledging the commitment of RtoP crimes (i.e. 
crimes against humanity) and the failure of the Syrian regime to protect its civilian 
population, the EU discourse did not promote the RtoP any further. By contrast, it 
affirmed that the main responsibility had to be assumed by the Syrian government 
itself. Yet, in the aftermath and possibly as lessons learned from both the Libyan and 
Syrian crisis, the EU started to create new capabilities for the prevention of mass 
atrocities. The EU therefore supported the creation of a new Task Force on the EU 
Prevention of Mass Atrocities in January 2012. 
With regard to the RtoP’s development as an emerging international norm, four 
conclusions can be drawn from the Syrian crisis. First, the application of the RtoP in 
case of the Libyan crisis has increased reluctance among sceptics of the norm, such 
as Russia and China, but also Brazil and India, to agree to the application of non-
coercive and coercive measure under emerging norm. Therefore, China and Russia 
referred constantly to the lessons learned from Libya when justifying their vetoes on 
UNSC draft resolutions on Syria (Brozus, 2012). Second, while European countries 
pointed towards the flexibility of international law, UNSC members Russia and 
China emphasised the dominance of the non-interference principle, national 
sovereignty and national interests. The Syrian crisis thus highlights the current 
limitations of the RtoP. Despite RtoP’s emphasis on the protection of populations 
over the past decade, the UNSC veto system still creates situations in which states 
can commit mass atrocity crimes against their citizens without facing any 
consequences (Williams et al., 2012). 
Third, as the US was pushing for military action in Syria after the alleged chemical 
weapon attacks by the Syrian government, President Obama managed to persuade 
some of its European partners to support his initiative. However, Obama did not 
make any reference to the RtoP but justified the need for military action on the basis 
of US national security interests. As in the case of Libya, the US did not act as norm 
entrepreneur for the RtoP either. Finally, and again as in the Libyan crisis, the Syrian 
conflict has shown that the RtoP is increasingly linked to the use of force and the 
question of whether to intervene militarily or not. Significantly, in the case of Syria, 
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the RtoP became dominant in European discourses only after the option of a military 
response had been put back on the table. 
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Chapter 6: From Kosovo to Syria – what has 
changed? 
The results of the case study analysis conducted in the two previous chapters shows 
that in both cases the RtoP’s influence seems moderate and does not go beyond 
affecting the discourse. Still in the case of Libya, the RtoP was much more dominant 
in European discourses than it was in the case of the Syrian crisis. It has widely been 
argued that the application in case of Libya had a significant impact on the extent to 
which the international community in general would consider the use of the RtoP in 
the case of Syria (Brozus, 2012; Chesterman, 2011; Dunne and Gifkins, 2011; 
Jolyon, 2013). The link between Syria and Libya in terms of the application of the 
RtoP has also been present in the European discourses themselves. Yet, European 
discourses have frequently emphasised that the two crises are not comparable. 
Furthermore, references were made to the Kosovo crisis and intervention in 1999, 
against which this thesis assesses whether the RtoP actually makes a difference. This 
assessment chapter starts by looking at the references made in European discourses 
on the comparison of Syria, Libya and Kosovo, highlighting the link between the 
RtoP’s practical application and its development as a norm. It also considers the 
existing academic debate on similarities and differences in the implementation of the 
military interventions in Kosovo and in Libya with the aim of assessing whether 
there is an actual difference in practice. The following section will then highlight the 
research results from the investigation of the Libyan and the Syrian crisis according 
to the chosen indicators for the case study analysis: the role of the UN and the EU as 
norm entrepreneurs, the crisis perceptions and the crisis responses. Potential lessons 
learned from the role of and the link between the RtoP and the EU in the Libyan and 
the Syrian crisis will be discussed in part three of this chapter before coming to a 
conclusion on the empirical analysis. 
6.1 Relating Syria, Libya and Kosovo 
In the French discourse it was stated on several occasions that the situation in Syria 
was not comparable to the crisis in Libya (Assemblée Nationale, 22 March 2011; 
Juppé, 24 March 2011; 23 May 2011; Araud, 8 June 2011). It was emphasised that 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Comparison        191 
the political, geographic and geostrategic situations in Libya and Syria were 
different. Alain Juppé highlighted that “even if there are several hundreds of 
thousands of deaths in Syria, the context is not the one we experienced in the attack 
on Benghazi” (Juppé, 23 May 2011). Juppé explained further that in the case of 
Libya, other Arab countries supported the military action and it was authorised by a 
UNSC resolution. By contrast, in the case of Syria the Security Council was unable 
to reach an agreement. The Foreign Minister stressed that the absence of a decisive 
response to the Syrian crisis was not due to the lack of willingness of France and 
other partners, the British in particular, but because the international context was not 
the same. France referred to the Libyan crisis response as an example in which the 
international community was successful in preventing further mass atrocities and 
assuming its responsibility as contained in the RtoP.  
On the comparison between the situations in Libya and Syria, German Foreign 
Minister Guido Westerwelle affirmed that “in each country the situations are very 
different and that is why there can only be a tailored political response (Euractiv, 
2011). The UK, similarly to France, stressed in June 2011 that there was “no 
prospect of a UN Resolution similar to 1973 on Libya” and that the international 
community therefore needs “to work … in other ways” (Hague, 12 June 2011). 
Cameron affirmed in September in 2011 that in the case of Libya there was an 
“ought” as well as a “could”. While the international community had a “moral 
obligation” to intervene, it was also able, due to support of the Arab nations, the 
UNSC and NATO. The “could” was, on the other hand, not present in the case of the 
Syrian crisis (Cameron, 22 September 2011). 
Similarly to the European official discourses, scholars have pointed out that the 
conflict in Syria is distinct from the conflict in Libya and does thus not precipitate for 
the same response (Buckley, 2012). Initially, the rebel operations in Syria for 
example have arguably not been near the scale of the rebel operations in Libya, while 
the latter did not have sectarian divisions comparable to those in Syria142. 
                                                
142 Syria’s complex demographics make it a difficult country to rule. It is believed that three-fourths of 
the country’s roughly 22 millions are Sunnis, including most of the Kurdish minority in the northeast 
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Furthermore, aside the fact that the Syrian government’s tanks and artillery have 
outmatched the rebels’ rifles and homemade bombs, the Syrian regime controls an 
army that is unified and committed to forcefully suppressing the protests and thus 
cannot be compared to Libya where the military helped topple the unpopular leader 
(idem). Another significant difference is that the Syrian regime was continuously 
backed by its strong and long-standing alliances with Iran and Russia. However, 
from a people-centred perspective, the situation in Syria is very similar to the crisis 
in Libya, as the citizens have been protesting against poverty, lack of democracy and 
corruption, and their protests have been suppressed violently by their de facto leader 
Although in Syria 2013, an international military intervention could be averted, it is 
worthwhile taking a look at the similarities and differences between the military 
intervention in Libya in 2011 and the one in Kosovo in 1999. By contrast with 
Kosovo, the military intervention in Libya ended with initial combat operations. 
Furthermore, the Libya air campaign was significantly less intense, but lasted much 
longer (Chivvis, 2012). Regarding civilian losses during the military operation in 
Libya the numbers of victims vary. The UN International Commission of Inquiry on 
Libya reported that during 20 NATO air strikes, 60 civilians were killed in 5 of them 
(UN, 2 March 2012). The New York Times stated that during 25 air strikes at least 
40, possibly more than 70 civilians, lost their lives (Chivers and Schmidt, 2011). 
Human Rights Watch claimed that the military intervention caused at least 72 
civilians deaths (Bolopion, 2011). In comparison to that, an estimated number of 
5000 civilians died during the air campaign over Kosovo. This might be related to 
                                                                                                                                     
(Bhalla, 2011). Most estimates put the number of Alawites in Syria at around 1.5 million, or close to 7 
percent of the population. When combined with Shia and Ismailis, non-Sunni Muslims average around 
13 percent. Christians of several variations, including Greek Orthodox and Maronite, make up around 
10 percent of the population. Rather than exhibiting a clear Sunni-Shiite religious-ideological divide, 
Syria’s history can be more accurately described as a struggle between the Sunnis on one hand and a 
group of minorities on the other (idem.). It is the divisions between the Syrian opposition that have 
prevented them from forming a unified force that the international community could support. 
President Assad belongs to the Alawite sect, a small, obscure branch of Shiism. Assad has 
concentrated power in the hands of his family and other members of the Alawite sect, which makes up 
the majority of the Syrian security forces (Buckley, 2012). 
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the pace of NATO’s operational tempo, which was significantly slower in Libya than 
in Kosovo (Vira and Cordesman, 2011). 
The Kosovo intervention was not authorised by the UN Security Council but was in 
the aftermath described as legitimate though illegal. While the Libya intervention 
was mandated by a UNSC resolution, it was still claimed that the military 
intervention was illegal as the mandate was extended ex post to target Muammar 
Gaddafi. The spectre of Kosovo thus remains in terms of the mismatch between the 
protection of civilians mandate and the declared aim of the intervening states to 
remove Gaddafi from power and to protect their national security (Dunne and 
Gifkins, 2011). 
As to the role of the EU as a security actor, French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
claimed on 31 August 2011 that in Libya, Europe was able “to do the job” without 
“begging” the US for support as it had been the case in Kosovo in 1999. However, 
the question remains open whether without American operational support 
particularly during the first few days of the intervention, Europe would still be able 
to call the Libyan intervention a success. According to Nigel White (2012: 220), the 
change within the UNSC from the situation in Kosovo in 1999, where the UNSC 
could not agree on military action to protect the Kosovars, to Libya in 2011 is 
marginal, but sufficient to give the initial action a sound legal basis. That marginal 
push may have helped by the emergence in the early twenty-first century of the idea 
that there is a responsibility to protect on the part of the international community. 
In comparison to the previous norm of humanitarian intervention which was 
contingent upon national interests, the RtoP would only make a difference if the 
crisis response was conducted from the point of view of those civilians in need, 
rather than those considering the intervention. The main difference of the RtoP is 
thus the focus on the protection of civilians based on the human security concept. 
The analysis of the Libyan crisis has shown that Europe talks about protection but 
lacks the according implementation. Significantly, the way the 2011 military 
intervention in Libya was implemented and conducted differed only slightly from the 
1999 Kosovo intervention. In the case of Syria, Europe talks about punishment rather 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Comparison        194 
than protection and fails to act altogether. From this perspective the RtoP does seem 
to make a slight difference on a rhetorical level but certainly not in practice. 
6.2 Norm entrepreneurs, crisis perception and 
response 
The roles of the UN and the EU 
UNSC Resolution 1973 was the first time that the UN had taken such quick and 
decisive action, explicitly based on the RtoP and without government consent. From 
the outset of the crisis, UN officials warned of the imminent threat of mass atrocities 
and framed their response in the RtoP language. The analysis of the UN discourse 
has shown that the RtoP was taken into consideration and guided political decision-
making in response to the Libyan crisis. Resolution 1973 stated explicitly that the 
primary goal of the intervention was the protection of Libyan civilians. Significantly, 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 referred merely to Libya’s responsibility to protect and 
did not explicitly mention the responsibility of the international community to protect 
the Libyan population.  
In Syria, the UNSC remained blocked due to the repeated vetoes by Russia and 
China. In comparison to the Libyan crisis, the UN response to the Syrian crisis was 
not framed in the RtoP language until May 2013, two years after the outbreak of 
violence, when it called on the Syrian government to meet its responsibility to 
protect its population. While the UN identified the Syrian crisis as a threat to 
international peace and security and linked the unfolding events to terrorism, it did 
not actively promote the RtoP as a legitimate basis for the international community 
to respond to the conflict in Syria. 
The EU clearly supported the RtoP but remained unable and incapable of reacting 
with means other than civilian. From the beginning, the EU emphasised that it was 
merely its responsibility to help. Instead of speaking of mass atrocities, the EU 
described the crisis in Libya as humanitarian emergency or disaster. The offer to 
deploy a military CSDP mission to support the delivery of humanitarian aid seemed 
more like an alibi than a serious proposal. The EU could have acted as norm 
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entrepreneur for the RtoP in case of the Libyan crisis but failed to reach a consensus 
among its core member states.  
HR Catherin Ashton’s view of the EU as a civilian power was confirmed in the case 
of the Libyan crisis. From the member state’s perspective, the EU’s role as primarily 
a civilian actor was also affirmed. For both France and the UK, the military operation 
would naturally be conducted by NATO and not the EU. Although Germany 
emphasised the importance of the CSDP for the EU’s global role, it was at the 
forefront of those calling for a peaceful response to the Libyan crisis on the basis of 
diplomacy and sanctions. While Europe was able to play a more decisive role in the 
case of Libya than it was in the case of the Kosovo in 1999, the military crisis 
response took place outside the EU institutional framework and with help of the US. 
In Syria, the EU referred to the responsibility of the Syrian government as well as the 
responsibility of the UN Security Council, although acknowledging the failure of the 
Syrian state’s responsibility to protect its citizens Europe’s responsibility to protect 
was merely pointed out by the European Parliament. Holding on to the claim that the 
main responsibility in the Syrian crisis laid with the Syrian government itself, the EU 
did not act as norm entrepreneur for the RtoP. In comparison to the Libyan crisis, the 
EU advised against any form of military intervention due to the lack of local and 
regional support and the danger of regional instability. The EU managed to activate 
its Civil Protection Mechanism but remained inactive in the area of military crisis 
management. Furthermore, it applied a range of sanctions and other non-coercive 
measures. Among the ‘Big 3’, none seemed to have envisaged a particular role for 
the EU in the response to the Syrian crisis. Although European defence ministers 
emphasised the need for a stronger European defence policy in 2012, as a security 
actor the EU remained, with the rest of the world, indecisive on how to best respond 
to the Syrian crisis. 
The crisis perceptions and policy responses 
The UK labelled the crisis in Libya as an RtoP case and in contrast to France and 
Germany, acknowledged that the Libyan government was failing in its responsibility 
to protect. However, initially it did not indicate who was supposed to assume the 
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responsibility, if not the Libyan government. Moreover, the UK was the first to point 
out the potential consequences of the Libyan crisis to the wider region. France 
Germany and the UK seemed to agree that the RtoP applied to the Libyan crisis. The 
emphasis ranged from the RtoP of the international community (France), to the RtoP 
of the UNSC (Germany), to the failure of the Libyan government to assume its RtoP. 
The ambivalences within Europe on the exact meaning of the RtoP in practice were 
exposed even more in the decision-making processes on the actual policy response. 
In Syria, France referred from the beginning to the commitment of mass atrocities 
and therefore emphasised its own responsibility as well the responsibility of the 
UNSC. At the same time France affirmed explicitly its commitment to the RtoP. It 
acknowledged that the Syrian regime had failed in its responsibility to protect the 
Syrian population and suggested an alteration of the voting rule in the UNSC. By 
contrast, the Syrian crisis was not very prominent in the German official discourse in 
general and German officials remained silent on questions of responsibility and the 
RtoP. The UK government described in detail the atrocities committed in Syria. 
Although initially not explicitly referring to the RtoP, it stressed the need of the 
international community to step in. Furthermore the UK stipulated that the lack of 
action would undermine the UN’s credibility, while Russia and China were already 
failing in their responsibilities as permanent members of the UNSC. 
In line with its perception of the Libyan crisis, as massacres possibly constituting 
crimes against humanity, France was among the first countries calling for a military 
intervention. Although also highlighting the principle of non-interference, France 
took the view that a military intervention would still be legitimate, if based on (1) a 
clear legal basis, (2) a demonstrable need and (3) regional support. France actively 
persuaded the other members of the UNSC to assume their responsibility to protect 
the Libyan civilians.  
In contrast to its French partners, Germany has described the crisis in Libya as a civil 
war from the beginning. Accordingly, its main argument against a response to the 
crisis with military means was to not to become a warring party in a protracted 
conflict. Germany’s position on the Libya intervention reflected its general aversion 
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against the use of force. Therefore, its crisis response focused on non-coercive 
measures. Germany agreed that the Libyan people needed to be protected but saw the 
responsibility to protect primarily with the countries in the region.  
Britain’s participation in the military intervention was justified with the argument 
that a failed Libyan state would be against the UK’s national interest. Alongside a 
demonstrable need, regional support and a clear legal basis, the presence of national 
security interests seems to constitute a fourth condition for British involvement in the 
Libyan intervention. The UK therefore seemed to pursue a double-track. On the one 
hand the British government emphasised its commitment to the RtoP. On the other 
hand the UK seems to still adhere to the old norm of humanitarian intervention when 
it comes to the question of military intervention. David Cameron’s discourse in the 
House of Commons on the debate about British military participation in Syria 
therefore very much resembles Tony Blair’s discourse on the need to intervene in 
Kosovo in 1999.  
From the outset, France expressed its willingness to participate in a military 
intervention as response to the Syrian crisis. However, only after the chemical 
weapons attacks, France justified the use of force on the basis of the RtoP. Despite 
focussing on the protection of civilians, France’s response seemed to be motivated by 
the necessity to punish the use of chemical weapons of mass destruction as well as by 
the need to prevent further mass atrocities. Yet, a military operation was dependent 
on the decision of the US. Germany, on the other hand, did not depart from its focus 
on peaceful means in response to the Syrian crisis and did not make any references to 
the RtoP. But Germany also advocated the sanctioning of the use of chemical 
weapons. The UK initially focused on increasing the pressure on the Syrian regime 
with sanctions and diplomacy but, similarly to France, did not rule out any further 
action. Furthermore, for the UK government British national interests were vital. 
During the debate on the British participation in a military operation in Libya, the 
RtoP was used as basis for arguments in favour as well as against. 
Europe and the rest of the world seemed to agree that Gaddafi had lost all his 
legitimacy as leader of Libya and that he had to step down. Although France and 
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Britain strongly emphasised in their discourses that the sole objective of the military 
intervention was the protection of the Libyan civilians, achieving this aim seemed to 
be possible, only if linked to Gaddafi’s removal. The lines between the goal of 
protection and regime change, which was not authorised by Resolution 1973, became 
blurred. In the case of the Syrian crisis, the RtoP was used as a justification for the 
proposed action, only after the chemical weapons attacks. There was a general 
consensus on the need to sanction the Assad regime for the use of weapons of mass 
destructions. Particularly those in favour of a military operation – namely France and 
the UK – referred to the RtoP as a legitimate basis for a military intervention. 
However the call for punishment seemed to undermine the core aim of protection of 
the emerging norm. Similarly, in the Libyan crisis, the aim of protection was blurred 
by calls for regime change and ex post extension of mandate given in Resolution 
1973.  
Assessing the presumptions 
For the in chapter 4 developed presumptions, it can be first of all be concluded that 
the RtoP does have influence. Although the RtoP’s influence on actual practice 
remains limited, it seems to have an influence on European decision-making. The 
analysis has shown further that in specific cases the RtoP can be assumed to have an 
influence despite its absence. For the case of Germany, it can be assumed that the 
RtoP was either not very dominant, or not used at all because Germany disagreed 
with the coercive interpretation of the RtoP taken by France and the UK. This again 
confirms the argument that the influence of the RtoP is increasingly linked to the use 
of force. Significantly, France and the UK have referred to the emerging norm when 
justifying the proposal or actual use of military force.  
Against the empirical findings elaborated on above, presumption III can partly be 
validated and partly be rejected. Presumption III stated: ‘The perception of a crisis in 
RtoP terms (i.e. the four RtoP crimes) increases its influence but does not entail the 
implementation of the RtoP’. Yet, the commitment of mass atrocities or a specific 
number of civilian victims alone does not seem to be a trigger for the application of 
the RtoP, unless the proposed crisis response contains the use of military force. In 
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other words, what seems to be a condition for the use of the RtoP in the foreign-
policy decision-making process is not (only) the way the crisis is perceived and 
described but rather the question of whether a military intervention will be deployed 
or not. Moreover, the rhetoric use of the RtoP in the case of Libya and Syria has not 
led to an according implementation of the actual policies. 
The empirical analysis has confirmed what has been suggested in presumption II: 
‘The EU’s role as norm entrepreneur can reinforce its role as security actor’. Yet, the 
supposition has to be qualified further according to the findings of this study. The 
Libyan crisis showed that even though the EU supported the RtoP in its discourse, 
the actual crisis response took place mainly outside the EU framework. The EU’s 
role as norm entrepreneur can potentially increase its role as security actor but only if 
the EU actively contributes to the implementation of the European crisis response. In 
the case of Syria the EU did not act as norm entrepreneur nor did it take a decisive 
part in the crisis response.  
At the same time, the analysis has shown that the role of the EU depends essentially 
on how the member states perceive the EU’s part in the crisis response. Although 
France, Germany and the UK expressed the general desire for a greater role of the 
EU in the area of defence, in the specific cases of the Libyan and the Syrian crises 
member states saw the EU mainly as civilian or normative power. While general 
expectations on the EU to become a military actor match neither practice nor the 
EU’s capabilities, the EU’s understanding of its responsibility in the analysed crises 
in terms of primarily assisting and helping on the other hand seems to match practice 
and existing capabilities much better. 
Finally, from the above conducted analysis it can further be concluded that 
presumption I has proven to be right. Presumption I stipulated that ‘The existence of 
a norm entrepreneur can increase the collective understanding of the RtoP in a 
specific case but not in general’. The analysis has shown that collective 
understanding in one case can lead to less agreement or even contestation in another 
case. In the case of Libya, the UN, the EU and France acted as norm entrepreneurs 
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for the RtoP. The UN promoted the RtoP in its general discourse on the Libyan crisis 
and in Resolution 1970 and 1973.  
However, in Resolution 1973, UNSC referred merely to responsibility of the Libyan 
authorities and not to the responsibility of the international community. The EU 
supported the UN’s approach to the RtoP but failed to reach a common position 
among its member states. Most actively, France persuaded its colleagues in the 
UNSC to agree on Resolution 1973 and promoted the RtoP in its official statements 
on the Libyan crisis. The three norm entrepreneurs – the UN, the EU and France – 
forged consensus on pillar 1 of the RtoP and to a limited extent on pillar 2. However, 
due to the ex post extension of the military operation to fight Libyan leader Gaddafi 
the RtoP was not implemented accordingly. The shared understanding of the RtoP 
did thus not only remain limited to the case of the Libyan crisis but also made some 
members of the international community even more sceptical towards the emerging 
norm. The extent to which RtoP has an influence is therefore not only determined by 
the presence of norm entrepreneurs but also by previous applications of the RtoP.  
Due to the recency of the case studies analysed in this thesis and with the Syrian 
crisis still ongoing at the time of writing, it is difficult to draw more general 
conclusions on the arguments discussed here or even make predictions for future 
cases. As events develop, a different set of questions may arise and the assumptions 
made here may change. Yet, when reviewing the Libyan and the Syrian crisis against 
the background of the development of the RtoP and the Kosovo crisis, the trend of 
linking the RtoP to the use of force and the option of a military intervention in 
response to mass atrocities seems to be persistent. 
6.3 RtoP and the EU in Libya and Syria – lessons 
learned? 
Jonathan Eyal (2012) has argued that the Libyan intervention constituted a missed 
opportunity for Europe to advance the RtoP as a new international norm. Through 
the way the military operation was conceived and implemented by France, Britain 
and the other powers and the subsequent expansion of the mandate, the Libyan 
intervention does not seem to differ much from the one in Kosovo in 1999. 
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Significantly, another factor despite the RtoP that could have made a difference in 
Libya and Syria was the EU’s CSDP and its role as a security actor. Yet, similar to 
the RtoP criticism it has been argued that due to the lack of a decisive response to the 
Libyan crisis, the EU has missed the “perfect” opportunity to make use of its 
common security and defence capabilities and to prove itself as a crisis manager in 
its neighbourhood. It seemed as if Libya was exactly the type of crisis for which the 
EU had been preparing since the experience in the Balkans in the 1990s. After 
having analysed the EU’s mostly civilian crisis responses to the mass atrocities in 
Libya and in Syria the question arises to what extent the EU considers the lessons 
learned from these two events in the further development of its CSDP or whether the 
CSDP will remain ‘dead’ as claimed by Alain Juppé in the context of the Libyan 
crisis. 
One reason for the disappointment with the CSDP in general and after Libya in 
particular were too high expectations. The Libyan civil war was the first security-
related crisis after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which had stirred 
the expectations of a more effective, more coherent and more visible EU foreign 
policy. One year after the outbreak of the Libyan crisis, some diplomats and 
academics argue that it was actually a wake-up call for the CSDP (Koenig, 2012). It 
triggered a renewed debate on lessons learnt within the EU’s broader crisis 
management structures. This new impetus for learning lessons is reflected in the 
Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on CSDP of 1 December 2011, which strongly 
emphasised the need for progress in CSDP.  
Although the outbreak of violence in February 2011 called for a decisive and swift 
response, the planning process leading up to EUFOR Libya was lengthy and 
cumbersome. Recognising the lack of a permanent planning structure, the Council 
advocated in December 2011 the need for a significant improvement in planning and 
conducting civilian and military CSDP operations. It was agreed to enable the EU 
Military Staff and the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate to do more 
effective advanced planning with the aim to speed up decision-making at the political 
level. However, the Council did not specify how this would be done in practice.  
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In the course of the development of the CSDP since the lessons learned from Kosovo 
in 1999, the EU has developed civilian and military rapid reaction mechanisms, such 
as the Civilian Response Teams and the battlegroups. Yet, the Libyan crisis proved 
to be another example where the EU did not make use of these structures. The fact 
that the battlegroups remain unused, led to frustration among some member states 
(Koenig, 2012). Although the EU emphasised the further enhancement of the EU’s 
rapid reaction mechanisms and particularly of the battlegroups in its Conclusions 
from 1 December 2011, no battlegroup was set on stand-by for the first semester of 
2012. Finally, the Libyan crisis was yet another example for the lack of capabilities 
and the need of transatlantic support. EU member states, mainly France and Great 
Britain, were at the forefront of NATO’s Libya intervention. However, 
approximately 90 per cent of the military actions against the Libyan regime would 
not have been possible without the support of the US (idem). The EU Council 
therefore suggested to work more efficiently with European resources and to avoid 
duplication by ‘pooling and sharing’ military capabilities.  
Two years later and in the aftermath of an averted military intervention in Syria, the 
EU Council came together again to discuss the state of play and further development 
of the CSDP. During the ‘European Defence Summit’ from 19 to 20 December 2013, 
the European Council held for the first time since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty a thematic debate on the CSDP in the light of current and future security 
challenges. However, the Council recommendations on the further development of 
the CSDP seemed therein rather influenced by the economic circumstances as well as 
the shifting security priorities towards energy and cyber security. With regard to 
Syria, the EU merely emphasised the importance of its role as humanitarian aid 
donor.  
While the CSDP did not play a major role in the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis, 
it equally does not seem to reflect on the further development of the EU’s security 
and defence policy. Although some have argued that the EU was following 
Catherine’s Ashton’s conceptualizing of the EU as primarily civilian power 
(Brattberg, 2011) and others have claimed that the CSDP was “designed to make a 
contribution to global security rather to protect its borders with military force” 
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(Kaldor, 2012), the EU Council did not depart from its aspiration to enhance the 
development of capabilities and to strengthen the European defence industry. At the 
same time, the ‘Big 3’ – France, Germany and the UK – seemed to disagree on how 
to “deepen European defence cooperation” (EU Observer, 2013).  
During the December 2013 defence summit, French President François Holland 
called for a new EU fund to help member states fund unilateral military operations 
(such as the one conducted by France in Mali). In response Angela Merkel stressed 
that Germany would not fund any military operations in which Germany was not 
involved, while David Cameron made clear that he would block EU institutions from 
developing and operating their own military assets (idem). Head of NATO, Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen, agreed with Cameron and added: “Let me stress: It is not Nato or 
the EU that possess [military] assets. They are owned by the individual nations” 
(idem). Even after the experiences in Libya and Syria, the EU has not given up on its 
common security and defence policy but the gap between expectations, responsibility 
and capabilities seems to remain.  
6.4 Conclusion 
For Ramesh Thakur, RtoP was a “game changer” which acted as a powerful new 
galvanising norm” over Libya (Thakur, 2011). For Alex Bellamy, the concept 
“played an important role in shaping the world’s response to actual and threatened 
atrocities there” (Bellamy, 2011: 263). It can be argued that the application of the 
RtoP in the case of Libya showed the biggest commitment of international 
community to assume its responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities since 
the inception of the emerging norm during the 2005 World Summit. At the same time 
it seems as if the influence of the RtoP was mitigated in the aftermath of the Libyan 
intervention, leading to even greater reluctance in its subsequent test case, the Syrian 
crisis. While the RtoP became increasingly linked to the use of force during the 
Libyan intervention, the prospects for its future application have diminished 
significantly.  
In this context it has also been argued that parts of the debate of the Libyan crisis 
exaggerated the role played by the RtoP and that NATO’s chosen means of 
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implementing UNSC Resolution 1973 have been used by opponents of the RtoP to 
delegitimise the emerging norm (Morris, 2013: 1256-1266). Criticisms made in 
debates over Libya, of the manner in which NATO had implemented the UNSC 
mandate, came to contaminate discussions over Syria (idem: 1275). In Syria, 
arguments on the danger of doing more harm than good, in terms of both the internal 
humanitarian situation and the potential for triggering a wider regional conflagration, 
were much more strongly sided against intervention. RtoP in action in Libya has 
consequently been employed to justify inaction in the case of Syria. 
What proved crucial to the passing of Resolution 1973 was the level of regional 
support for a more robust UNSC response: the African Union, the League of Arab 
States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organisation of the Islamic Council all 
condemned the actions of Gaddafi’s regime, with the latter three explicitly calling on 
the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. Such support was cited by all three, 
France, Germany and Great Britain as essential to the legitimacy of the military 
intervention. Furthermore, US President Barack Obama, who was initially very 
reluctant to allow the US to get involved, was eventually persuaded of the 
compelling case for intervention by a trio of top advisers: Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice and especially Samantha Power, US 
Representative to the UNSC (Chesterman, 2011).  
However, the US change of position and then support of the military operation did 
not seem motivated by the RtoP but was as Saira Mohamed notes “driven more by 
singular national interests than by any sense of responsibility” (Mohamed, 2012: 
320). In addition to that, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy together with UK 
Prime Minister David Cameron seemed determined in the use of military force 
against Gaddafi. The main trigger cited was the seemingly murderous intentions of 
Gaddafi to exact indiscriminate revenge on large swathes of the Libyan people who 
had dared to rise up in protest (Howorth, 2013: 20). Finally the last reason for the 
military intervention was that it was judged relatively simple in military terms (idem: 
21).  
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As Julian Howorth notes “the case of Syria seems in many ways to be diametrically 
opposed to that of Libya” (2013: 23). To begin with, while decisions about military 
action in Libya were taken promptly within the time span of a month after the 
outbreak of violence, the Syrian crisis continued to unfold over a period of two and a 
half years (March 2011 to September 2013) with no decisive action taken by the 
international community until the end of August 2013. Second, as many as 30.000 
people had died in Syria up to the beginning of 2013, making the relevance of the 
RtoP even more acute in Syria than in Libya. Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 2042 
from April 2012 described the “widespread violations of human rights abuses [and] 
the death of many thousands of people”, yet there was no mention of the prospect of 
military intervention until Summer 2013, after the alleged chemical weapons attacks. 
Third, the preferred European course of action, even in France, was, alongside the 
US, the imposition of sanctions. Fourth, there was no regional support of any form of 
military intervention raised by Arab League or other organisations.  
On the other hand, there were also fundamental reasons for the inaction of the 
international community in the Syrian case. First, the Syrian military is, unlike in 
Libya, a highly efficient, well-armed and well-trained force with bases all over the 
country. Furthermore, the opposition in Syria was extremely diverse, disunited and 
fractious. Finally, the possibly most important reason was that Syria had solid 
international backing not only from Russia and China but also from Iran. From the 
comparison between Libya and Syria it can be concluded that there are few clear 
prescriptions as to when in military intervention is and is not appropriate or justified. 
Furthermore, Jennifer Welsh argued that 
… RtoP was born in an era when assertive liberalism was at its height 
and sovereign equality looked and smelled reactionary. But as the 
liberal moment recedes, and the distribution of power shifts globally, 
the principle of sovereign equality may enjoy a comeback. (Welsh, 
2010: 428) 
Thus a shift on global power may be as significant for normative structures as well as 
for material changes (Morris, 2013: 1279). The boldness of Russia’s and Chinas 
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rejection of the RtoP in general but specifically in the Syrian crisis might ultimately 
influence the development of the RtoP, as well as the dynamics of the global power 
distribution. If power continues to shift from its traditional Western grounds towards 
Russia, China and the other BRICS (Brazil, India and South Africa), who are sharing 
a “long-held mistrust of western-led military action” (Wagner and Jackman, 2013: 
57), opposition to the RtoP may become more mainstream. In this context, Brazil’s 
initiative on a ‘Responsibility while Protecting’, concerning the authorisation, 
implementation and review of uses of force for humanitarian purposes offers an 
interesting insight into how such shifts may manifest themselves and impact on the 
development of the RtoP. 
How this exactly impacts on the RtoP in the future depends on how the emerging 
norm is conceived in the first place. According to Alex Bellamy (2011: 166) the 
question is whether the RtoP is primarily “a policy agenda in need of 
implementation” [or a] ‘red flag’ to galvanize the world into action”. For Bellamy 
the answer is the former, with the RtoP “best employed as a diplomatic tool, or 
prism, to guide efforts to stem the tide of mass atrocities” but with “… little utility in 
terms of generating additional international political will in response to such 
episodes” (idem). On the other hand, Thomas Weiss has argued that it is “hard to 
fathom” why RtoP should be diverted from the key role it has to play as a potential 
antidote to international politics which “over the last decade” have resulted in the use 
of “not too much but rather too little armed force to protect human lives” (Weiss, 
2011: 288-9). However, only time will tell how the recent developments will play out 
and what their implications for the RtoP will be. The constant danger of reading too 
much into current events and the temptation to exaggerate the inductive potential of 
individual (and potentially infrequent) cases must be guarded against.  
In conclusion, the RtoP arguably influenced the European crisis responses in both 
cases – the Libyan and the Syrian crisis. At the same time the case study analysis has 
shown that interpretations of the RtoP vary from case to case. While the criteria of a 
flexible interpretation of the RtoP forms a part of the RtoP norm, as accepted in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, different interpretations of the norm do not 
per se undermine the further institutionalization of the international norm. More 
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specifically if the focus and the aim of any application of the RtoP was consistently 
the protection of civilians from mass atrocities but merely the instruments to 
implement this aim changed, we would be likely to be able to speak about a 
consistent state practice of the RtoP. However, the analysis of the Libyan and the 
Syrian crisis has shown points in the opposite direction. The instrument of a military 
intervention in the form of a no-fly zone and its implementation has not changed 
from Kosovo to Syria despite technological innovations such as drones for example. 
Moreover, the crisis response has not exclusively aimed at the protection of civilians 
but also at regime change and at sanctioning an incumbent regime.  
The increasing link of the RtoP to the use of military force against the will of a de 
facto government, envisaging different political aims than protection, prevents the 
emerging norm from further institutionalisation. It also implies that since its 
development in 2001, in response to the lessons learned from the Kosovo crisis, 
nothing much has changed than the discourse. While European actors make use of 
the RtoP language and speak of a responsibility to protect populations from mass 
atrocities, the actual policy response in form of (a proposed or actual) military 
intervention remains the same as in 1999. The concrete policy impact of the RtoP 
remains therefore limited.  
Finally, Europe’s – particularly France and the UK – association of the RtoP with the 
use of force turns the emerging norm against its founding principle human security. 
While the centre of attention remains with those considering the crisis response or 
more specifically the intervention, the change of perspective towards a people-
centred conception of security remains unimplemented. For the link between the 
RtoP and human security this means that the RtoP did not only fail to implement its 
human security basis in Libya and Syria, but that its recent applications have actually 
started to contradict the very core of the concept of human security. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This study has focused on the influence of the RtoP as an emerging international 
norm on European responses to mass atrocities in its neighbourhood. It has shown 
that the RtoP serves as legitimisation for the use of force in the crisis response. But it 
has also argued that it provides for little change when it comes to the actual 
implementation of proposed policies. The underlying research puzzle that sparked 
interest in conducting this study was to assess the impact of the concept of human 
security in post-Cold War Europe. Since its inception in the 1994 Human 
Development Report, the problem of operationalising the concept and thus turning it 
into a theoretically coherent and applicable concept, has not been solved. In order to 
circumvent the difficulty of operationalising the concept of human security and 
according to Keith Krause’s (2007), it has therefore been argued that human security 
can only be applied to practice when it is defined narrowly and it is linked to a 
specific policy initiative. Accordingly, in light of the narrowly-defined freedom of 
fear component of human security, it seemed sensible to choose the RtoP as an area 
of practical application of the human security concept.  
In light of the failures of the international community to prevent mass atrocities in 
Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995) and the lessons learned of the Kosovo 
intervention in 1999, the development of the RtoP was explicitly based on a people-
centred conception of security. To recall Ramesh Thakur’s (2006: 28) argument, the 
RtoP derived from the human security concept in the sense that it aimed at “an 
evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those seeking or needing support, 
rather than those considering the intervention.” By contrast, humanitarian 
intervention, particularly the British interpretation, was contingent upon national 
interests and therefore linked to the notion of sovereign states having a ‘right’ to 
intervene. As an emerging international norm the RtoP was based on the concept of 
human security. Building on the redefinition of sovereignty as responsibility and 
shifting the centre of attention from the state to the people, it diverges from the ‘old’ 
norm of humanitarian intervention. 
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In this context, the underlying aim of this thesis was to assess the policy impact of 
human security in the form of the newly emerging international norm of the RtoP. It 
was stipulated that if the RtoP had an impact on actual policy, as opposed to mere 
rhetoric, a change in the design and the direction of policies taking into account the 
human security concept would be visible. If, however, the RtoP and the people-
centred focus were merely reflected in the discourse, the actual policy impact of 
human security and the RtoP would remain limited.  
Having applied a social constructivist theoretical and analytical framework to the 
empirical analysis of two case studies – the Libyan and the Syrian crisis in the period 
from 2011 – 2013, it has been shown that the influence of the RtoP on European 
responses to these crises is mostly superficial. While the RtoP is present in the 
official discourses on the crises, the design and direction of the proposed policies 
seem to divert from the people-centred perspective and the aim of protection. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the RtoP makes little difference in practice.  
Before we deny any potential policy impact of the human security concept, the 
presumed connection between the RtoP and human security has to be further 
qualified. The RtoP toolkit includes a range of measures, such as political pressure 
and economic sanctions that should be exhausted before the option of a military 
intervention is even considered. Yet, the RtoP has been used predominantly in 
connection with proposals to make use of military force in a crisis response, as this 
study has revealed. While a military intervention is not per se anti-human security, it 
is the implementation of such a policy in the form of a military no-fly zone, as in the 
case of Libya, that does not differ from the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and is not 
designed effectively to protect civilians on the ground. Furthermore, the stated aim of 
protection was only superficially reflected in the implementation and conduction of 
the military operation on the ground in Libya. It became further blurred by the 
demands for regime change. The same is true for the case of Syria where the 
application of the RtoP was invoked with the aim to sanction the Assad regime rather 
than to protect the Syrian civilian population.  
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In practice, the RtoP seems thus to disregard its human security basis and the aim of 
protection, which could potentially make a real difference in response to cases of 
mass atrocities. Significantly, the applications of the RtoP in the case of Libya and 
Syria openly contradict the core principle of the human security concept – the 
people-centred perspective. The focus of intervention seems to remain with those 
conducting the intervention and not those in need of protection. In chapter 2 of this 
thesis, it had been assumed that there would be a shift after the Kosovo intervention 
in 1999 in the focus of interventions from national interests to human security, as 
well as from military action to the prevention of mass atrocities. For the two case 
studies analysed in this study, this shift can only be recognized on the rhetorical level 
but not in practice. 
In the conclusion of chapter 2, it was argued that the normative development of the 
RtoP should not be seen as a precursor to its implementation but that it continues 
throughout the process of its application in practice. From the revision of the four 
RtoP cases prior to the outbreak of the Libyan and the Syrian crisis in 2011, four 
conclusions on the normative status of the RtoP were drawn. First, the RtoP is used 
by proponents and opponents of the norm. This assumption also applies to European 
responses to the Syrian crises, where in the French and British debate on a possible 
military intervention, the RtoP has been used as the basis for arguing in favour as 
well as against.  
Second, it was concluded that the scope of the RtoP is limited to the four crimes as 
stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. In both the Libyan and the 
Syrian crises, the commitment of crimes against humanity and war crimes was 
constituted. Yet, this conclusion can only partly be confirmed for the two analysed 
case studies. While claims for (military) action were linked to the calls for regime 
change (in Libya) and to demands for punishment (in Syria), it seems as if the scope 
of the RtoP was significantly broadened in both cases. The third conclusion was that 
the toolbox of the RtoP remains unclear. Although the RtoP was not designed to be 
tantamount to military intervention, practice in the cases of Libya and Syria has 
shown that the recent normative development of the RtoP seems to be going in that 
direction.  
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Finally, the analysis in chapter 3 suggested that the implementation of the RtoP (and 
the CSDP) is challenged by the lack of political will from powerful states. This final 
conclusion can somewhat be rejected in the case of Libya and Syria (eventually), as 
at least France and the UK were willing also to react with military means. However, 
in the case of Libya EU member states were unwilling to apply the RtoP under the 
EU framework. Moreover, member states seemed deeply divided on the use of force 
in response to the Libyan crisis. With regard to Syria, on the international level 
powerful states such as Russia and China have long rejected any kind of coercive 
response to the Syrian crisis. The US, the UK and France were willing to consider a 
military intervention only after the chemical weapons attack by the Syrian 
government in Summer 2013. The application of the RtoP (and the CSDP) therefore 
remains dependent on the political will of the actors involved. 
As for the link between the RtoP and military intervention, Alex Bellamy has argued 
that the RtoP has the potential of making three important contributions to questions 
of military intervention (see chapter 3):  
1. The RtoP can replace the older norm of humanitarian intervention with a 
broad range of measures directed mostly at preventing mass atrocities.  
2. The RtoP thus advocates for a comprehensive crisis response. 
3. The RtoP can provide a new framework for the implementation of policies by 
focusing on the protection of civilians.  
From the analysis of the Libyan and the Syrian crisis, the RtoP seems, however, not 
to make a difference in the (proposed) military intervention but resembles the old 
norm of humanitarian intervention instead of replacing it. In its practical application, 
the RtoP seems to have turned against its human security foundation and therefore 
offers little added value to the actual protection of civilians. 
It has further been contended that the RtoP had, amongst other drivers, an important 
impact on the EU’s understanding of its responsibility and the development of the 
CSDP. The EU’s foreign policy has been criticised for falling into the capability-
expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993) since the CSDP’s creation during the St Malo summit 
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in 1998 when some member states called for a greater role of the EU in the area of 
defence. Moreover, the US has, in the case of the Kosovo crisis as well as in the case 
of Libya, claimed that it is time for Europe to provide for its own security (see 
chapter 5, Obama quoted in Brown, 2011; Biscop, 2011b).  
However, the EU fell short in developing sufficient military capabilities and the 
member states remain reluctant to act militarily under the EU umbrella. The famous 
‘capability-expectations gap’ continues to characterize EU foreign policy. It will not 
cease to exist until an exclusively civilian role of the EU in the area of crisis 
management is accepted by its member states and transatlantic partners or member 
states enable the EU as a fully-fledged military actor to provide the respective 
defence capabilities and the political will to use them under the EU framework. 
The EU’s understanding of its responsibility as well as the perception of the ‘Big 3’ 
on its role in case of Libyan crisis and, to a limited extent, in the Syrian crisis seems 
to match its available capabilities much better. The EU’s interpretation of the RtoP 
was from the beginning focused more on the prevention of mass atrocities with non-
coercive means. During the Libyan and the Syrian crisis, the ‘Big 3’ and the EU 
itself promoted the image of a normative and civilian crisis manager and not of a 
hard security actor responding with military force. While the EU’s sense of 
responsibility matches its crisis management capabilities, this also implies that, in 
comparison to the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the CSDP makes as much of a difference as 
the RtoP – only a rhetorical one. And although France claimed that Europe was able 
to respond decisively to the Libyan crisis, the military intervention took place outside 
the EU framework and would not have been possible without US support. While 
both the Kosovo crisis and the Libyan crisis have been designated as ‘wake-up calls’ 
for the CSDP (see Shepherd, 2009 on Kosovo and Koenig, 2012 on Libya), the 
results from this study suggest that the EU recognises the ‘capability-expectations 
gap’ in its discourse but fails to make the according changes to close it in practice. 
The theoretical and analytical framework of the thesis was built on the argument that, 
due to the RtoP’s indeterminacy, it is likely to be interpreted differently by diverse 
European actors. Although the analysis revealed different interpretations of what the 
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RtoP means, entails and when it applies, there still seems to be an agreement among 
France, Germany, the UK and the EU institutions that the RtoP is strongly linked to 
the use of force and the question of military intervention. Amongst the ‘Big 3’, 
France, which was willing in both cases to participate in a military operation, seemed 
the strongest supporter of the emerging RtoP norm. The UK also supported the RtoP 
in both cases but appeared still to be leaning more openly towards the norm of 
humanitarian intervention, as any deployment of the British military has to be based 
on national (security) interests. In consequence of its history, Germany remained 
averse to the use of force and therefore presumably also abstained from supporting 
the RtoP in either of the crises analysed.  
While European understandings of what the RtoP means and entails seem fairly 
convergent, the interpretation of when it applies and whose responsibility it is, are 
much more divergent. For France, the RtoP seems to apply in any crises involving 
the commitment of mass atrocities. It also understands it as its responsibility as part 
of the international community to act. The UK supports the application of the RtoP in 
crises where its national interests are at stake and emphasises the importance of 
assuming the responsibility collectively within the UN framework. Germany instead 
has increasingly underlined the responsibility of regional actors as well as of the 
state, in which the crisis is taking place itself. As we have seen, Germany does not 
subscribe to an RtoP that entails the use of military force. 
RtoP as emerging norm: a (new) research agenda 
Given the empirical analysis conducted in this thesis, further studies on the influence 
of the RtoP should take into account three arguments. The arguments presented 
below depart from the assessment of the four presumptions in chapter 7. By taking 
into account the empirical findings of this study, the presumptions tested in this 
analysis can be developed further in order to provide incentives for future research 
on the influence of the RtoP. 
Building on the findings of chapter 2 and 3, it was stipulated that norm entrepreneurs 
can increase the collective understanding of the RtoP in a specific case, but not in 
general (presumption I). While this presumption has not been rejected after the 
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analysis of the Libyan and the Syrian crisis, it should be revisited. The analysis has 
shown that the influence of norm entrepreneurs remains generally limited. The case 
of the Libyan crisis, however, is very likely to influence future applications of the 
RtoP. The focus should shift from the role of norm entrepreneurs to the effects that a 
collective understanding of the RtoP in one case, can have impact on its application 
in another. Against this background, the first argument future research should 
consider is:  
1. The Libyan intervention will serve as a point of reference for future RtoP 
applications, most likely in a negative way. 
Second, since the EU did not act as a norm entrepreneur for the RtoP in either of the 
two analysed case studies, the relation between the EU’s role as a norm entrepreneur 
and as a security actor remains hypothetical (presumption II). The analysis has 
highlighted the importance of how member states, themselves, perceive the role of 
the EU in the area of security and defence. On this note, a question worth exploring 
further would be why member states remain unwilling to make use of military means 
for crisis management within the EU framework. This question could lead to an 
analysis of the conditions under which European states decide on the use of force in- 
or outside the EU framework. In this context, it would be equally interesting to 
explore further the conditions under which the application of the RtoP is considered. 
On this note, a second argument that could inspire future research is: 
2. The conditions under which the application of the RtoP and the use of force in- 
and outside the EU framework are considered matter. 
Finally, presumption III argued that there is no direct link between the perception of 
a crisis in RtoP terms (referring to one or four of the RtoP crimes in the discourse) 
and its according implementation. While the presumption has proven to be partly 
correct, the analysis has shown that the RtoP has become increasingly linked to the 
issue of military intervention. Therefore, future analyses should focus on whether the 
issue of military intervention serves as the main trigger for applying the RtoP rather 
than the crimes committed throughout the crisis in question. If this is the case, the 
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actual implementation of the RtoP in terms of its people-centred approach appears 
even less likely. A third argument, from which future research could depart, is: 
3. RtoP is likely going to be applied if a military intervention is considered no 
matter how severe the (humanitarian) crisis. 
This thesis has focused on the influence of the RtoP as an emerging international 
norm on European responses to mass atrocities in its neighbourhood. As stated 
above, the focus has been on the impact of the RtoP as a norm and the question of to 
what extent it is used to legitimize a certain crisis response. Therefore this study did 
not aim to answer the question of why European actors responded to the crises 
analysed above in a specific way. This thesis can thus not draw any conclusions on 
the causes for European crisis responses or more specifically for military 
interventions and the use of force (see also chapter 1). Rather it intended to analyse 
how European responses to crisis in its neighbourhood involving mass atrocities are 
constructed and whether the RtoP and the CSDP make a difference therein. 
In addition, this thesis has focused on the analysis of the official discourses of the 
‘Big 3’, the EU and the UN. Therefore no interviews were conducted to investigate 
the motivations of member states’ reactions ‘behind the scenes’. The focus on the 
official discourse was in line with the chosen research question, which concentrated 
on the influence of the RtoP as legitimizing factor for action. Legitimacy, as assumed 
in this thesis, was mainly defined in the sense of justifying actions in front of broader 
domestic but also European and international audiences. The chosen research design 
and the selected methodology were able to provide an answer to the main research 
question of this study. 
The results of the empirical analysis conducted in this study confirm the chosen 
constructivist agenda. The analysis has thus affirmed, firstly, that foreign policy 
actors do not see their interests through a narrow perspective of material gain but a 
broader one, allowing them to act on the basis of moral considerations. Secondly, the 
study has shown that these interests are socially constructed by the environment in 
which the actors involved find themselves. However, such findings have to be 
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qualified by an important thread of realism, which has been detected at the beginning 
of this study, suggesting that altruism and compromise only go so far. National 
interest never disappears completely, though it may be reconceptualised, and because 
of this, turning rhetorical commitment into action on the ground will continue to be 
challenging for the foreseeable future. 
Taking a slightly different angle and involving more time and resources, the analysis 
of the main research question of this study could focus more intensely on the internal 
foreign policy decision-making processes in Brussels, Paris, Berlin, London and even 
New York. Therefore, a large number of semi-structured interviews could be 
conducted with officials in the national capitals as well as in Brussels in order to 
scrutinise the impact of human security and the RtoP on the formation of the actual 
crisis response behind the scenes. A round of semi-structured interviews could be 
complemented further by a survey inquiring as to the reasons behind the choice for a 
specific crisis response in more than the three selected member states, which would 
provide the possibility to compare European crisis responses on a larger scale. 
Furthermore, attending a session of the General Assembly on the RtoP and 
conducting interviews at the UN headquarters in New York could provide important 
new insights on the further development of the RtoP as an emerging norm as well as 
on its role in the decision-making process on the international level.  
Analysing the influence of the RtoP with a focus on the internal dimension, the 
theoretical framework of the study would have to be amended accordingly. While it 
would still be argued that a social constructivist approach is the most appropriate to 
analyse the impact of (emerging) international norms on European foreign policy, the 
focus on the internal political decision-making process would require the inclusion of 
a foreign policy analysis approach. Furthermore the interactions between the 
different analysed levels – nation states, the EU and the UN – could be 
conceptualised in terms of a three-level game (see for example Bouchard, 2008).  
The focus on the ‘Big 3’ in this thesis has been chosen on the basis of three reasons. 
First, due to their political impact within the EU and as a consequence, based on their 
potential as norm entrepreneurs. France, Germany and the UK are among the 
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
Conclusion        217 
founding EU member states. They are also the biggest member states in terms of the 
size of their populations and their economies. Furthermore the three, France and the 
UK in particular, have supported and promoted the creation of a common European 
security and defence policy since the St. Malo summit in 1998. Against this 
background, the focus of the analysis has been put on those member states that are 
powerful enough to decide on whether to invoke or contest the RtoP as an emerging 
international norm. For France, Germany and the UK this assumption has proven 
right. While France and the UK actively supported the RtoP in both crisis responses, 
Germany voted against the Franco-British approach in case of the Libyan crisis as 
mandated in Resolution 1973. Furthermore, it was concluded that the absence of the 
RtoP in the German official discourse, particularly in the Syrian case, could be seen 
as a form of silent contestation of the RtoP. Again, whether Germany contested the 
RtoP in the case of the Libyan and the Syrian crisis, or whether its choice of crisis 
response was motivated by other factors (such as state or federal elections), would 
have to be investigated in interviews. 
Apart from the relevance of the core member states for the assessment of the RtoP’s 
impact, doing this study differently, the analysis of the position of smaller member 
states on the influence of the RtoP and on the question of military intervention would 
also be valuable. In the case of Libya, the analysis of Italy’s position, which was also 
in favour of a military intervention from the beginning and actively participated in 
Operation Unified Protector, would be particularly relevant. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the position of Poland could be considered. Significantly, Poland 
abstained in the voting on Resolution 1973 alongside Germany, Russia, China and 
Brazil.  
In this context, and moving towards a more international perspective on the influence 
of the RtoP, a closer analysis of the Russian abstention on Resolution 1973 and its 
vetoes on several draft resolution on Syria in the UN Security Council could provide 
a further angle for the analysis that would well be worth investigating. It has been 
argued that Russia’s blocking of any UNSC action on Syria has been motivated by 
the fact that Russia felt ‘outplayed’ or even cheated after the implementation of 
Resolution 1973 (von Eggert, 2012). Redoing the study could thus focus on the 
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impact of the RtoP caught in the tensions between Russian Realpolitik and a 
European value-based foreign policy.  
The point of view of other emerging powers as included in the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) and particularly Brazil’s position would be 
another approach to address the topic of this thesis. Significantly, in response to the 
application of the RtoP in the Libyan crisis, Brazil launched the initiative of a 
‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RWP) in 2012. The RWP emphasises that the use 
of force should be seen as a last resort and recommends the establishment of a 
mechanism that enhances the procedures inside the UN Security Council to monitor 
and access the implementation of resolutions mandating the use of force. In this 
context, Brazil might serve as important norm entrepreneur contributing to the 
further normative development of the RtoP.  
Finally, for Europe the support of the US in terms of military capabilities and 
structures has proven to be crucial for the implementation of an intervention as in the 
case of Libya for example. Without the strikes conducted by the US military during 
the first days of the intervention in Libya, the operation would not have ‘succeeded’ 
the way it did. What changed in comparison to the Kosovo intervention in 1999, in 
which the US took the lead much more explicitly than in Libya, is the discourse and 
Obama’s changing foreign policy doctrine towards the approach of ‘leading from 
behind’. While this term is somehow misleading, as the US contribution in terms of 
military equipment and personnel was still significant, the Libyan crisis might 
nevertheless account for a change in transatlantic relations in the area of security and 
defence. Significantly, in the case of Syria, President Obama was the one seeking 
support for a military intervention from Europe, arguably less because of European 
defence capabilities than because of the need for partners to legitimise such an action 
internationally.  
However, for the further development of the RtoP and the question of military 
intervention, the US position will be crucial. The US justified the Libyan 
intervention on the basis of national security interests, and proposed military action 
in Syria as punishment of the Assad government. It did not apply the RtoP. 
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There arise, inevitably, various ideas on how to re-do this study from different 
perspectives. In this context, there might also develop new research projects on the 
EU’s CSDP, the RtoP and human security more broadly. Before, however, indulging 
in furthering this thesis’s research agenda in alternative ways, the relevance of the 
topics analysed throughout this thesis should be reconsidered against the ever-
changing research agendas in EU Studies and International Relations. 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and its institutional 
innovations, such as the newly designed post of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as the establishment of the 
European External Action Service, EU External Action seemed an increasingly 
significant area of study. Furthermore, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 
December 2010 until present, the different policy areas included in EU External 
Action and particularly the EU’s CFSP and CSDP would seem to have become more 
relevant in practice. At the same time, the Euro crisis that has been affecting 
European countries since 2009 has diverted political attention from foreign affairs 
towards internal EU policies specifically related to the Eurozone. While EU External 
Action in general will, due to the EU’s economic weight, never be irrelevant, the EU 
is still far from representing a fully-fledged and capable security actor, as this study 
has shown. Therefore it is assumed that the centre of attention in EU studies will 
continue to focus on economic and financial policies. More specifically, research is 
likely to look at the power of single member states such as Germany in these policies 
areas, the question of further political integration, but also on migration and asylum 
issues as one consequence of the increased number of refugees arriving at Europe’s 
borders and less on European defence and external security issues. 
However, in light of the worsening of the situation in the Central African Republic 
(CAR) in January 2014, the EU provisionally agreed to send a military CSDP 
mission to secure the main roads leading to the CAR (EU Observer, 2014). 
Furthermore, the first European defence summit 2013 since the Euro crisis was 
convened in December 2013. Therefore, the EU’s CFSP and CSDP should not be 
disregarded in future research. Whether the RtoP will play a role in future EU 
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interventions or whether it may ‘rest in peace’ after the Libyan and the Syrian crisis, 
remains to be seen. 
Against this background, studies in the area of the CSDP, human security and the 
RtoP have great potential to make further valuable contributions to knowledge and to 
practice. Since the focus so far has been on the European side, it would be 
worthwhile to aim in future studies at assessing the actual impact of the European 
security and defence policies on the ground. The investigation of CSDP missions in 
terms of their implementation of the human security concept would provide a further 
opportunity to assess the impact of the concept, since the presumed link between the 
RtoP and human security has proven to be spurious. In this context, research methods 
such as observing one or several CSDP missions on the ground or even actively 
participating as a member of the civilian staff could lead to highly relevant insights 
on the effects of the RtoP and CSDP on the ground.  
Conducting fieldwork in Libya, for example, could provide for a further 
understanding of the effects of a military intervention, including technological 
innovations such as drones on the ground and in terms of its impact on the human 
security of the civilian population. While potentially producing interesting research 
results, fieldwork in Libya could only be conducted if the security situation is stable 
enough and with the support of an interpreter. Such a study would be practically 
informed rather than theory based and could help European governments in gaining a 
better understanding of how best to respond to crises involving mass atrocities. The 
assessment of situations post-intervention on the ground could also contribute to the 
further development of ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ initiated by the Brazilian 
government in 2012.  
On the theoretical level, another study could focus on elaborating on the social 
constructivist framework to analyse the influence of (emerging) international norms. 
In chapter 4 it has been argued that the norm-life cycle (emergence, evolution and 
internationalisation) developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) 
should not be regarded as a one-directional but rather as a two-directional process. 
This study has shown that, independent of its normative status, a norm can influence 
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behaviour in the sense that it is used as legitimate basis for action. From the analysis 
of a norm’s influence, however, conclusions can be drawn on the development of the 
norm. The three stages of norm development therefore influence each other rather 
than follow one after the other.  
Amending the norm-life cycle, the newly developed framework should also contain a 
component conceptualising the superficial or hypocritical use of international norms. 
The constructivist perspective could thus be paired with a more rationalist 
perspective. As outlined previously, combining the social constructivist theoretical 
framework with a foreign policy analysis approach could account for the 
investigation of the influence of international norms on actors’ internal foreign policy 
decision-making processes. 
The EU, RtoP and the ‘real world’ 
Before chancing a last look at the situations in Libya post-intervention and in Syria 
after the agreement on the dismissal of Syria’s chemical weapons, some final 
conclusions on the role of the EU as a security actor in its neighbourhood should be 
drawn. In the two cases analysed in this thesis the EU has acted neither as a 
significant security actor nor as norm entrepreneur for the RtoP. The EU’s low 
profile as security actor was explained by the lack of political will and capabilities in 
the case of Libya and by the EU simply getting in line with the rest of world’s 
paralysis on how to respond to Syria. The EU has however claimed in both cases that 
its main responsibility is to help and to assist, particularly with reconstruction once 
the violent conflicts have been put to an end. Therefore it might be worthwhile 
having a brief look at the EU’s engagement in post-intervention Libya. Notably, in 
the case of Syria, where the civil war continues at the time of writing, the focus of 
the crisis response is still on finding a political solution and on providing 
humanitarian relief. 
In its conclusions from 1 December 2011, the Foreign Affairs Council affirmed its 
“readiness to provide further assistance to Libya across a range of possible sectors, 
including inter alia security sector reform and border management.” Following the 
end of the fighting in Libya the EU shifted its humanitarian support to issues related 
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to the field of development cooperation. The EU has provided two packages of short-
term and medium-term support. Within the first package, ten million (Euros) have 
been allocated to support the Libyan government to build general public 
administrative capacities and to provide technical assistance. More specifically, the 
EU has funded civil society in Libya and a programme supporting the establishment 
of basic education for all children, but also including training of teachers and 
assisting the Ministry of Education in the formulation of an effective education 
policy.  
Regarding the medium-term support, 50 million (Euros) had been made available for 
the cooperation with Libya for the period of 2012 until 2013. These funds were 
allocated according to the needs of the Libyan authorities, following the results of a 
coordinated needs assessment by the international community at the Paris 
Conference in September 2011143. In early March 2012, the EU sent an expert 
mission to Libya that aimed at assisting the Libyan authorities to assess their specific 
needs on border management. Consisting of ten experts, the mission is deployed for a 
period of three months in order to make recommendations to the EU for concrete 
action and support to an efficient border management regarding Libyan land, sea and 
air borders.  
In comparison to previous cases, the EU’s engagement in reconstructing Libya 
emphasised at all stages that the process was based on the process of local 
ownership. Accordingly, the EU would only support and assist in areas and with 
means that are required by local actors and based on their needs. In this context, the 
EU seems to keep its promises by playing a greater role in the post-conflict 
reconstruction process in Libya while also emphasizing the people-centred approach 
of its response. With a worsening security situation and the resurgence of the fighting 
                                                
143 The Paris Conference on Libya brought together EU member states, the UN, the World Bank and 
the IMF as well as the Libyan authorities. The participants agreed to divide their assessments across 
12 different sectors. The EU has initially been assigned the assessment in the areas of border 
management, civil society and media.	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in 2013 it seems, however, as if the EU’s efforts in reconstructing Libya and guiding 
a process of political transition have come too early.  
In the aftermath of Muammar Gaddafi’s fall in August 2011, Stewart Patrick, former 
US State Department Official, concluded in Foreign Affairs that the Libyan 
intervention was “the first unambiguous military enforcement of the Responsibility 
to Protect norm, Gaddafi’s utter defeat seemingly putting new wind in the sails of 
humanitarian intervention” (Patrick, 2011). However, a year after the intervention the 
state of Libyan affairs appears rather bleak, making the initial success of the RtoP 
looks less compelling. Reports by human rights organisations and journalists have 
revealed that the country’s transition has stopped due to rival groups and competing 
militias. Human rights abuses and corruption are widespread and, instead of 
developing stable institutions, Libya is becoming more and more fractured 
(Beaumont, 2012) 
Ian Martin, the UN’s envoy to Libya, explained at the beginning of January 2012:  
“The former regime may have been toppled, but the harsh reality is that 
the Libyan people continue to have to live with its deep-rooted legacy; 
weak, at times absent, state institutions, coupled with the long absence 
of political parties and civil society organisations, which render the 
country’s transition more difficult.” (UN News, 2012) 
The post-intervention assessment of the situation in Libya confirms the view that the 
intervention was not directed at the protection of civilians, but aimed and achieved 
the removal of the Gaddafi regime. As it was, to a certain extent, the case in Kosovo 
too, Libya is turning after the intervention into a fragile and corrupt state, in which 
the violence has by no means come to an end and the way to democracy is still long. 
By contrast, some have argued further that the NATO intervention in Libya has 
prolonged the conflict in Libya, spiking its death toll alongside increasing human 
rights abuses and weapons proliferation in the country (Kuperman, 2013). 
Significantly, The Independent title in September 2013 was “We all thought Libya 
had moved on – it has, but into lawlessness and ruin” (Cockburn, 2013). While 
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international attention focused on the chemical attacks in Syria in Summer 2013, the 
fact that Libya slipped into a severe economic crisis remained almost unnoticed. 
Although the military intervention was justified on the grounds of the RtoP, the 
international community seemed to have ignored the continuously escalating 
violence since October 2011.  
The destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal began after the agreement 
reached between the US, the Russian and the Syrian government in September 2013. 
A political solution to the ongoing conflict in the country has, however, not been 
found by the time of writing and the violence continues to spread. David Cameron 
reminded in October 2013 that the chemical weapons agreement should not allow the 
international community to assume the Syrian crisis is over (The Independent, 2013). 
According to media reports, the UN has stopped updating the Syria death toll, as it 
could no longer verify the source of information, on which the last count of 100.000 
deaths caused by civil war had been established in July 2013 (The Washington Post, 
2014). The Irish Times (2013) reported in December that, according to the Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights, the number of victims has risen to 130.000 assuming 
that the actual figures are much higher. The Washington Post further quoted an 
eyewitness in Syria doubting the effect of destroying the chemical weapons for the 
Syrian population. 
 “We have been killed for the last three years with all different kinds of 
weapons — tanks, mortar shells, snipers. Destroy the chemical 
weapons, or don’t. That won’t matter, because with chemical weapons 
or without them, the killing continues, the rivers of blood continue.” 
(Aya Mahaini, Syrian activist, quoted in Morris and Birnbaum, 2013) 
Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, about 2 million people have 
fled the country while around 4.5 million people have been displaced internally 
(UNHCR, 2014). Refugees from the Syrian civil war have mostly fled to 
neighbouring countries Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. Europe has been 
criticised for taking in only a small percentage of the 2 million Syrian refugees 
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(Amnesty International, 2013). In January 2014, the UN called on the EU to open its 
doors: 
Syria has become an unflinching contest for regional supremacy, 
anchored largely by the ancient regional power struggle between 
Tehran and Riyadh, but fuelled by more contemporary grievances. The 
volatile sectarian power tussle leaves little concern for the health and 
safety of millions of refugees, the majority of whom are women and 
children. (Chulov and Grant, 2014) 
Consideration of the situations in Libya and Syria in late 2013 reveals that although 
European responses to both crises were at least partly influenced by the RtoP, a 
military intervention or the destruction of weapons of mass destruction should only 
be the beginning of the international community’s responsibility. At the time of 
writing neither of these conflicts had been resolved. The worsening security 
situations in both countries called for a greater European engagement, which went 
beyond the aim of regime change and the sanctioning of war crimes. Therefore, in 
Libya and Syria the only chance for the RtoP really to make a difference rested with 
the implementation of the responsibility to prevent and to rebuild.  
When looking at the enduring crisis in Eastern Ukraine and the rise of violence 
linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria throughout 2014, the questions for 
Europe and the RtoP seem to be the same as back in 1999: Where do we see 
Europe’s responsibility and why does the RtoP seem to apply in some cases of mass 
atrocities and not in others? Although left with the difficulty of making 
generalizations and predictions, the RtoP will certainly have future influence on both 
political behaviour and scholarly debate in Europe. Assessing its significance 
empirically therefore remains imperative.    
 
  
Europe’s Responsibility to Protect 
        226 
Annex I: Research notes 
Part I of this thesis used mainly secondary sources on the development of the RtoP 
and the CSDP as well as on the four cases of RtoP implementation. A number of 
publicly available documents have crucially shaped the RtoP debate, beginning with 
the ICISS report, The Responsibility to Protect, through the report of the High Level 
Panel, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Secretary-General Annan’s 
report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For 
All, culminating with the World Summit Outcome Document and ending with the 
most recent report of Secretary-General Ban, Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect. These documents show the development from embryonic ideas to fleshed-
out policy proposals and reveal differences from one stage to the next and what they 
mean for the roles and burdens of the actors involved.  
The analysis of the European discourse on the four reviewed RtoP cases in chapter 3 
built on official documents by the UN, EU as well as France, Germany and the UK 
where available. Furthermore, the analysis relied on existing scholarly publications 
and on newspaper articles quoting the French, German and British official positions 
on the four cases. The newspapers accessed for the national discourses analysed in 
chapters 2 and 3 were: Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and The 
Guardian.  
The second part of this thesis built first of all on the analysis of official documents of 
the UN, the EU and France, Germany and the UK. In addition to that, scholarly 
articles and think tank analysis on the background of the Libyan and the Syrian crisis 
have been included to back up the empirical analysis. The time frame for the case 
study on the Syrian crisis has been extended until September 2013, throughout the 
process of data collection (see chapter 5). Due to the recency of the Syrian crisis, the 
number of available secondary sources and scholarly analyses on the case remained 
limited at the time of writing. There is thus a slight imbalance in the availability of 
data in comparison to the case study on the Libyan crisis. Furthermore, the categories 
chosen for the discourse analysis (see chapter 5) were not equally represented in both 
case studies. Data on the national perceptions of the role of the EU in particular was 
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much harder to find in the case of the Syrian crisis than in the case of the Libyan 
crisis. 
At the time of writing the conclusion, the Libyan crisis – although ongoing – had 
disappeared vastly from the mainstream media. Yet, it was considered important to 
include a final section on the impact of the RtoP on the ‘real’ world. For the short 
press review conducted in the final section of the conclusion, a random selection of 
newspaper articles reporting on the most recent developments (at the time of writing) 
in the Libyan and the Syrian crises has been consulted. 
The author herself translated all quotes from official French and German documents 
and speeches referred to in this thesis. The original quotations have been provided in 
footnotes. In order to facilitate the tracing of the data, the primary sources have been 
listed according to the chapters they have been used in (see references). 
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